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ABSTRACT

INHERITING NIETZSCHE: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND FOUCAULT ON
THE FOUNDATION OF CRITIQUE

By
George William Shea, IV
May 2015

Dissertation supervised by James Swindal
My dissertation examines the theoretical ramifications that rejecting a metaphysical
foundation has for providing critical and normative resources. While commentators often dismiss
post-metaphysical philosophies as contradictory variants of anti-metaphysics, I demonstrate
using the work of Nietzsche that they proceed instead from a deliberate “methodological
decision” to suspend the use of metaphysical principles. For this reason, while the
methodological commitments of post-metaphysical critical social theories establish a theoretical
orientation for their inquiries, they must forego analyses that attribute domination to the
distorting effects of illusion, error, or illegitimacy, and would thus cast liberation from
domination as a return to a metaphysical foundation. In this light, Horkheimer’s critique of
instrumental reason ultimately fails insofar as it invokes a rational, human essence in need of
liberation from the distorting effects of Western reason. Alternatively, Foucault’s conception of
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critique, “the art of voluntary insubordination,” succeeds as a viable post-metaphysical practice
since it uniquely advances a form of social and political resistance that refrains from appealing to
any such essences. In the end, my dissertation establishes the coherence of post-metaphysical
methodologies in general as well as the import of the Frankfurt School and Foucault’s normative
resources specifically, both of which continue to be a source of debate in critical social theory.
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DEDICATION

To the lean and hungry spirits that go forth to fatten themselves…
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

1

At first glance, the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Horkheimer, and Michel Foucault
would seem to make for strange bedfellows. The generally accepted picture of Nietzsche
presents him as an idiosyncratic loner who touts the modern triumph of an individualistic
nihilism that finds its highest expression in the living existence of the Übermensch. Horkheimer,
to the contrary, is most famously known as the early, socially-engaged, director of The Institute
for Social Research and for penning, in conjunction with Theodor Adorno, the twentieth
century’s most scathing critique of the Enlightenment, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Foucault,
alternatively, is known as the twentieth century’s most renowned theorist-historian-philosophersociologist who sought to investigate the mechanisms of normalization and subjectivation that
are linked to discourses of madness, discipline, and sexuality. Given the disparate focus of their
work, they appear to share little in common.
Despite these surface differences, there are nonetheless a few key theoretical concerns
that link their work. One might even say that Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault form a
“loose” and “unofficial” tradition within the history of philosophy itself. All three thinkers
undertake serious engagements with the entire history of Western thought, examine the
interpenetration of reason and power, grapple with the contradictions of modernity, and
reformulate the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and self-determination. However, as I will
argue, the most significant thread that ties their work together is their sophisticated engagement
with the history of Western metaphysics. All three thinkers characterize Western metaphysics as
the project of ascertaining the essential, universal, and immutable structures of reality that
underlie the totality of existence for the purpose of securing an indubitable foundation for our
judgments concerning the world, our relation to it, our relation to one another, and our relation to
ourselves. Under this interpretation, Western metaphysics aims to secure a primordial truth that
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elicits everyone’s assent. Moreover, at the very heart of this project, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and
Foucault discern an impetus to tyranny and fascism. The drive to metaphysics is the drive to a
singular primordial truth—or set of truths—that excludes all others and forces one’s fidelity.
Metaphysics stands as an ideological weapon to include and exclude through its mechanisms of
validation and invalidation, thereby establishing the legitimacy and illegitimacy of that over
which it reigns. In this way, the dream of metaphysics is the dream of wielding a primordial truth
that establishes the universal and necessary authority of those who possess it—that is,
metaphysics is an instrument for establishing one’s rightful rule.
It is not difficult to see, then, that many commentators read Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and
Foucault as engaged in a critique of Western metaphysics as well as a critique of the conceptions
of reason that metaphysics presupposes. And thus, as a critique of reason, the work of all three
thinkers is denounced as a variation of an “absurdist,” “aporetic,” “self-referential,”
“relativistic,” anti-metaphysics. More specifically, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault have all
been read as engaging in an “unmasking” critique of reason that invalidates the claims of reason
by disclosing reason’s association and admixture with something other than reason. On this
account, Nietzsche’s work purportedly aims to reveal will to power as the fundamental reality
that underlies all of existence and thus as corrupting reason at its very core. Horkheimer’s work
supposedly reveals reason’s inextricable link with myth, which calls into question reason’s
ability to substantiate its own standards of validity. And, Foucault’s work ostensibly
demonstrates that the claims of reason are always relative to their historically constituted
discourse, which calls into question reason’s claims to universality and necessity. Thus, all three
thinkers are accused of undertaking a critique of reason that aims to invalidate reason, and
thereby the project of Western metaphysics, via an appeal to a more fundamental insight into the
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nature of reality. In this way, all three thinkers supposedly critique reason by somehow stepping
outside of reason so as to nullify its authority. However, as their critics readily note, this is a selfrefuting theoretical endeavor. By laying claim to a more essential insight into reality so as to
invalidate reason, all three thinkers must in the end hold that their claims are truer than the
claims of metaphysics, which ultimately leads to the espousal of a self-refuting anti-metaphysics.
Critics of anti-metaphysical philosophies correctly demonstrate that every anti-metaphysics, in
order to establish the validity of its own position, must ultimately rely upon its own appeal to a
primordial truth, which in the end simply installs another metaphysical system. In this way, the
critique of metaphysics presupposes metaphysics and the critics of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and
Foucault highlight the futility of any such endeavor.
While the critics of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault are correct that every antimetaphysical system is simply another metaphysical system in disguise, does this mean then that
there is no escape from metaphysics? Must we always play its game and according to its rules?
We seem to find ourselves in nothing less than a theoretical blackmail. One is either for or
against metaphysics, and to be against metaphysics is, oddly enough, both to fail by the
standards of metaphysical philosophy—anti-metaphysical philosophy is irrational—and also to
be engaged in metaphysical philosophy—every anti-metaphysics is really just another
metaphysics. Thus, it seems that there is no alternative to metaphysical philosophy.
As I will argue in the following chapters, the link that binds the work of Nietzsche,
Horkheimer, and Foucault is precisely a sensitivity to this very blackmail as well as a
sophisticated attempt to circumvent its grip. Like the Epicurean clinamen, like the slightest
possible deviation between an arc and its tangent, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault all
attempt to chart a course between, and away from, the antipodes of metaphysics and anti-
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metaphysics. More specifically, I will argue that the singular originality uniting their work is a
conception of post-metaphysical philosophy as “methodology.” Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and
Foucault are all aware of the theoretical pitfalls of an anti-metaphysical philosophy. For this
reason, they establish their theoretical positions via a “methodological decision” to suspend the
principles and assumptions of metaphysics—that is, they bracket the metaphysical
presuppositions of timeless absolutes and universal subjects capable of discerning such
absolutes—and instead begin with the decision to favor interpretation and historical
contextualism over absolute knowing, contingency over necessity, nominalism over realism, and
history over metaphysics. For this reason, their work does not aim to disprove metaphysics, as
their critics contend, but rather stands as a methodological alternative to metaphysical
philosophy.
The consequences of erecting a post-metaphysical philosophy upon the basis of a
methodological decision to suspend metaphysical principles are quite noteworthy. First, since the
project of metaphysics as Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault characterize it, is to disclose
primordial truths about the immutable structures of reality that force everyone’s assent, and since
Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault all aim to circumvent the grip of metaphysics
methodologically, this means that the commitments that orient their inquiries turn out to be
reflexive, tentative, experimental, and dialogical. In other words, since the commitments
orienting post-metaphysical inquiries do not stand as universal and necessary truths regarding the
nature of reality, they are instead reflexive heuristics established via a methodological decision
on the part of the inquirer. Since the commitments orienting post-metaphysical inquiries do not
feign to possess the finality of primordial truths, they are thus advanced experimentally and
possess only a tentative status. And, lastly, given the reflexive, experimental, and tentative
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character of the commitments that orient post-metaphysical inquiries, they are ultimately
dialogical—that is, they are always open for discussion and thus capable of reversal. In this way,
for Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault, post-metaphysical philosophy as a methodology
evades the latent impulse to tyranny discerned in metaphysical philosophy.
As a further consequence of advancing post-metaphysical philosophy as a
methodological alternative to metaphysics, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault employ
alternative conceptions of critique to those typically deployed by metaphysics. Whereas
metaphysical forms of critique aim either to “unmask” as illegitimate those false absolutes that
do not accord with a primordial truth or to prescribe a course of action as legitimate based on its
accordance with a primordial truth—which is really to say that metaphysical forms of critique
attempt to justify their normative legitimacy via an appeal to a founding origin—the postmetaphysical forms of critique offered by Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault, since they
methodologically suspend the use of metaphysical principles, do not advance conventional
normative resources. Neither the aims of their work nor the standards of value by which they
evaluate better and worse socio-political endeavors purport to express the intransigence of
primordial truths. Again, the methodological commitments that orient the post-metaphysical
philosophies of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault are reflexive, tentative, experimental, and
dialogical. Thus, Nietzsche chooses life as a value and fabricates will to power as the measure of
life. Horkheimer considers the alleviation of human suffering a goal without need of justification
and advances dialectical materialism as a method best suited for achieving this purpose. And,
Foucault aims to make possible alternative styles of life in the forms of the “aesthetics of
existence” and the “undefined work of freedom” and deploys archaeological and genealogical
analyses as methods for developing techniques that would enable us to alter the conditions that
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have made us into something that we would rather not be. Thus, as I will conclude, neither
Nietzsche, Horkheimer, nor Foucault purport to advance primordial truths regarding the nature of
reality or to advance normative positions to which everyone is beholden since such claims
belong to the province of metaphysics.
Ultimately, my aim here is quite simply to demonstrate contrary to those critics who
denounce the work of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault as forms of an absurdist antimetaphysics that all three theorists, rather than engaging in the self-refuting project of
invalidating metaphysics, instead suspend methodologically the use of metaphysical premises. In
this way, I establish via readings of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault the theoretical
coherence, and the thus tenability, of post-metaphysical philosophy in general when conceived of
as a methodology. More significantly, I demonstrate that the purported failure of all three
thinkers to propose universal and necessary foundations for normativity and critique is not a
detriment to their work as is often claimed, but is rather a considered success when regarded as a
methodological strategy for circumventing the impetus to tyranny they detect in metaphysics.
Thus, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault can each be read as fabricating novel, theoretical
instruments for critique that simultaneously refrain from establishing the systems of tyranny they
seek to avoid. In the end, I demonstrate that the advantage of post-metaphysical methodologies
lies in their openness and dialogical relationship to both their own commitments as well as those
of other forms of inquiry, which is an asset to any form of philosophy that aims to mitigate the
fascist tendencies to domination, exploitation, and oppression as Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and
Foucault all precisely aim to do.
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CHAPTER 2:
NIETZSCHE AS POST-METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHER OF LIFE

8

INTRODUCTION
In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Jürgen Habermas claims that Nietzsche’s
work falls prey to “the aporias of a self-referential critique of reason that is bound to undermine
its own foundations.”1 The reason for this, he argues, is that it undertakes an “unmasking”
critique of reason that either assumes, on the one hand, the validity of its own position and
thereby remains ensnared in the dialectic of enlightenment or, on the other hand, undermines
entirely the standards of rational legitimacy and thereby calls into question the very foundation
of its own critique. On either account, according to Habermas, Nietzsche’s position lapses into
performative contradiction and is thus incoherent. Overturning Habermas’s misreading of
Nietzsche as a postmodern irrationalist is significant since it continues to play a decisive role in
shaping successive debates regarding the critical potential of Nietzsche’s work, most especially
regarding the place of Nietzsche’s post-metaphysical philosophy in critical social theory. While
Fred Dallmayr2 defends Nietzsche by highlighting Habermas’s disingenuous reduction of
Nietzsche’s oeuvre to ideas advanced in The Birth of Tragedy, and Karin Bauer3 situates
Habermas’s anxiety regarding Nietzsche’s purported irrationalism within the context of
Nietzsche’s influence on Horkheimer and Adorno, neither author directly challenges Habermas’s
accusations of Nietzsche’s work as contradictory or incoherent. Here, I argue that in claiming
Nietzsche employs Wille zur Macht both as a principle by which to invalidate the claims of
metaphysics and as the primordial “other” to reason that “unmasks” it as an expression of
domination, Habermas misreads in the work of Nietzsche a commitment to ideology critique—

1

Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1993), p. 104. Hereafter PDM.
2
Fred Dallmayr, “Habermas’s Discourse of Modernity: Nietzsche as Turntable,” in Habermas, Nietzsche, and
Critical Theory, ed. Babette Babich (New York: Humanity Books, 2004).
3
Karin Bauer, “Nietzsche, Enlightenment, and the Incomplete Project of Modernity,” in Habermas, Nietzsche, and
Critical Theory, ed. Babette Babich (New York: Humanity Books, 2004).
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the project of unmasking illusions via an appeal to a primordial truth. In doing so, Habermas fails
to account for Nietzsche’s problematization of the very notion of truth, something Habermas
presumes necessary for Nietzsche’s critique. For this reason, Habermas’s misreading inverts
Nietzsche’s line of argumentation by mistaking the conclusions Nietzsche draws from his
critique of truth—Wille zur Macht as the measure of life rather than truth—for the reasons he
advances for his critique of metaphysics and reason—the existence and value of truth is assumed
on the basis of metaphysicians’ faith. Due to this inversion, Habermas constructs a reading of
Nietzsche that is problematic since such a reading makes use of the very idea of a primordial
truth that Nietzsche himself repudiates. Alternatively, I demonstrate that a coherent account of
Wille zur Macht emerges when we interpret it as the fabrication of a post-metaphysical principle
that originates from Nietzsche’s critique of truth and not as an impetus for it. Thus, by closely
examining Habermas’ criticisms of what he considers to be Nietzsche’s critique of reason, I not
only defend Nietzsche’s work from the accusations of incoherence and contradiction, but I also
establish the central role Nietzsche’s critique of truth plays in conceptualizing Nietzsche as a
post-metaphysical philosopher.

THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PROJECT OF MODERNITY
The Enlightenment’s most lasting effect has been the severing of any connection between
faith and reason. The discovery of the “new world,” in conjunction with the events of the
Renaissance and the Reformation, set in motion a critical suspicion of faith as a means for
buttressing the social and cultural sway of myth, tradition, and religious authority that
culminated in their eventual toppling. In faith’s place, reason established itself as the only
rightful authority worthy of recognition since it alone was capable of generating universal
understanding and consent. Yet, according to Habermas, reason’s ascendency during the
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Enlightenment brought with it what came to be the defining crisis of modernity—the need to
establish its own criteria out of itself. Appearing initially in the realm of aesthetic criticism as the
querelle des anciens et des modernes, modernity, as both a radical break from antiquity and the
middle-ages, and as a consciousness of itself as “the new,” was confronted with the necessity of
having to fashion for itself its own standards without recourse to the models that had gone
before. According to Habermas, it was Hegel, however, who was the first to lift this issue to the
level of a properly philosophical problem. Since modernity established itself through a rejection
of the past—as superstitious, mythic, and irrational—it had to provide for itself, and out of itself,
its own norms. Specifically, reason, which tore down the old idols and erected itself in their
place, must, if it is to substantiate its claim to authority, also provide the norms by which
modernity can guide itself.
Habermas locates both Hegel’s framing of this problem and his solution to this problem
in Hegel’s early seminary writings while studying in Tübingen. According to Habermas, Hegel
saw in the division between faith and knowledge, between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment, an
inability for either to speak to “the ethical totality of an entire nation and of inspiring a life of
political freedom.”4 On the one hand, Hegel criticizes Orthodoxy for its reduction of the ethical
life to mandates that usher solely from authority and thus denigrate the intrinsic value of rational
human beings, which only further reinforces the separation of private religion from public life.
On the other hand, Hegel claims that while the “religion of reason” holds that only that which is
authorized by universal human reason is legitimately binding, it is nonetheless incapable of
inspiring the heart and arousing enthusiasm, and thus fails to inspire the institutions of public life
and thereby to unify the ethical totality of the state. In this way, the crisis of modernity finds its
concrete expression in the division between an Orthodoxy inspired by an impassioned fidelity to
4

Habermas, PDM, p. 26.
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blind authority and a cult of reason driven by an unimpassioned recognition of universal moral
duty. Thus, the task for Hegel is to fashion out of modernity and for modernity a new model that
can overcome the cultural division between private religion and public life, which would thereby
inspire the ethical life of the nation as a whole.
According to Hegel, at the heart of the modern conception of reason, from Descartes to
Kant, lies the principle of subjectivity: “…the structure of a self-relating, knowing subject, which
bends back upon itself as object, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image.”5 Manifested in the
assertion of the authority of the subject’s own insights over and against the authority of religion
and tradition, in the authority of individual freedom and will to establish government over and
against the authority of divine right, in the authority of a knowing subject to disenchant nature
through science and thus liberate itself from superstition, and in the authority of the individual to
pursue his own welfare so long as it is in harmony with the welfare of others, the principle of
subjectivity expresses itself in every major facet of social life. Its most significant expression,
according to Hegel, is found in Kant’s three Critiques, which designate the proper limits of
reason by dividing the epistemic, the moral, and the aesthetic spheres one from the other and
erecting each upon its own distinct and sovereign foundation. While the principle of subjectivity
has unshackled the powers of human freedom and reflection from the tyranny of tradition and
religion, it has not been able to exhibit itself as a genuine power of unification via the creation of
a new norm for modernity. In Hegel’s estimation, Kant fails to recognize in his own threefold
division of reason the concrete divisions already at work within culture, which themselves stem
from the principle of subjectivity itself. Thus, according to Hegel, in failing to recognize the
concrete divisions at work within culture, Kant’s critiques provide a merely formal unity of
reason instead of an actual unity of reason. Therefore, for Hegel, Kant’s failure to generate
5

Habermas, PDM, p. 18.
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concrete cultural unity from his merely formal unity of reason discloses modernity as an
unfinished project and thereby elicits the need for a philosophical response. As Habermas frames
it, “The question now is,” for Hegel, “whether one can obtain from subjectivity and selfconsciousness criteria that are taken from the modern world and are at the same time fit for
orienting oneself within it.”6
If, for Hegel, the task of modernity is to provide for itself and out of itself its own criteria,
and if the principle of subjectivity lies at the heart of modernity, then the philosophical task of
modernity is to realize the unifying power of reason by employing the principle of subjectivity in
order to overcome the divisions it has created. This means that reason must be conceived of as a
form of reflexive relation within the subject that is nonetheless capable of creating real unity
within the individual, society, and philosophy. As Habermas states: “If the true identity is in turn
supposed to be developed from the approach of the philosophy of reflection, reason does have to
be thought of as the relation-to-itself of a subject, but now as a reflection that does not merely
impose itself upon another as the absolute power of subjectivity; rather, it finds its existence and
movement in nothing else but resisting all absolutizing, that is, in doing away with every positive
element it brings forth.”7 Whereas the finite and infinite, free and determined, known and
believed remain irrevocably torn asunder in the Kantian philosophy, Hegel carries the internal
logic of the principle of subjectivity to its conclusion and overcomes the divisions brought forth
by subject-centered reason. According to Habermas, “In place of the abstract antithesis of the
finite and infinite, therefore, Hegel puts the absolute self-relation of a subject that attains selfconsciousness from its own substance and has its unity within itself as the difference between the

6
7

Habermas, PDM, p. 20.
Habermas, PDM, p. 33.
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finite and the infinite.”8 In this way, Hegel’s characterization of absolute knowledge—the subject
coming to know itself through the dialectic as the knowing subject—allows him to conceptualize
reason as a unifying force that overcomes the dichotomy between private religion and subjectcentered reason. Thus, as Habermas says, “The absolute comes to be neither as substance nor as
subject; it is apprehended only as the mediating process of a relation-to-self that produces itself
free from conditions.”9
For Habermas, however, the story of modernity does not neatly end here:
If we pause now for a moment and look back at the course of our thought, it seems that Hegel has
reached his goal with this concept of an absolute that overpowers every absolutization and retains
as unconditional only the infinite processing of the relation-to-self that swallows up everything
finite within itself. Hegel can conceive modernity in terms of its own principle. And, in doing this,
he establishes philosophy as the power of unification that overcomes all the positivities that have
issued from reflection itself—and thereby heals the modern manifestations of disintegration.10

Yet, the form that reason must assume in Hegel’s solution to the problem of modernity, on
Habermas’s account, “solves the problem too well.”11 Hegel’s subject of absolute knowing is
disclosed to itself both as an individual and as a universal; it is both a particular subject in the
world and also the site of all possible cognition. In this way, the individual and the universal
achieve unity only through the process of absolute knowing. However, for Habermas, “In the
concrete universal, the subject as universal maintains a primacy over the subject as individual.”12
The political repercussions, according to Habermas, are tremendous: “For the sphere of the
ethical, the outcome of this logic is the primacy of the higher-level subjectivity of the state over
the subjective freedom of the individual.”13 For Hegel, this is the only solution to the
antagonisms that arise between the state and society when individuals are freed from the

8

Habermas, PDM, p. 33.
Habermas, PDM, p. 33-34.
10
Habermas, PDM, p. 36, emphasis added.
11
Habermas, PDM, p. 42.
12
Habermas, PDM, p. 40.
13
Habermas, PDM, p. 40.
9
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arbitrary whim of monarchical political rule. Specifically, Hegel is addressing the new capitalist
free-market economy in which the pursuit of individual self-interest is divorced from the ethical
concerns of the nation and in which one’s own ends confront those of others in an arena of
competition. Modern civil society, on Hegel’s account, is merely a market-like relation of
individuals and not that of an ethical and social whole. In Hegel’s estimation, the principle of
subjectivity and its resultant form of individuality has uncoupled economic aims from the aims
of the political order. Thus, the socio-political task for Hegel is to overcome the dichotomy
between an unfettered and absolute individual freedom and a state that imposes its political and
social order. Just as with knowing, this division can be mediated only when the particular
realizes itself as a moment of the universal and the universal realizes itself as a concrete
particular. In terms of the individual and the state this means that the individual will is to find
expression in the state and the state is to find expression in the concrete individual. “But,”
Habermas contends, “when the ‘state’ of the Philosophy of Right gets elevated to the ‘reality of
substantive will, to something rational in and for itself,’ this has the consequence that political
movements that press beyond the boundaries drawn by philosophy offend against reason
itself.”14 In effect, any political position that does not reinforce the status quo is ultimately
deemed irrational. Thus, on this account, Hegel’s philosophy of the state ultimately undermines a
foundation for political critique and resistance since the state essentially takes precedence to the
individual who is supposed to identify with the state—that is, there is no foundation outside of
the state upon which to anchor a critique of the state.
In the end, Habermas finds Hegel’s solution to the problem of modernity wanting since,
in its attempt to establish a norm out of itself that could provide for the ethical totality of the
nation, it ultimately undermines any position from which to launch political critique.
14

Habermas, PDM, pp. 40-41.
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Nonetheless, according to Habermas, Hegel’s work is of lasting importance since he is the one to
have “inaugurated the discourse of modernity. He introduced the theme – the self-critical
reassurance of modernity. He established the rules within which the theme can be varied – the
dialectic of enlightenment.”15 Those operating in Hegel’s wake, whether it was the Left or the
Right Hegelians, adhered to the dialectic of enlightenment; they remained within a concept of
philosophy that sought to correct itself via further philosophy, via further enlightenment. Thus,
the radical “left” or “young” Hegelians, specifically Marx, disappointed with the Hegelian state,
sought to realize the ideal of the ethical totality by shifting the principle of modernity away from
the knowing subject and toward the producing subject. Marx critiqued Hegel’s theory of the state
by disclosing the social antagonisms that manifested themselves in the state and pointed toward a
self-organization of society that would overcome the alienation of laborers and the division
between public and private life. In this way, Marx continued with the dialectic of enlightenment
and attempted to further the project of modernity via the rules of the game that Hegel himself
had established. Similarly, on Habermas’s account, the conservative “right” or “old”
Hegelians—such as, Rosenkranz, Hinrichs, and Oppenheim—ultimately defended a strong state
that could mediate the unfettered individuality and competitive interests unleashed under
capitalism. On their view, only a strong state could guarantee the unity of particular and
universal, individual and community, only it could be counted on to direct a people rationally
and stand above a multitude of desires and conflicting inclinations. In this way, the right
Hegelians too tried to remain within the dialectic of enlightenment to further the project of
modernity, i.e., to affect a unity of the divisions wrought by the principle of subjectivity. On
either account, enlightenment was to correct itself via further enlightenment. However,
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Habermas argues, only with the neo-romantics, with Nietzsche, is there an attempt to depart the
dialectic. It is here, in this intellectual milieu, that Habermas situates the work of Nietzsche.

NIETZSCHE, THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT, AND MODERNITY
According to Habermas, the project of modernity was ultimately one of trying to replace
the socially unifying force that was once provided by religion with an ethical totality that was to
arise from within reason itself. With Hegel, this project achieved self-consciousness—reason
overcomes its deficiencies, not by going outside of itself, but rather by internally amending itself.
To this extent, Hegel established the parameters within which the project of modernity was to
unfold—the dialectic of enlightenment. Both the Left and Right Hegelians, while ultimately
dissatisfied with the Hegelian brand of social mediation, nonetheless continued to develop the
project of modernity via the dialectic of enlightenment, though they too ultimately failed to unify
the divisions wrought by the principle of subjectivity. Here, “[in] the context of this
constellation,” in the foundering project of modernity, Habermas claims that, “Nietzsche had no
choice but to submit subject-centered reason yet again to an immanent critique – or to give the
program up entirely.”16 Accepting the latter option, Nietzsche abandons reason and thereby takes
leave of the dialectic of enlightenment.
By doing so, Nietzsche alternatively attempts to gain “a foothold in myth as the other of
reason.”17 On this reading, Habermas casts what he considers to be Nietzsche’s critique of reason
as an heir to the Romanticism of Schelling, Schlegel and the early Hegel—all of whom claim
that, “[in] the forms of a revived mythology, art can reacquire the character of a public institution
and develop the power to regenerate the ethical totality of the nation.”18 Thus, the early Hegel
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argues that myth will ultimately replace philosophy since aesthetic intuition is the highest act of
reason,19 and Schelling argues that in aesthetic intuition speculative reason surpasses itself in the
form of a new mythology that unifies the true and the good in the beautiful,20 while Schlegel
argues that only the mythopoetic that is cleansed of the rational opens the way to the primordial
and unifying forces of myth.21 According to all three of these accounts, only art, in the form of a
new mythology, can replace the unifying force of religion lost during modernity.
A serious challenge, however, faces the impulse of neo-Romanticism—that is, how can a
new mythology emerge if the very terms of modernity prohibit an unmediated return to mythic
origins? Whatever the new mythology will be it cannot be a simple revival of, or return to, the
myths of yore. A form of neo-mythology must replace both the previous mythologies and
modernity in order to restore the unifying power of religion. According to Habermas, this need
for an “aesthetically renewed mythology,” born from the problems that erupted during
modernity, explains Nietzsche’s appeal to the Dionysian. While the Romantics identified
Dionysus with Christ, which would—in making the otherworldly promises of Christianity
promises to be redeemed in this world—“rejuvenate” the hopes of the West and restore a sociopolitical solidarity severed by the rise of enlightenment, Nietzsche’s Dionysus is deployed as a
means of departing entirely from both this Christian notion as well as Western modernity. In
essence, the Romantic recuperation of Dionysus was an attempt to think the still-to-come
fulfillment of the modern age. In Nietzsche’s hands, according to Habermas, the Dionysian
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becomes paradigmatic of an experience of self-oblivion that shatters the basic tenets of
modernity:
What Nietzsche calls the “aesthetic phenomenon” is disclosed in the concentrated dealings with
itself of a de-centered subjectivity set free from everyday conventions of perceiving and acting.
Only when the subject loses itself, when it sheers off from pragmatic experience in space and time,
when it is stirred by the shock of the sudden, when it considers “the longing for true presence”
(Octavio Paz) fulfilled and, oblivious to itself, is transported by the moment; only when the
categories of intelligent doing and thinking are upset, the norms of daily life have broken down,
the illusions of habitual normality have collapsed – only then does the world of the unforeseen and
the absolutely astonishing open up, the realm of aesthetic illusion, which neither hides nor reveals,
is neither appearance nor essence, but nothing other than surface.22

On Habermas’s account, Nietzsche attempts to solve the problem of the origin of a renewed
mythology by grounding reason’s “other” in an aesthetically disclosed experience of dissolution
in which the subject is liberated from certainty and necessity and plunged into the excesses of
power and illusion. With this move, Habermas argues, Nietzsche turns away from the
emancipatory content of modernity and the dialectic of enlightenment and confronts reason with
an aesthetico-mystical experience that supposedly vitiates reason’s claim to authority. As
Habermas explicitly states, “As a counter-authority to reason, Nietzsche appeals to experiences
that are displaced back into that archaic realm – experiences of a self-disclosure of a de-centered
subjectivity, liberated from all constraints of cognition and purposive activity, and imperatives of
utility and morality.”23
Here, according to Habermas, upon the authoritative revelation of the aesthetico-mystical
experience of the Dionysian, Nietzsche builds a metaphysical theory of irrationality in which the
world appears as “a network of distortions and interpretations for which no intention and no text
provides a basis.”24 The de-centering of the subject becomes the site of an all-consuming decentering of meaning. Art becomes human beings’ only genuine metaphysical activity since life
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itself is nothing more than illusion. Moreover, as the site of illusion, of falsifications and fictions,
of deception, and of art, life reveals itself for what it truly is—Wille zur Macht, the power to
create meaning.25 Moreover, according to Habermas, armed with a theory of life as Wille zur
Macht, Nietzsche sets out to unmask human existence generally, and reason specifically, for
what it really is: “the subjective power claims of value appraisals”26 and the history of
domination and subjugation. According to Habermas, much of Nietzsche’s work following The
Birth of Tragedy27 is an attempt to “demonstrate” that Wille zur Macht operates behind our
claims to knowledge, morality, and normativity. In the end, says Habermas, Nietzsche claims
that the project of modernity, as the unfolding of dialectical reason, is nothing more than another
expression of the Wille zur Macht that underlies all of human existence, nothing more than
another expression of the will to domination and subjugation, despite all of the Enlightenment’s
pretenses to freedom, liberty, and emancipation.
HABERMAS’S CRITIQUE OF NIETZSCHE
As is evident, Habermas takes issue with what he considers to be Nietzsche’s attempt to
undertake “an unmasking critique of reason that sets itself outside of reason.”28 Simply put,
Habermas charges Nietzsche with appealing to an aesthetic experience that “enthrones taste, ‘the
Yes and the No of the palate,’ as the organ of a knowledge beyond true and false, beyond good
and evil.”29 Moreover, in doing so, Habermas claims that Nietzsche has confusedly pursued “a
critique of ideology that attacks its own foundations.”30 In two short paragraphs in “Section III”
of his chapter on Nietzsche in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas dismisses
25
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the entire Nietzschean enterprise by arguing that the position Nietzsche attempts to establish is
ultimately self-refuting since Nietzsche cannot legitimate the very perspective from which he
claims the illegitimacy of reason—in other words, by appealing to a position that undermines the
legitimacy of reason, and thereby the legitimacy and truth of any position, Nietzsche in turn
undermines the very legitimacy and force of his own position.
On this reading, Habermas claims that Nietzsche is thus caught in a double bind: either
Nietzsche is engaged in an aesthetic science, genealogy, that “unmasks” and “demonstrates” that
Wille zur Macht is always at work in reason, which would undermine reason’s claims to
objectivity, truth, and validity, but would also in turn destroy genealogy’s own claims to
scientificity and truth, or Nietzsche appeals to a foundational aesthetic experience, the Dionysian
experience of an obliterated and de-centered subjectivity, that reveals itself as the suppressed
“other” to reason, which would undermine the authority of rational standards, but would also in
turn undermine any standards upon which Nietzsche could establish the authority of his own
aesthetic preferences. In either case, according to Habermas, Nietzsche falls prey to “the aporias
of a self-referential critique of reason that is bound to undermine its own foundations.”31 In other
words, for Habermas, Nietzsche undertakes an “unmasking” critique of reason that either
assumes, on the one hand, the validity of its own position and thereby remains ensnared in the
dialectic of enlightenment or, on the other hand, undermines entirely the standards of rational
legitimacy and thereby calls into question the very foundation of his own critique.

THE NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS
That Nietzsche engages in a critique of truth, metaphysics, and reason, and that he rejects
dogmatic philosophy and advances Wille zur Macht as a philosophical alternative, is rather
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uncontroversial. Of issue is the manner and style in which this rejection is undertaken as are the
purported conclusions that are supposed to follow from it. Considering that Beyond Good and
Evil stands as Nietzsche’s first and most systematic expression of Wille zur Macht,32 whereas the
previously published Thus Spoke Zarathustra presents a more literary account, and considering
that Beyond Good and Evil additionally offers one of Nietzsche’s most sustained and lucid
engagements with metaphysics, I will advance a reading here of Nietzsche’s position in Beyond
Good and Evil that demonstrates that Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and his formulation
and deployment of Wille zur Macht are neither incoherent nor self-refuting. In making this case,
I will follow Alexander Nehamas in defining dogmatic metaphysics as that view that “aims to be
accepted necessarily and unconditionally—not as the product of a particular person or
idiosyncrasy but as the result of a discovery about the unalterable features of the world.” 33 For
this reason, dogmatic metaphysics does not merely aim to be a view amongst others but more
significantly aims to be “an accurate description of the real world which forces its own
acceptance and makes an unconditional claim on everyone’s assent.”34 In this way, when using
the terms metaphysics and dogmatic philosophy throughout the rest of this essay, I will be
referring to: the project of ascertaining the immutable and incontrovertible truths regarding the
essential structures of reality, the concomitant values by which we are to live our lives, as well as
the methodological procedures and commitments such a project implies.
In the opening lines of the “Preface” to Beyond Good and Evil, speaking directly in
regard to dogmatic philosophy, Nietzsche states:
Supposing truth to be a woman – what? is the suspicion not well founded that all philosophers,
when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women? that the gruesome
32
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earnestness, the clumsy importunity with which they have been in the habit of approaching truth
have been inept and improper means for winning a wench? Certainly she has not let herself be
won – and today every kind of dogmatism stands sad and discouraged. If it continues to stand at
all! For there are scoffers who assert it has fallen down, that dogmatism lies on the floor, more,
that dogmatism is at its last gasp.35

Quite simply, Nietzsche claims here that the project of Western metaphysics, if it is premised
upon the acquisition of a primordial truth, is stillborn. While Nietzsche’s claim may be
contentious, it is not without its justification. It would seem that if philosophy had indeed
discovered a primordial truth—that is to say an irrefutable truth that is accessible and
demonstrable to all rational people and not merely accepted as an article of faith, and that would
act as an edifice upon which to erect the definitive theory of the essential structures of reality—
then we would most likely “know” this truth, that it would be widely recognized, especially
amongst philosophers. Yet, in the history of Western philosophy, we find neither a singular
shared truth that has been passed down from generation to generation of philosophers nor even a
generally accepted range of ideas. Instead, we find an incessant contestation and battle of wills,
worldviews, and philosophical positions. At some time or another wholly incompatible and
opposing philosophical theories have all been considered correct. In the Hellenic world alone
idealist, materialist, mystical, and skeptical theories were all equally considered viable by
different groups—the Platonists, Aristotelians, Epicureans, Stoics, Plotinians, and Academics—
each one thinking that they alone possessed a primordial truth that secured the necessity of their
dogmatic metaphysical system.
It is precisely here, however, that we must take the greatest precaution to read Nietzsche
carefully. Nietzsche is neither a naïve nor an Academic skeptic, and he is all too aware of the
skeptics’ dilemma. As Ken Gemes notes, “To deny the existence of truth is prima facie
paradoxical. Such denials invite the question ‘Is it true that there is no truth?’ To answer ‘Yes’ is
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 2003), “Preface.”
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35

23

to claim there is at least one truth, namely that there is no truth. To answer ‘No’ is to deny that
there is no truth and hence commit oneself to the claim that there is some truth.”36 In either case,
the position of Academic skepticism is self-refuting. Thus, we must avoid not only reading
Nietzsche as an Academic skeptic, but we must also realize that Nietzsche’s critique of truth, and
thus his critique of Western metaphysics, is a careful attempt to avoid the trap of either falling
back into the project of metaphysics or of falling into the skeptics’ dilemma. As Stuart Dalton
notes, “Nietzsche is challenged to find a way to get ‘beyond’ metaphysics without falling into
such traps.”37 In this way, Nietzsche sets himself the Herculean challenge of negotiating the
dilemma of advocating either a form of dogmatic metaphysics—which is premised upon the
existence of a primordial truth—or a form of absurdist relativism—which denies the very
possibility of a primordial truth.
To begin, Jessica Berry has done considerable work arguing for, via Montaigne’s
influence on Nietzsche, the manner in which Pyrrhonian38 skepticism affords a coherent
theoretical model for rendering intelligible Nietzsche’s sophisticated skeptical position in regards
to a primordial truth. As Berry notes, “Nietzsche is […] keenly attuned to Montaigne’s
skepticism, since in [Human, All Too Human], too, skepticism is a necessary antidote to
metaphysical dogmatism. It is what unseats the justification for metaphysical hypotheses without
forcing Nietzsche into the opposite (negatively dogmatic) position of denying the existence of,
for instance, things-in-themselves—recall Nietzsche’s reluctance to dispute ‘the absolute
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possibility’ of a metaphysical world in [Human, All Too Human], I, 9.”39 Unlike more absurd
forms of skepticism that deny either the existence or possibility of truth, and would thus advance
the position that it is true that there is no truth, Pyrrhonian skepticism advances evidence equally
on behalf of opposing sides of a position so as to render any judgment on the issue moot, thereby
leaving one in a state of indeterminacy (aporia) and with no other option than to suspend
judgment (epochê) until better evidence is brought to light.40 Thus, in arguing for Montaigne’s
influence on Nietzsche as a sophisticated skeptic, Berry claims that, “As a Sextan Skeptic
[Montaigne] is above all concerned that his attack on dogmatic convictions about human reason
not itself become dogmatic. Since Nietzsche is motivated by a similar concern in [Human, All
Too Human], namely, that his attacks on dogmatic metaphysics not simply install new dogmas,
this point is important. For it is this concern that sets Pyrrhonism apart from other varieties of
skepticism.”41 As Berry concludes, Nietzsche’s skepticism regarding the project of metaphysics
does not commit him to the equally dogmatic position that the project of metaphysics is
impossible and that a primordial truth does not exist. Thus, one can reasonably read Nietzsche as
advancing reasons to “doubt” the credibility of the project of metaphysics—as the Pyrrhonian
skeptics do with any dogmatic position—without insisting on the correctness of his own
position—that is, without insisting that it is true that metaphysics is false. Nietzsche himself in
Ecce Homo says of his own approach, “I do not refute ideals, I merely draw on gloves in their
presence.”42 Thus, rather than casting Nietzsche’s position as a form of Academic skepticism and
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saddling his work with the theoretical aporias with which it is associated,43 I will—for the
purposes of my argument—instead term Nietzsche’s relation to dogmatic metaphysics and its
notion of a founding truth as “critically suspicious” in order to delineate it clearly from any
variant of Academic skepticism.44
In Twilight of the Idols, we find an excellent example of Nietzsche’s critical suspicion—
as opposed to skepticism—regarding metaphysics in the chapter entitled “How the ‘Real World’
at last Became a Myth.” There, he says, “The real world—unattainable? Unattained, at any rate.
And if unattained also unknown.45 In this passage, Nietzsche neither asserts the impossibility of
metaphysics nor the non-existence of a primordial truth. He does not declare that a primordial
truth through which the real world would be disclosed is unknowable since this would be a
dogmatic assertion about the impossibility of metaphysics. Rather, he precisely puts forward the
claim that a primordial truth disclosing the real world is unattainable and elects not to assert it.
Instead, Nietzsche announces his suspicion regarding the primordial truth of metaphysics: that
the “real world” exists. In this way, we may consider Nietzsche a sophisticated skeptic, like the
Marquis de Sade46 before him, who does not deny the existence of an ultimate entity, but
rather—placing the “burden of proof” on those who advance the claim of an ultimate entity’s
existence—maintains a vigilant suspicion of all dogmatisms until their claims have been proven
true. Thus, from the perspective of Pyrrhonian skepticism, we can read Nietzsche’s critical
suspicions, not as attempts to refute definitively the notions of a primordial truth and
43
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metaphysics, which would of necessity commit him to the dogmatic assertion of his own
position, but rather as merely expressing doubt regarding the existence and knowledge of a
primordial truth upon which a dogmatic metaphysical system could be erected.
Quite significantly, then, upon the basis of his critical suspicion toward metaphysics and
its notion of a primordial truth, Nietzsche makes the methodological decision to begin theorizing
as if we are without a primordial truth. While he does not state this methodological decision
explicitly in Beyond Good and Evil, he does so in Human, All Too Human:
Probable victory of skepticism – Let us for once accept the validity of the skeptical point of
departure: if there were no other, metaphysical world and all explanations of the only world
known to us drawn from metaphysics were useless to us, in what light would we then regard men
and things? This question can be thought through, and it is valuable to do so, even if we do for
once ignore the question whether the existence of anything metaphysical has been scientifically
demonstrated by Kant and Schopenhauer. For the historical probability is that one day mankind
will very possibly become in general and on the whole sceptical in this matter; thus the question
becomes: what shape will human society then assume under the influence of such an attitude of
mind? Perhaps the scientific demonstration of the existence of any kind of metaphysical world is
already so difficult that mankind will never again be free of mistrust of it. And if one has a
mistrust of metaphysics the results are by and large the same as if it has been directly refuted and
one no longer had the right to believe in it. The historical question in regard to an unmetaphysical
attitude of mind on the part of mankind remains the same in both cases. 47

In this paragraph, Nietzsche makes three points that are directly pertinent to conceptualizing his
work as an alternative to metaphysics—that is, as “post-metaphysical.” First, Nietzsche is clear
that he does not conflate a mistrust of metaphysics with the refutation of metaphysics. Thus,
Nietzsche is explicit that he does not consider metaphysics refuted; he is not a dogmatic antimetaphysician. Second, given this mistrust of metaphysics, however, Nietzsche tells us that he
will proceed as if it has been refuted. In this way, Nietzsche makes a “methodological decision”
to proceed philosophically on the alternative, conditional, and experimental basis that we are
without a founding origin by means of which we could secure primordial truths concerning the
way things “really” are; he is not a dogmatic metaphysician. Lastly, Nietzsche provides an
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interpretative key in this paragraph for making sense of his later affirmative claims regarding life
and existence: Nietzsche tells us in no uncertain terms that the commitment orienting his later
critical inquiries is to theorize about this world and this life as though the metaphysical
interpretation had been refuted—in other words, Nietzsche reveals to us that the aim of his work
is to provide an interpretation of existence in which the metaphysical interpretation has been
methodologically bracketed; he is post-metaphysical. Though Nietzsche himself never describes
his work explicitly in terms of a “methodological decision,” this decision on Nietzsche’s part to
suspend methodologically the metaphysical interpretation of life is decisive for establishing the
tenability of post-metaphysical philosophy in general as a coherent theoretical alternative to
metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophies.
Proceeding from this methodological basis, Nietzsche can begin to examine critically
what must now necessarily appear as “the prejudices of the philosophers.” Most significantly,
Nietzsche’s post-metaphysical methodological procedure allows him to provide an alternative
interpretation of the products born from the Wille zur Wahrheit—the very impetus to
metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the defining characteristic of philosophers to which der
Wille zur Wahrheit gives rise is “the faith in antithetical values,”48 which Nietzsche terms the
fundamental faith of all metaphysicians. According to Nietzsche, “It is on account of this their
‘faith’ that they concern themselves with their ‘knowledge’, with something that is at last
solemnly baptized ‘the truth.’”49 Because they have assumed in advance the existence and value
of a primordial truth, metaphysicians, on Nietzsche’s conjecture, divide existence into two
mutually exclusive and opposing ontological realms. Here, it is reasoned by metaphysicians that
if a primordial truth is by its very nature eternal, permanent, and unchanging, then logically it
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must of necessity preclude all that is ephemeral, impermanent, and transitory since otherwise
truth—that which is unchanging—would be opinion—that which changes. From this single
intuition, Nietzsche speculates, a host of further assumptions follow on the part of philosophers:
‘How could something originate in its antithesis? Truth in error, for example? Or will to truth in
will to deception? Or the unselfish act in self-interest? Or the pure radiant gaze of the sage in
covetousness? Such origination is impossible; he who dreams of it is a fool, indeed worse than a
fool; the things of the highest value must have another origin of their own – they cannot be
derivable from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, mean little world, from this confusion of
desire and illusion! In the womb of being, rather, in the intransitory, in the hidden god, in the
“thing-in-itself” – that is where their cause must lie and nowhere else!’50

Truth must have an origin of its own since nothing less than truth could give birth to it; the pure
cannot be born of the impure since that impurity would precisely contaminate it. Thus, since the
impermanent can never give rise to the permanent, or the impure to the pure, truth—so the
argument goes—must exist as uncreated and as ontologically distinct from untruth in its own
unique realm.51
From this initial assumption concerning the nature of truth, and the metaphysical reality it
supposes, philosophers proceed to construct elaborate metaphysical theories regarding the
natures of both the self and knowledge. Since the senses reveal nothing more than a material
world in flux, and thus provide access to nothing more than the illusory, the apparent, and the
merely conjectural, there must be another faculty possessed by humans that is capable of
accessing the timeless and unchanging—namely, reason. Philosophers must therefore assume an
unproblematic and clear distinction between the instinctual and the conscious since the very idea
of a primordial truth that exists in its own realm necessitates the ideal of a free, rational, and
intellectual subject that can overcome and isolate itself from the impulses, drives, and desires
precisely so as to access a realm that could house a pure and unmediated truth.52 In this way, for
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Nietzsche, the very notion of a primordial truth contains within it the ideals of, and the divisions
between the real and the merely apparent, the true and the false, the pure and the base, the
unbiased and the biased, reason and the senses, the universal and the particular, the mind and the
body, the doer and the deed, the free and the determined, the highest and the lowest…etc., etc.
Thus, for Nietzsche, the notions of a primordial truth, metaphysics, and reason all mutually
implicate one another. Yet, as Nietzsche rightly points out, if a primordial truth has yet to be
proven, then these basic tenets of metaphysicians are nothing more than their articles of faith,
which would, as Nietzsche satirically notes, highlight a failure on their part to live up to their
very own standards of truth: “It has not occurred to even the most cautious of them to pause and
doubt here on the threshold, where however it was most needful they should: even if they had
vowed to themselves ‘de omnibus dubitandum’.”53 It would seem, on Nietzsche’s account, that
the impetus to metaphysics—der Wille zur Wahrheit, born from a faith in the value of truth—is
directly opposed to the very spirit of metaphysicians’ purported commitment to truth.
Significantly, then, Nietzsche’s methodological suspension of the metaphysical
interpretation cuts at the core of the assumed division between appearance and reality. According
to Nietzsche, it is only because metaphysicians presuppose the value of a primordial truth that
they therefore devalue untruth and, by association, value another world as real and devalue this
world as apparent. However, one is justified in characterizing this world as apparent only in
relation to a real world. But, if one does not truly “know” whether the real world exists, then one
cannot truly judge whether this world is apparent. Thus, Nietzsche further argues in Twilight of
the Idols, “We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? …
But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!”54 The metaphysical
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dichotomy of the real world and the apparent world can be maintained only upon the assumption
that a primordial truth exists and that it must exist in a realm that is mutually exclusive from the
one that is impermanent and untrue. However, when one of the mutually exclusive terms of the
equation is removed—as is done by bracketing the metaphysical interpretation—we are not
thereby left with the remaining mutually exclusive term. In other words, if we are without
“reality,” we are not thereby left with “mere appearance.” Rather, according to Nietzsche, it is
only because we assume another higher realm in which truth is purported to exist that we would
even judge this world as a lesser realm of appearance. In this way, when we bracket the realm of
reality in which a primordial truth is supposed to exist, we also suspend the very measure—the
interpretation—by which we would even consider regarding this realm as untrue and as mere
appearance. This means that Nietzsche’s methodological decision to bracket the metaphysical
interpretation not only suspends the assumed distinction between the true and the untrue, but also
suspends the entire system of dichotomies assumed by most metaphysical systems.55 More
importantly, and in accordance with the Pyrrhonian dictum to assent only to appearances,
Nietzsche’s methodological decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation leaves us with
only one world, this one, with which to give our assent.

THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM
According to Nietzsche, if one takes seriously his critical suspicions regarding truth,
metaphysics, and reason—and thereby the attempts on the part of past philosophers to secure an
eternal ground for imbuing life with meaning and significance—then the problem of nihilism
steps to the fore:
Finally: one discovers of what material one has built the “true world”: and now all one has left is
the repudiated world, and one adds this supreme disappointment to the reasons why it deserves to
55
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be repudiated. At this point nihilism is reached: all one has left are the values that pass
judgment—nothing else.56
What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking;
“why?” finds no answer.57

While the ascetic ideal as it is expressed in philosophy, art, and religion, is an attempt to ward off
nihilism, Nietzsche thinks that pursuing the idea of a primordial truth to its ultimate consequence
precisely leads to the critically suspicious position that informs his work.58 In other words, der
Wille zur Wahrheit when carried to its logical conclusion eventually turns back upon itself and
calls into question the existence, and thereby the presumed value, of truth. Significantly, without
a primordial truth there is no basis upon which to judge with certainty that truth is more valuable
than untruth. In this way, while still under the sway of the metaphysical interpretation, it comes
to appear that since metaphysicians have yet to establish the veracity of the value of truth that all
values are therefore foundationless and thus little more than fictions—in other words, it seems
that without a primordial truth that nothing is therefore of value. Life appears as wholly
meaningless and devoid of purpose. The question, “To what end?” seems hopelessly
unanswerable. However, as Nietzsche argues, nihilism is the result of the metaphysical
interpretation, of positing the meaning of existence in a metaphysical realm that exists externally
to this world:
The end of the moral interpretation of the world, which no longer has any sanction after it has tried
to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. “Everything lacks meaning” (the untenability of
one interpretation of the world, upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished,
awakens the suspicion that all interpretations of the world are false). 59

When we lose faith in the value of truth, by which we judged this world as lesser, we nonetheless
tend to maintain a judgment of this world as meaningless since we still judge it from the
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perspective of the loss of the other world, from the loss of “the true” meaning of existence,
which was to be secured by the metaphysical interpretation. In this way, the problem of nihilism
is deeply rooted in the critical suspicion of der Wille zur Wahrheit and metaphysics. Central to
Nietzsche’s critical suspicion of a primordial truth, then, is the task of overcoming the problem
of nihilism, which requires that we surmount this misplaced sense of loss.60
For one should make no mistake about the meaning of the title that this gospel of the future wants
to bear. ‘The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values’—in this formulation a
countermovement finds expression, regarding both principle and task; a movement that in some
future will take the place of this perfect nihilism—but presupposes it, logically and
psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. For why has the advent of
nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final
consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and
ideals—because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’
really had.— We require, sometime, new values.61

Nietzsche’s work thus contains two movements: one whereby he pursues his critical suspicion of
der Wille zur Wahrheit to its terminus, leading to a methodological suspension of the
metaphysical interpretation, and a second in which, having come upon the problem of nihilism,
he fabricates post-metaphysical tools in order to overcome it. For this reason, as I will argue, it is
imperative that we read Nietzsche’s tools for overcoming the problem of nihilism as the result of
a considered post-metaphysical methodological procedure and not as a return to metaphysics if
his work is to be regarded as coherent and as offering constructive resources for engaging our
present.62

Here, one is reminded of Derrida’s affirmation of ‘play’ in “Structure, Sign, and Play”: “Turned towards the lost
or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the
saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of thinking of play whose other side would be the
Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming,
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interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of center. And it plays without
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“SUCH DANGEROUS MAYBES”
Typically, according to Nietzsche, metaphysicians measure the value of a judgment in
relation to its truth or falsity. In this way, a judgment is valuable only if it is true and only if it is
true is a judgment valuable. Thus, for metaphysicians, untrue judgments are not only worthless,
but they are also dangerous, and thus something to be avoided at all costs. However, since
Nietzsche suspends methodologically the metaphysical interpretation, he stands on substantially
different footing than that of the philosophers of whom he is critically suspicious. Specifically,
truth is not a criterion of which he can avail himself in measuring the worth of a judgment since
his methodological decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation prohibits him from
appealing to the very criterion that he has bracketed.63 Thus, while Nietzsche’s work is clearly in
conversation with metaphysical philosophy, it cannot itself be another form of metaphysical
philosophy if it is to avoid falling into hopeless confusion—that is, it cannot appeal to truth in
order to measure the worth of its judgments without violating its own methodological
constraints. In fact, Nietzsche is quite clear that he is aware of the methodological constraints
that his decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation place upon him: “The falseness of a
judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment: it is here that our new language
sounds strangest.”64 Nietzsche feigns no pretense to a commitment to the philosophical ideals of
primordial truths and founding origins, and thus to a metaphysical theory of reality. For this
reason, whatever post-metaphysical tools Nietzsche fabricates for overcoming the problem of

affirming or denying will be replaced by a stronger and healthier form of skepticism that can venture the
experimental creation of values.
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nihilism, it is more than evident that they are not going to be part of a metaphysical project of
advancing a “true” theory of reality, i.e., metaphysical dogmatism.

LIFE AS A VALUE
In accordance with the above-mentioned methodological constraints, Nietzsche fabricates
a new evaluative criterion for determining the value of his post-metaphysical judgments:
[Our] fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest of judgments (to which the synthetic a
priori belong) are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the fictions of logic,
without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and selfidentical, without a continual falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live –
that to renounce false judgments would be to renounce life, would be to deny life. 65

Here, Nietzsche is arguing that if he, like a metaphysician, were to remain committed to the
metaphysico-philosophical moral imperative to abide by truth, then in the absence of a
primordial truth—which would guarantee both the certainty and the value of his judgments—he
would have to renounce all of his judgments as though they were false and refrain from making
any further judgments. However, if he were to do so, then it would be impossible for him to live
since, as Nietzsche will later argue, life of necessity involves evaluation. Thus, unlike the
Pyrrhonian skeptic who remains comfortably and dispassionately within a self-induced state of
aporia and epochê in the hope of achieving ataraxia, Nietzsche ventures out from behind the
safety of Pyrrhonian indifference and affirms his post-metaphysical commitment to life as a
value.66 As Nietzsche states, “The question is to what extent is [a judgment] life-advancing, life-
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preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding.”67 Having suspended
methodologically the metaphysical interpretation, Nietzsche explicitly advances an alternative
measure for the value of a judgment to that of truth—that is, life stands as the measure for
judgments not truth. For this reason, even though he is critically suspicious of what he considers
to be metaphysical concepts such as causality, identity, and unity, Nietzsche nonetheless
recognizes that he must employ these concepts, these “untruths,” and make judgments based
upon them if he is to live.68 Thus, in his commitment to the employment of “untruths” in the
name of life—the affirmation of life as a value being itself an “untruth” in the service of life—
Nietzsche decisively places himself outside the confines of the metaphysical interpretation.
Significantly, Nietzsche draws the full consequences of his methodological suspension of
the necessity to employ true judgments: “To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be
sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which
ventures to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil.”69 In other words, as soon
as one suspends methodologically the metaphysical interpretation, one thereby brackets the
metaphysico-philosophical moral imperative to employ only truth as a standard by which to
measure the value of one’s judgments. Moreover, in doing so, one renounces the entire
metaphysico-philosophical apparatus that demands that one’s values usher from an essential
insight into the basic structure of reality, that one’s values and concepts accord with reality. In
67
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this way, one frees oneself from the metaphysico-philosophical moral prohibition against the
false, the untrue, and the uncertain. Thus, from the position established by the methodological
decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation, what metaphysicians derogatorily denote as
perspective—untruth, bias, and prejudice—becomes, for Nietzsche, the basic condition of life.

PERSPECTIVE AS THE BASIC CONDITION OF LIFE
Whereas metaphysicians begin with the assumption of the ideal of the real world and its
lesser correlate the apparent world, Nietzsche, critically suspicious of a primordial truth, begins
methodologically with the absence of truth as the condition in which we experience life. Thus,
having bracketed the metaphysical interpretation, which posits the two mutually exclusive and
ontologically distinct realms of reality and appearance, Nietzsche concludes that the only realm
that we can reasonably assert to exist is this one, life.70 One of Nietzsche’s primary criticisms of
metaphysics is that the presumed value of truth ultimately devalues this world, and thereby life,
in favor of another world, one for which we have no evidence. Nietzsche criticizes Plato
specifically, however, for having introduced this division, and the ramifications that follow from
it, into Western history: “[It] certainly has to be admitted that the worst, most wearisomely
protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist’s error, namely Plato’s
invention of pure spirit and the good in itself.”71 The “error,” according to Nietzsche, lies in the
Once again, we can liken Nietzsche’s position regarding the appearance of life to that of the Pyrrhonian skeptics
who claim: “Those who say that the Sceptics reject what is apparent have not, I think, listened to what we say. As
we said before, we do not overturn anything which leads us, without our willing it, to assent in accordance with a
passive appearance – and these things are precisely what is apparent. When we investigate whether existing things
are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said
about what is apparent – and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. For example, it appears to us
that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a perceptual way); but whether (as far as the
argument goes) it is actually sweet is something we investigate – and this is not what is apparent but something said
about what is apparent. And if we do propound arguments directly against what is apparent, it is not because we
want to reject what is apparent that we set them out, but rather to display the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if
reasoning is such a deceiver that it all but snatches even what is apparent from under our very eyes, surely we should
keep watch on it in unclear matters, to avoid being led into rashness by following it?” Empiricus, p. 8.
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fact that “[to] speak of spirit and the good as Plato did meant standing truth on her head and
denying perspective itself, the basic condition of all life.”72 In other words, for Nietzsche, if we
do not possess a primordial truth, then the condition in which we exist and from which we
experience life is perspective.73 In this way, for Nietzsche, if perspective is the basic condition of
life, then our valuations do not issue from an essential insight into the ultimate nature of reality.
They are instead nothing more than the product of our own personal prejudices and biases.
Moreover, we do not merely possess preferential values, we also have no other recourse than to
affirm and assert those values since at its most basic, at the very core of living, we continually
affirm either the value of life or the value of death—that is, one either takes those actions
necessary to continue living or one will die. But again, without a primordial truth, we cannot be
certain that life is indeed more valuable than death. Thus, for Nietzsche, to live is to affirm the
value of life over and above death, and to affirm life is to prefer living to dying. Living is an
experiment in valuing life.
Once we affirm our preference for living, however, a host of further preferences ensue.
For instance, to prefer living is precisely to prefer our own life to that of others. Here, Nietzsche
is not advancing a form of egoism, but rather is noting that our preference for our own lives
compels us to impose ourselves upon existence—we rearrange the world in order satisfy our
preference for our own lives. This is manifested at its most basic in the necessity to eat—either
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we kill plants or animals, or we perish. Thus, our preference for our own lives entails that we at
minimum take the life of non-human others. Similarly, we rearrange our environments in order
to make our habitats more hospitable to our preference for life. Thus, for Nietzsche, to assert that
perspective is the basic condition of life is to assert that the essence of life74 is to affirm the
preference of one thing over and above another and to impose this preference upon others and
the world. As Nietzsche says:
To refrain from mutual injury, mutual violence, mutual exploitation, to equate one’s will with that
of another: this may in a certain rough sense become good manners between individuals if the
conditions for it are present (namely if their strength and value standards are in fact similar and
they both belong to one body). As soon as there is a desire to take this principle further, however,
and if possible even as the fundamental principle of society, it at once reveals itself for what it is:
as the will to the denial of life, as the principle of dissolution and decay. One has to think this
matter thoroughly through to the bottom and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is
essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity,
imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation – but why
should one always have to employ precisely those words which have from old been stamped with
a slanderous intention? Even that body within which, as was previously assumed, individuals treat
one another as equals – this happens in every healthy aristocracy – must, if it is a living and not a
decaying body, itself do all that to other bodies which the individuals within it refrain from doing
to one another: it will have to be will to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to
itself, gain ascendency – not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because
life is will to power. […] ‘Exploitation’ […] pertains to the essence of the living thing as a
fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely
the will to life.75

Thus, for Nietzsche, life is precisely a bold, arbitrary, and ultimately unjustifiable imposition of
oneself, one’s preferences, and one’s values into and upon existence—life is Wille zur Macht.
However, it is important to remember that Nietzsche’s claim that perspective is the basic
condition of life and his characterization of life as Wille zur Macht are not assertions of a
fundamental insight into the nature of reality, nor are they intended as dogmatic metaphysical
truths, rather, they are the results of Nietzsche’s methodological decision to suspend the
metaphysical interpretation and to provide in its stead an alternative interpretation of existence—
they are interpretative principles fabricated by Nietzsche for the purpose of living. As
The word is ‘essence’ should be taken here loosely to denote only Nietzsche’s generalization of the characteristics
of life and not as an insight into its “true reality.”
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Maudemarie Clark notes on this very point, “Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power is not a
doctrine at all. Although Nietzsche says that life is will to power, he also gives us clues that he
does not regard this as a truth or a matter of knowledge, but as a construction of the world from
the viewpoint of his values.”76 In other words, Nietzsche is careful not to mistake Wille zur
Macht for another metaphysics of life.

WILLE ZUR MACHT
Having decided to suspend methodologically the metaphysical interpretation, to begin
alternatively with a methodological commitment to perspective as the basic condition of life, and
to characterize life without metaphysical justification as at bottom the affirmation of preferences,
Nietzsche fabricates Wille zur Macht as the principle by means of which all of existence can be
interpreted: “A living thing desires above all to vent its strength – life as such is will to power.”77
Rejecting Epicurean or Newtonian materialistic atomism as another instance of the metaphysical
interpretation—in this instance as one that tries to imbue the apparent world of flux with a real
material permanence—Nietzsche alternatively hypothesizes that all of existence can be
interpreted as the dynamic interplay of centers of force—rather than as numerically distinct
material units that remain the same through space and time—wherein each center of force is
designated as a specified quanta of power that seeks above all else to vent its strength. The
notion of venting strength, for Nietzsche, includes the activities of growing, expanding, and
incorporating into oneself as well as suppressing, exploiting, appropriating, imposing one’s own
forms, and overpowering the strange and weak.78 Through their interplay, forces can be
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quantitatively distinguished as stronger or weaker. In this context, according to Nietzsche, “The
stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the latter cannot assert its degree of
independence.”79 In this way, through their differentiated quantification, forces can be
qualitatively distinguished as commanding and obeying, growing and decaying, ascending and
descending, and as active and reactive. Significantly, then, while the history of philosophy is
abound with metaphysical dualisms—appearance vs. reality, truth vs. error, knowledge vs.
opinion, mind vs. body, freedom vs. determinism—that ultimately stem from Der Wille zur
Wahrheit, Nietzsche’s characterization of existence as Wille zur Macht posits a single principle
through which all phenomena can be interpreted. With this single interpretative device,
Nietzsche provides his own alternative accounts of the perennial issues of philosophy. However,
once again, Nietzsche is careful not to reify his interpretative principle into a new metaphysical
dogmatism—Wille zur Macht is not the final culmination of metaphysics. As Nietzsche very
clearly says:
Someone could come along who, with an opposite intention and art of interpretation, knew how to
read out of the same nature and with regard to the same phenomena the tyrannically ruthless and
inexorable enforcement of power-demands – an interpreter who could bring before your eyes the
universality and unconditionality of all ‘will to power’ in such a way that almost any word and
even the word ‘tyranny’ would finally seem unsuitable or as a weakening and moderating
metaphor – as too human – and who nonetheless ended by asserting of this world the same as you
assert of it, namely that it has a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course, but not because laws prevail
in it but because laws are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences
every moment. Granted this too is only interpretation – and you will be eager enough to raise this
objection? – well, so much the better. – 80

Nietzsche very clearly warns his readers not to confuse Wille zur Macht, an interpretation, for a
metaphysical principle founded upon a primordial truth. In the end, Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht
remains coherently within the methodological parameters he established for himself—the
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suspension of the metaphysical interpretation gives way to the fabrication of a post-metaphysical
principle for interpreting life.

IN DEFENSE OF NIETZSCHE
Returning to Habermas’s critical reading of Nietzsche, there is much with which to take
issue. Dallmayr in his piece, “Habermas’s Discourse of Modernity: Nietzsche as Turntable,”
makes several observations in this regard. First, Dallmayr notes that Habermas’s presentation of
the Dionysian in Nietzsche is highly oversimplified. Rather than having abandoned thought to
pure Dionysian frenzy, Dallmayr claims that, “Even and particularly The Birth of Tragedy—a
youthful and (in his own admission) somewhat Romantic and effusive work—did not simply
glorify irrational chaos but rather culminated in a paean on Attic tragedy seen as combination
and reconciliation of Dionysus and Apollo.”81 More importantly, Dallmayr points out that
Nietzsche does not reject philosophical thinking entirely, but more specifically rejects essentialist
and foundationalist inclinations within philosophy. In this way, Nietzsche’s critical suspicion is
aimed, not at philosophy in toto, but dogmatic tendencies in thought, philosophy, and
metaphysics specifically. If anything, and as I have been arguing, Nietzsche’s work is an attempt
to escape the trappings of foundationalist and dogmatic thought so as to offer an alternative
philosophical approach to the millennial old tendency to metaphysics—one that avowedly
emphasizes an experimentalism that Habermas neglects to acknowledge.82 Lastly, Dallmayr
importantly notes that Habermas’s dismissal of Nietzsche as “irrational” precisely enacts the
very characteristics that later Nietzscheans, such as Foucault, will describe at work in
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philosophical discourse—namely, that every discourse “harbors a principle of exclusion, thus
attesting to the intrusion of power (or the interlacing of pouvoir/savoir).”83
Similarly, Bauer, in her “Nietzsche, Enlightenment, and the Incomplete Project of
Modernity,” argues that Habermas’s own critical perspective, which emphasizes the division
between the Enlightenment and its excluded “Other,” between rationalism and irrationality,
perpetuates a dichotomous discourse of division and opposition that inhibits any discussion from
moving to more fruitful terrain.84 One could argue that Habermas’s framing of the problem of
modernity in terms of the Enlightenment and its excluded “Other” imports onto Nietzsche’s postmetaphysical philosophy a dialectical tinge that it precisely aims to avoid. Moreover, Bauer
argues that, “By focusing on the Dionysian experience and elevating it to function—
supposedly—as a doctrine, Habermas not only does injustice to The Birth of Tragedy but
practically erases from his criticisms a serious engagement with Nietzsche’s later texts. Only by
disregarding the multiplicity of perspectives in Nietzsche’s oeuvre can Habermas achieve his
aim. For instance, nowhere in Genealogy can one speak of a subjectivity liberated from the
constraints of cognition, purpose, utility, and morality. The very aim of the book is to expose
these constraints.”85 In other words, according to Bauer, Habermas’s reading of Nietzsche, which
focuses heavily on The Birth of Tragedy, does not cohere with claims Nietzsche makes in later
works. While both Dallmayr and Bauer’s engagements with Habermas’s reading of Nietzsche
make important contributions to overturning Habermas’s characterization of Nietzsche’s work,
neither author directly challenges Habermas’s accusations of Nietzsche’s work as contradictory
or incoherent. My contention with Habermas’s portrayal of Nietzsche does not concern
Habermas’s locating Nietzsche’s work in conversation with the philosophers of modernity or the
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German Romantics, but rather with Habermas’s general claim that Nietzsche is engaged in a
critique of reason that undermines its own foundations since it undermines the foundations for all
critique.
First, implicit within Habermas’s criticisms appear to be his own commitment to the
dialectic of enlightenment—that is, Habermas seems committed in advance to a form of thought
that can conceive of philosophy only as operating along the lines of a mutually exclusive
division between legitimacy and illegitimacy, and in which the sole aim of philosophy is to
“unmask” illegitimate forms of thought via an appeal to a more legitimate form of thought—
namely, one founded in a truth disclosed through reason.86 Consequently, Habermas reads
Nietzsche as similarly engaged in the task of advancing a legitimate form of thought that is
supposed to disclose the illegitimacy of other forms of thought via an appeal to a founding
origin. And, in this case, Habermas reads Nietzsche as claiming that the Dionysian experience of
self-oblivion discloses Wille zur Macht at the very core of reason and thereby as corrupting and
rendering illegitimate all forms of rational thought. This is why Habermas says of Nietzsche:
On the one hand, Nietzsche sees the possibility of an artistic contemplation of the world carried
out with scholarly tools but in an antimetaphysical, antiromantic, pessimistic, and sceptical
attitude. Because it serves the philosophy of the will to power, a historical science of this kind is
supposed to be able to escape the illusion of belief in truth. Then, of course, the validity of that
philosophy would have to be presupposed. That is why Nietzsche must, on the other hand, assert
the possibility of a metaphysics that digs up the roots of metaphysical thought without, however,
itself giving up philosophy. He proclaims Dionysus a philosopher and himself the last disciple and
initiate of this god who does philosophy. 87

The very attribution of the term ‘validity’ to what he calls “the philosophy of the will to power”
indicates that Habermas situates Nietzsche’s work squarely within the dialectic of enlightenment,
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within a vision of philosophy that remains tethered to the notion of a primordial truth. For this
reason, Habermas overlooks Nietzsche’s methodological decision to suspend the metaphysical
interpretation since he would not otherwise attribute to Nietzsche’s work a claim to validity that
Nietzsche himself explicitly brackets. Thus, in situating Nietzsche’s work within the
“unmasking” mechanisms of the dialectic of enlightenment, Habermas disregards the
methodological procedure by which Nietzsche takes leave of the dialectic, metaphysics, and
dogmatism. Moreover, so long as Habermas reads Nietzsche as engaged in the tasks of
“refuting” or “invalidating,” Nietzsche must of necessity remain trapped in the dialectic—worse,
Nietzsche’s work must appear as contradictory and incoherent. However, as I have argued,
attributing the project of an “unmasking” and “vitiating” critique of reason to Nietzsche conflicts
with what Nietzsche actually says regarding his “mistrust” of metaphysics and his
methodological suspension of the metaphysical interpretation.
As I have demonstrated via a close reading of Beyond Good and Evil, part of Nietzsche’s
philosophical project is to carry out a critical suspicion of a primordial truth the purpose of
which is neither to disprove the existence of such a truth nor to prove its impossibility since both
claims are self-refuting. Rather, Nietzsche’s initial aim, like that of the Pyrrhonian skeptics, is
merely to advance enough evidence so as to render the existence of a primordial truth
indeterminate and to do so without thereby lapsing into dogmatism himself. From this position,
Nietzsche then suspends methodologically the metaphysical interpretation and, moving beyond
Pyrrhonian skepticism, provisionally characterizes perspective—the absence of a primordial
truth—as the basic condition of life. Thus, given Nietzsche’s methodological suspension of the
metaphysical interpretation, it would be quite out of step with this methodological commitment,
as Habermas would have it, for Nietzsche to assert that the Dionysian experience of a de-
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centered subjectivity reveals “the world […] as a network of distortions and interpretations for
which no intention and no text provides a basis”88 since even a primordial aesthetic experience
revealed via a mystical intuition would nonetheless carry with it the weight of a metaphysical
interpretation regarding the essential and ultimate nature of reality. In other words, even an
aesthetico-mystical experience of a primordial truth—even if it were the truth of an irrational
“other” to reason—would remain mired in the forms of metaphysical dogmatism that Nietzsche
unambiguously strives to evade. Thus, since Nietzsche is of his own admission not a dogmatist,
he cannot possibly appeal to an aesthetico-mystical experience of a de-centered subjectivity that
would provide the ground to establish the truth that existence is Wille zur Macht—to do so would
be to fall into a blatant and fatal contradiction; it would be to run in stark contrast with very aims
of his post-metaphysical project. Therefore, despite Habermas’s contestations, Wille zur Macht is
not a mere “metaphysical conception of the Dionysian principle.”89 Rather, as I have
demonstrated, Wille zur Macht arises out of Nietzsche’s methodological suspension of the
metaphysico-philosophical moral impulse to accord with the truth and is thus, as an alternative to
principles purporting to be primordial truths erected upon founding origins, the fabrication of
what I have termed a “post-metaphysical interpretative principle.”
Secondly, since Wille zur Macht is a post-metaphysical principle, it can neither be the
case that Nietzsche employs Wille zur Macht to “unmask” the history of reason as an expression
of domination nor that his later texts are attempts to “demonstrate” that Wille zur Macht is at
work perverting the histories of knowledge, morality, psychology, and culture. Rather,
Nietzsche’s deployments of Wille zur Macht are interpretations explicitly put forward for the
purpose of advancing life. Moreover, we find that Nietzsche’s principle of Wille zur Macht quite
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impressively characterizes life, enacts that very characterization, and thereby meets the
standards of that very characterization. As Philip J. Kain similarly notes:
The doctrine of will to power is an interpretation – not a truth but a mere belief – and to rank
interpretations, to hold that the highest interpretation is the one that will give us the greatest
feeling of power, is itself just a second interpretation. Nietzsche is holding that it is will to power
which establishes and ranks our beliefs and at the same time that it is a mere belief to hold that
will to power establishes and ranks beliefs. Circular as this is, it is a coherent position. If will to
power is taken as the criterion of belief, then it should be the case that the criterion itself satisfies
the criterion. Thus, if will to power is to be accepted as the criterion of belief, it is to be accepted
only if it is the case that accepting it will increase our feeling of power, i.e., if accepting will to
power increases will to power. 90

In other words, if for Nietzsche the measure of the value of a judgment is not its truth or falsity
but whether or not it is life-advancing, and if life itself is characterized as the venting of strength,
which is itself defined as the overcoming and mastery of weaker forces, then whether or not a
judgment does indeed advance life is measured by whether or not it permits a force to overcome
and command resisting forces, i.e., by the extent to which it increases a force’s strength. Thus, no
judgment or interpretation is true or false for Nietzsche, but only stronger or weaker—that is, not
all interpretations equally advance life since not all interpretations equally enhance power.91
For these reasons, Nietzsche’s deployments of Wille zur Macht in his later works serve
several purposes. First, as has been repeatedly stated, they are ultimately in the service of
advancing life. Second, they advance life precisely by providing interpretations that overcome
resistance and enhance power. Nietzsche’s interpretations serve this latter purpose in two ways.
On the hand, while deployments of Wille zur Macht do not aim at presenting a metaphysical
account of existence, this is not to say that they do not aim at providing an account of existence.
Thus, in order to demonstrate that Wille zur Macht provides a viable post-metaphysical
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alternative to the metaphysical interpretation of existence, Nietzsche must be able to demonstrate
that an interpretation of existence via Wille zur Macht can meet its own standards of internal
coherence and consistency. On the other hand, in doing so, these interpretations must also
advance life. Thus, Nietzsche’s genealogies of philosophy, morality, Christianity, nihilism, and
the ascetic ideal are all instances of Nietzsche demonstrating that Wille zur Macht—as an
interpretative principle—can provide both a coherent alternative interpretation of existence that
meets its own standards as well as advancing life in doing so. We also find that Wille zur Macht,
can be employed to interpret physics, chemistry, geology, weather, history, science, philosophy,
psychology, morality, and all of existence—even interpretation itself. In this way, Nietzsche’s
genealogies “perform” Wille zur Macht—they are instances of Nietzsche deploying Wille zur
Macht as an interpretative force, venting its strength over resistant interpretative forces, so as to
advance life. Thus, for Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht is the most life-advancing interpretative
principle heretofore.92
Nietzsche, however, is not unaware of the theoretical precariousness of his method. As he
says in regard to Wille zur Macht as a post-metaphysical principle that enhances life, “One seeks
a picture of the world in that philosophy in which we feel freest; i.e., in which our most powerful
drive feels free to function. This will also be the case with me!”93 In other words, Nietzsche is
“honest” with us that the project of advancing life via Wille zur Macht is, in the end, ultimately
Nietzsche’s own personal way to overcome the problem of nihilism and of giving meaning to his
life. It is the post-metaphysical philosophy of Wille zur Macht that most enhances Nietzsche’s
sense of power, and therefore makes him feel freest. Thus, Nietzsche says in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra:
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I came to my truth by diverse paths and in diverse ways: it was not upon a single ladder that I
climbed to the height where my eyes survey my distances. And I have asked the way only
unwittingly – that has always offended my taste! I have rather questioned and attempted the ways
themselves. All my progress has been an attempting and a questioning – and truly, one has to
learn how to answer such questioning! That however – is to my taste: not good taste, not bad taste,
but my taste, which I no longer conceal and of which I am no longer ashamed. ‘This – is now my
way: where is yours?’ Thus I answered those who ask me ‘the way’. For the way – does not
exist!94

And also in Beyond Good and Evil:
Are they friends of ‘truth’, these coming philosophers? In all probability: for all philosophers have
hitherto loved their truths. But certainly they will not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, and
also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman, which has hitherto been the
secret desire and hidden sense of all dogmatic endeavors. ‘My judgment is my judgment: another
cannot easily acquire a right to it’ – such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say. 95

Nietzsche is clear that his post-metaphysical philosophy of Wille zur Macht is not supposed to
stand as a dogmatic solution to the problem of nihilism and to the problem of affirming life.
Instead, it is a solution to his problem of nihilism and to his problem of affirming life. In this
way, there is nothing coercive about Nietzsche’s post-metaphysical philosophy of Wille zur
Macht. We are under no compulsion to accept it as true since it is fabricated out of a
methodological suspension of—and as an alternative to—the metaphysico-philosophical moral
imperative to accord with the truth. Thus, Nietzsche himself is clear that we need not read Wille
zur Macht or his later genealogies as dogmatic metaphysical descriptions of reality—as Nehamas
earlier defined them—to which we must assent.

CONCLUSION
In the end, Habermas’s insistence that Nietzsche’s work is incoherent and self-refuting,
that Nietzsche is engaged in a critique of reason that undermines its own foundations since it
undermines the foundations for all critique, is wholly untenable. As I have shown, Nietzsche’s
critical suspicion of metaphysics is meant neither as a refutation of the existence of a primordial
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truth nor of the metaphysical systems truth presupposes. Likewise, Wille zur Macht is not meant
to stand as a new metaphysical principle born from an aesthetico-mystical insight into the
ultimate nature of reality nor as a principle by which to “unmask” the tyranny of reason. Instead,
Wille zur Macht is a post-metaphysical principle fabricated for the purpose of advancing life.
That Nietzsche can provide an account of reason via Wille zur Macht only serves to strengthen
its interpretative force, to “demonstrate” that it can measure up to the standard to which
Nietzsche holds it. In this way, that Nietzsche can provide a coherent and viable interpretation of
existence via Wille zur Macht simply serves to demonstrate that there can be more than just the
metaphysical interpretation of existence. Thus, Nietzsche’s account of metaphysics is not meant
to be a “critique of reason” in the sense in which Habermas alleges. While for Habermas it is
precisely reason that operates as a mechanism by which to unmask false absolutes as illusions, as
a founding origin by which to erect the legitimacy of a position that can identify all
illegitimacies, Nietzsche on all accounts disavows just such origins and just such a project. Thus,
in no way can Nietzsche undermine his own “critique” since in no way is he engaged in the
project of an undermining critique of a primordial truth. Moreover, as I have demonstrated, when
we read Nietzsche as a “post-metaphysical philosopher,” we can provide an alternative to
Habermas’s account of Nietzsche, one that is both viable and coherent.
This is not, however, to repudiate entirely Habermas’s reading of Nietzsche. Habermas is
correct that Nietzsche does indeed aim to take leave of the dialectic of enlightenment and that he
does indeed aim to jettison the metaphysical standards of truth and falsity. However, unlike on
Habermas’s account, Nietzsche does not do so by appealing to an aesthetico-mystical experience,
which would only draw Nietzsche back into metaphysics and thus only perpetuate the dialectic.
Rather, Nietzsche draws the full consequences of his departure: he accepts “untruth” and
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perspective as the basic condition of his life and hazards into the unknown, the uncertain, and the
experimental. Thus, Nietzsche truly does exit the dialectic and take root in the mythical.96
Nietzsche’s myths tell the tale of Wille zur Macht, the eternal return of the same, free spirits,
Übermenschen, philosophers of the future, and the genealogy of morals. However, Nietzsche’s
myths, precisely because they take leave of the dialectic, neither command nor elicit our
allegiance. We are not coerced into accepting the truth of Nietzsche’s myths. And, it is here that
Habermas misses the very strength of Nietzsche’s position. Habermas is correct, after modernity
post-metaphysical philosophy cannot return to myth since pre-modern myth was still
metaphysics. It can no longer serve us in its old guises. But, as Nietzsche suggests, “perhaps”
metaphysical truth too is just one more myth: “It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is
worth more than appearance; it is even the worst-proven assumption that exists.”97 Thus, what
Habermas misses is that as a post-metaphysical philosopher, Nietzsche goes forward—Nietzsche
does not search for founding origins, he instead fabricates. And, it is here, resulting from a
methodological decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation of life and thereby the
assumed value of primordial truths, that Nietzsche has something to offer those of us who
consider ourselves post-metaphysical and post-foundational: the methodological courage to
fabricate and experiment with new forms of thought and life—an experimental thinking and
living that evades the metaphysico-philosophical moral impulse to tyranny.
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CHAPTER 3:
HORKHEIMER’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS POST-METAPHYSICAL
METHODOLOGY
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INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, I advanced a reading of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics that
argued not only for the coherence of Nietzsche’s work as a form of post-metaphysical
philosophy, but also for its very significant and original characterization of post-metaphysical
philosophy as the fabrication of methodological principles. Whereas the project of metaphysics
aims for an insight into the essential structures of reality so as to provide an unassailable
foundation for its first principles—most significantly for those that establish normative
standards—post-metaphysical philosophy begins instead with a “methodological commitment”
to the principles that establish its critical orientation. In this way, the principles of postmetaphysical philosophies do not reflect—nor do they claim to reflect—an insight into the
fundamental nature of reality. Rather, post-metaphysical philosophy, as methodology, begins
with a transparent and reflexive relationship to the commitments that motivate critical inquiry.
Thus, unlike metaphysics, which aims for necessity and infallibility, post-metaphysical
philosophy maintains a flexible and fallibilistic relation to both the principles that orient its
critical inquiries as well as the metrics by which it assesses those commitments.
Even though Nietzsche advances a viable and rich post-metaphysical philosophy, the aim
of Nietzsche’s work is predominantly geared toward personal transformation in the face of the
advent of nihilism, which means that though Nietzsche’s work offers an abundance of conceptual
resources for post-metaphysical philosophy—the Apollonian vs. the Dionysian, the Übermensch,
the eternal return of the same, will to power, free spirits, philosophers of the future, genealogical
history—those resources were not explicitly devised for the purposes and concerns of critical
social theory. In order to address issues in post-metaphysical critical social theory specifically, I
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will turn to the work of Max Horkheimer.98 Largely overshadowed by the work of his fellow
colleagues Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, Horkheimer himself stands as more than just
the early director of the Frankfurt School and his work stands as more than a mere appendage to
that of Adorno and Marcuse. As J. C. Berendzen notes, one of Horkheimer’s most significant
contributions to philosophy at large is his development of dialectical materialism as a viable
post-metaphysical critical social theory.99 Similarly, Hauke Brunkhorst lauds Horkheimer’s
“materialist destruction of philosophy” for opening the way to a “social-scientific transformation
of philosophy” that takes leave of the problems of metaphysical philosophy.100
Despite the few commentators that applaud the achievements of Horkheimer’s work,
there are also those that consider Horkheimer’s work inherently aporetic, if not essentially
incoherent—specifically, these criticisms are advanced by Thomas McCarthy,101 Jürgen
Habermas,102 and Georg Lohmann.103 In turning to Horkheimer’s work, my aim here is twofold.
First, I will examine these criticisms so as to demonstrate, contrary to these commentators, that
Horkheimer’s dialectical materialism does indeed advance a viable and coherent postmetaphysical methodology, both epistemically and normatively. However, while disagreeing
with their reasons, but in agreement with these commentators’ conclusions, I too will argue that
98
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Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason is inherently problematic—though not because it is
ultimately self-contradictory, but rather because of the way in which it is undertaken in Eclipse
of Reason. In the end, I will argue that Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason lapses into
metaphysics despite his best efforts to keep it from doing so. This is problematic for Horkheimer
as a post-metaphysical philosopher since he is committed methodologically to the position that
metaphysics is an instrument of domination and hinders the alleviation of human suffering. Thus,
by lapsing into metaphysics, Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason enacts the very
tyranny, domination, and perpetuation of suffering that he sought to obviate, which therein
transgresses the earlier methodological parameters he established for himself. Given both the
achievements and failures of Horkheimer’s work, my second aim is to use them as a backdrop to
address similar criticisms leveled against Foucault’s work as a post-metaphysical critical social
theory. I will argue in the following chapter that the alleged failures of Foucault’s work—the
purportedly opaque critical orientation of his genealogical method and his refusal to provide
conventional normative resources—when contrasted to the work of Horkheimer, actually mark
considerable successes for Foucault’s post-metaphysical critical methodology.
MCCARTHY’S CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION IN DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
While Thomas McCarthy has high-praise for Horkheimer’s rather sophisticated solution
to the epistemic problems concerning post-metaphysical methodology—dialectical materialism
forgoes absolute metaphysical and epistemological foundations and yet evades falling into either
academic skepticism or relativism by means of a rigorous contextualist approach to truth—he
nonetheless considers Horkheimer’s attempt to replace Kantian pure practical reason with an
“ungrounded feeling of compassion” for the suffering of all living beings as leaving dialectical
materialism in a normative shortfall. On the one hand, McCarthy agrees with Horkheimer’s
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assessment that the pure rational moralities of German Idealism problematically shift the moral
burden from the social arrangement that produces oppression and inequality to the individuals
constituted by that society, which has the unwitting effect of transmitting a socio-structural
problem to the inner life of individuals. In Horkheimer’s estimation, as described by McCarthy,
“[The] “characteristic opposition [in pure rational moral theories] between duty and interest, the
universal and the particular, is an expression of the tension in capitalist society between the
possessive individualism required to thrive in a market economy and a concern for the general
welfare that, invisible-hand notions notwithstanding, is ill served by market mechanisms.”104
Thus, for Horkheimer, morality is best addressed as a socio-historical and not an individual
moral problem. However, on the other hand, McCarthy finds it wholly unsatisfactory that, given
the shortcomings of pure rational morality, Horkheimer thereby rejects out of hand any attempt
whatsoever to ground in reason the feelings of indignation, compassion, love, and solidarity. On
McCarthy’s account, Horkheimer’s appeal to “ungrounded feelings” generates as many problems
as it purportedly solves.
In McCarthy’s estimation, Horkheimer equivocates rational justification with ultimate
grounding and thus imposes a needless opposition between irrational feelings and rational
justification. Alternatively, according to McCarthy, “To drop the idea of pure rational motivation
is not to deny that motives can be elaborated, criticized, defended, and shaped by reasons.”105
Thus, just because Horkheimer rejects pure practical reason does not mean that he had to give up
all attempts to provide rational justification for those “feelings.” Instead, as McCarthy argues,
“If…Horkheimer had introduced into his discussion of morality the nonfoundationalist sense of
rational justification he appealed to in his discussion of truth, this connection could not have
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been sustained.”106 However, since Horkheimer creates an unbridgeable gulf between
“ungrounded feelings of compassion” and the “rational justification of universal ideals,” he
leaves us with no measure for determining with whom one should have sympathy and at what
one should feel indignation. Moreover, since social relations affect feelings, feelings cannot act
as an independent variable by which to gauge social imperatives. In this way, according to
McCarthy, Horkheimer’s normative justification for dialectical materialism fails to provide any
substantive normative resources.
HABERMAS’S CRITIQUE OF DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
As Karin Bauer,107 Peter U. Hohendahl,108 and Christopher Rocco109 all note, Habermas’s
hostility to Dialectic of Enlightenment is motivated not only by what he considers to be the
corrupting influence of Nietzsche’s critique of reason on Horkheimer and Adorno, but also by
the danger of its “black” ideas metastasizing like a social cancer throughout the European
intellectual milieu, especially in the forms of Derridean deconstruction and Foucaultian
genealogy. As Habermas himself says, “…under the sign of a Nietzsche revitalized by
poststructuralism, moods and attitudes are spreading that are confusingly like those of
Horkheimer and Adorno. I would like to forestall this critique.”110 The “moods and attitudes”
that so distress Habermas in connection with Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Adorno are those
manifested in a pessimism regarding the emancipatory potential of reason. On Habermas’s
account, just as Nietzsche attempts to unmask reason as an expression of Wille zur Macht, which
106
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in the end undermines the rational standards of epistemic and moral legitimacy, so too do
Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to unmask the Enlightenment’s complicity with myth, which in
calling into question the distinction between reason and myth, undermines the very criterion
presumed necessary for the modern conception of critique. For Habermas, this means, then, that
in both cases the authors engage in a totalizing critique of reason that ultimately undermines its
own foundations. As a result, both projects equally fall prey to performative contradiction.
On Habermas’s account, the Enlightenment established itself in direct contrast to myth,
tradition, and religion. In this way, the early task of the Enlightenment was to affect a break
between reason and myth. Since it alone was capable of generating universal understanding and
consent, reason discredited tradition and religion as legitimate sources of authority and installed
itself as the only rightful authority worthy of recognition. Moreover, in doing so, reason thereby
located myth—delineated now as the irrational—as the origin of the inhumane, barbaric,
oppressive, dominating, and regressive at work within the social field. As the Enlightenment
progressed, having cast the openly mythic as invalid, it similarly achieved a reflexive and critical
relation to its own theories via the method of ideology critique developed by Marx. As Habermas
explains it, ideology critique:
…Attempts to show that the validity of a theory has not been adequately dissociated from the
context in which it emerged; that behind the back of the theory there lies hidden an inadmissible
mixture of power and validity, and that it still owes its reputation to this. Ideology critique wants to
show how, on a level for which this painstaking distinction between contexts of meaning and
contexts of reality is constitutive, precisely these internal and external relationships are confused –
and that they are confused because validity claims are determined by relationships of power.
Ideology critique itself is not a theory competing with some other theory; it simply makes use of
certain theoretical assumptions. Thus equipped, it disputes the truth of a suspicious theory by
exposing its untruthfulness. It advances the process of enlightenment by showing that a theory
presupposing a demythologized understanding of the world is still ensnared by myth, by pointing
out a putatively overcome category mistake. 111
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In this way, ideology critique exposes the invalidity of a theory by unmasking the power
relations that establish its standing and therein what must be considered the illegitimate grounds
for its acceptance. In essence, ideology critique discloses a purportedly “true” theory as another
instance of myth. According to Habermas, in ideology critique the Enlightenment was able to
safeguard against mythic principles being reintroduced under the guise of theory. With
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, however, ideology critique itself comes
under suspicion. Whereas ideology critique originally tested a theory so as to be certain that it
derived from principles of reason, and not from the particular power interests of a social class,
ideology critique in the hands of Horkheimer and Adorno reflects back upon itself and calls into
question the very principles of reason that establish the grounds for distinguishing universally
valid and legitimate understanding from myth. Thus, the major thesis of Dialectic of
Enlightenment, “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to myth,”112 erodes
the very distinction between myth and enlightenment that makes possible the liberating potential
of modernity and the Enlightenment on Habermas’s reading.
At the core of Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument in defense of their thesis is the claim
that in both myth and reason an identical relation to nature holds. Via a reading of the history of
Western culture beginning in the Homeric myths, continuing through the early modern sciences
of Bacon, Descartes, and Newton, and having culminated in the organization of 20th century latecapitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno attempt to demonstrate that the underlying impetus driving
the entirety of the Western world is a desire to dominate nature for the purpose of selfpreservation. In this way, according to Habermas, the aim of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic
of Enlightenment is to unmask the operations of power that lurk beneath and corrupt Western
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reason so as to affect a totalized form of ideology critique. Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique
reduces reason to an “instrumental” form: reason can no longer generate its own ends but
operates strictly as a mechanism for determining the most effective means to any end.
Horkheimer and Adorno’s unmasking of the infusion of power into Western reason thus calls
into question the very standards and ideals by which the Enlightenment established itself in
contrast to myth. As Habermas says:
With their concept of “instrumental reason” Horkheimer and Adorno want to add up the cost
incurred in the usurpation of reason’s place by a calculating intellect. This concept is
simultaneously supposed to recall that when purposive rationality, overblown into a totality,
abolishes the distinction between what claims validity and what is useful for self-preservation, and
so tears down the barrier between validity and power, it cancels out those basic conceptual
differentiations to which the modern understanding of the world believed it owed the definitive
overcoming of myth.113

Thus, by disclosing instrumental reason’s origin in the drive to self-preservation, Horkheimer
and Adorno purportedly dissolve the distinction between myth and enlightenment that makes
critique possible. In this way, since ideology critique is aimed at its own foundations, critique
becomes total and falls prey to the accusation of performative contradiction. However, what
Habermas finds even more disconcerting in their critique is that, “Horkheimer and Adorno
regard the foundations of ideology critique shattered – and yet they would still like to hold on to
the basic figure of enlightenment.”114 In other words, even though Horkheimer and Adorno
employ ideology critique to call into question its very foundations, they do so with the intent of
enlightening the Enlightenment about itself. Thus, they confusedly hold onto Enlightenment
ideals in some form. For this reason, Habermas claims, “If they do not want to renounce the
effect of a final unmasking and still want to continue with critique, they will have to leave at
least one rational criterion intact for their explanation of the corruption of all rational criteria. In
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the face of this paradox, self-referential critique loses its orientation.”115 That is, without some
rational basis, critique forfeits its critical purchase. But, Horkheimer and Adorno ultimately
refuse this path. They carry their critique past the point of no return and, in this way, slide off
into “the groundless.”116 Thus, in the end, according to Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno find
themselves in “the performative contradiction inherent in an ideology critique that outstrips
itself.”117
LOHMANN’S CRITIQUE OF ECLIPSE OF REASON
Lohmann advances similar critiques to both McCarthy and Habermas, but aims them
directly at Horkheimer’s last major text, Eclipse of Reason. In this context, Lohmann argues that
Horkheimer’s analysis of the crisis of reason undermines any foundational position from which
one could indict or resist the collapse of reason. According to Lohmann, the first major difficulty
with Horkheimer’s analysis is that he locates the point of resistance in the individual who is “let
alone.” Such an individual is characterized as one who lives without metaphysical comfort and
whose suffering is unappeased by society’s offerings of happiness.118 Purportedly following
Schopenhauer, Horkheimer claims that in suffering we find compassion, which is the recognition
of, and sympathy with, the suffering of others. Upon this basis, Lohmann argues, Horkheimer
tries to construct a foundation for social solidarity: “The solidarity of compassion, one might say,
kindled by the observation of individual suffering, links—in a negative way—the self-realization
of one individual with that of another and, finally, with that of all individuals. Human beings
would thus experience their solidarity not in happiness but in misfortune, suffering, and pain.”119
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Thus, compassion, born out of suffering, is supposed to found an obligation to respect all livings
beings in nature capable of suffering. Lohmann contends, however, that our own suffering does
not necessitate compassion for others and thereby solidarity in suffering. Here, Lohmann cites a
study by Barrington Moore120 that establishes empirically that only in certain instances does
suffering transform into compassion, which is considered enough to refute Horkheimer’s
Schopenhauerian thesis. For this reason, though Horkheimer tries apparently to construct a
universal obligation for compassion out of suffering, he fails to provide an adequate explanation
or ground for how or why one ought to feel compassion. Thus, Lohmann says, “…[It] is still
unclear whether and how the intended solidarity of compassion can be derived…from conscious
individual suffering.”121 In the end, Horkheimer’s position amounts to a baseless assertion that
compassion for others serves as the foundation of social solidarity.
Secondly, Lohmann argues that Horkheimer’s critique of reason either remains merely at
the level of the programmatic or succumbs to historical relativism since it fails to secure an
adequate foundation for critique. In Lohmann’s terms, it needs a “comprehensive concept of
reason” through which the critique of reason can be justified. However, since Horkheimer’s
history of the crisis of reason tells the story of the rise of subjective reason as calculating
instrumentality, and its overthrow of an objective reason that could secure metaphysical
foundations, critique therein loses any basis upon which to rest truth-claims. Thus, Horkheimer’s
critique of subjective reason must be relativistic since, on Horkheimer’s own admission, there is
no form of absolute reason to which he can appeal. For this reason, Lohmann claims that, “The
demonstration that the instrumental reason of subjective self-preservation ultimately destroys the
individual whose self-realization it originally aimed to promote is…denunciatory. Yet this
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finding yields no objectively justifiable alternative. It shows only that these approaches do not
work.”122 In the end, according to Lohmann, all Horkheimer is left with is a vague appeal to a
form of reason that is “other” to the one that was born of the metaphysical impulse to dominate
nature.

APPROACHING THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
In defending Horkheimer from the above criticisms, and so as to defend my own critical
thesis, I will here follow Helmut Dubiel’s standard division of Horkheimer’s work into the three
distinct phases of materialism, critical theory, and the critique of instrumental reason.123
However, since the history of the Frankfurt School is both a long and a complicated one, an
attempt to delve into the precise ways in which the members of Frankfurt School changed their
theoretical approach in relation to those conditions is beyond the scope of my intentions here,
especially considering that Dubiel, Jay,124 and Wiggershaus125 have each written exacting
histories of the Frankfurt School that meticulously trace its theoretical development in relation to
the historical exigencies it faced. Thus, while there is much of importance to be said with respect
to the Frankfurt School’s foundation in Marxism, its engagement with Lukács, and its
appropriation of concepts found in Weber, I point readers to the above named studies for detailed
responses regarding these connections. Instead, borrowing from their work, I will provide only
the necessary bits of socio-historical background needed to establish and inform the theoretical
continuity between the three major phases of Horkheimer’s work. The specific thread of
continuity that will guide my presentation of Horkheimer is his life-long commitment to the
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“open dialectic” as an alternative methodological approach to metaphysics. Thus, in what
follows, I will begin with an account of the early theoretical orientation of the Frankfurt School,
its transformation into critical theory and the critique of instrumental reason, and I will conclude
by addressing Horkheimer’s critics as well as advancing my own criticism of Horkheimer’s
critique of instrumental reason as it is presented in Eclipse of Reason.

EARLY ORIENTATION OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
At the heart of Horkheimer’s early materialist phase is the concern to establish a more
just and rational society, which, according to the early Frankfurt School theoreticians, meant
abolishing the private ownership and control of the means of production and reorganizing them
under the management of a planned economy. However, despite their Marxist leanings, the
Frankfurt School found itself at odds with the Communist party on two points, and thus as
Marxist outsiders. First, based on the work of Frankfurt School economist Friedrich Pollock, its
members maintained that the liberal period of free-market capitalism Marx both analyzed and
critiqued had transformed into what Pollock would eventually term ‘state capitalism.’ According
to Pollock’s thesis, free-market capitalism, in which entrepreneurs pursued their own economic
interests unimpeded by state regulation and interference, was as crisis-prone as Marx had
claimed. However, after the global economic collapse in the 1920’s, the state began to intervene
in the marketplace and stave-off tendencies toward crisis. These interventions, Pollock argued,
could potentially preserve the capitalist mode of production indefinitely. The gist of Pollock’s
thesis was that the catastrophic economic collapse of capitalism, which was supposed to act as a
catalyst to a socialist revolution on Marx’s account, was no longer inevitable. Thus, the Great
Depression signaled for Pollock and other members of the Frankfurt School, not the end of
capitalism, but only the end of its liberal phase. In this way, state capitalism, through
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interventions in the market place, could mitigate the tendencies toward crisis in capitalism and
yet still serve the profit interests that drove liberal capitalism rather than the humanitarian
interests advocated by socialism.126
Secondly, Horkheimer rejects Lukács’—and, for that matter, the entire socialist
intelligentsia’s—identification of the proletariat as both the object of political theory and the
subject of political action.127 The guiding position of socialist theory is that only with the
development of a commodity economy, as in capitalism, does society become totalizing in such a
way that the exploitative and alienating conditions of the proletariat can be known and that the
recognition of these conditions will be sufficient to overthrow the capitalist organization of
society. In this way, when workers are brought to see the conditions of their existence under
capitalism, they will revolt. For this reason, the proletariat is considered both the object of theory
and the subject of practice. However, Horkheimer rejects the thesis that a “class consciousness”
is present, either transcendentally or empirically, in the proletariat as a theoretical knowledge
adequate to their condition and thus as an impetus to political revolution. Specifically,
Horkheimer’s rejection of “class consciousness” as a mediating point for theory and action was a
response to the defeat of the German labor movement towards the end of the Weimar
Republic.128 As Jay notes:
Critical Theory was developed partly in response to the failure of traditional Marxism to explain
the reluctance of the proletariat to fulfill its historical role. One of the primary reasons for
Horkheimer’s early interest in psychoanalysis had been the help it might give in accounting for the
psychological “cement” of society. Accordingly, when he assumed the reins of the Insitut in 1930,
one of the first tasks he announced was an empirical study of the mentality of workers in the
Weimar Republic.129
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Thus, in order to understand the failures of “class consciousness,” the Frankfurt School
introduced psychoanalytic method into orthodox Marxism. Moreover, this ultimately led
members of the Frankfurt School to reject Marxism’s insistence on the complete dependency of
the cultural superstructure upon the economic base, which alienated them only further from the
Communist party. It is, in this context, that the members of the Frankfurt School begin to
develop their unique methodological approach to the problems of social injustice in the early part
of the 20th century.

THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH
In his inaugural address as director of the Institute for Social Research, Horkheimer
claims that:
[Social philosophy’s] ultimate aim is the philosophical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human
fate—the fate of humans not as mere individuals, however, but as members of a community. It is
thus above all concerned with phenomena that can only be understood in the context of human
social life: with the state, law, economy, religion—in short, with the entire material and
intellectual culture of humanity. 130

Moreover, according to Horkheimer, in order to identify the social forces that shape the structure
of society, and thereby the life of humanity, the guiding question of social philosophy must be:
The question of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychical development of
individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrower sense (to which belong not
only the so-called intellectual elements, such as science, art, and religion, but also law, customs,
fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.).131

With this task in mind, Horkheimer rejects previous social philosophies that have developed out
of the work of Kant and Hegel, and that have culminated in a positivistic approach to social
philosophy at large. For Horkheimer, Kant’s philosophy ultimately remains trapped within an
isolated subject that determines the transcendental conditions of possible experience. Since the
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knowing subject is ultimately considered constitutive of cultural phenomena, it is therefore
incapable of examining the ways in which the economy, law, and religion act as social forces
constitutive of the subject. While Hegel improves upon the work of Kant by situating the
knowing subject within the constitutive forces of its social framework and history, and thus
locates the meaning and reason of the individual within the State and the historical destiny of
nations, the failure of the contestation of individual wills to find a synthesis in a higher order or
reason leads to an ever-increasing disbelief in the metaphysical realization of Absolute Spirit,
which culminates in a Schopenhauerian pessimism. Thus, according to Horkheimer, the Hegelian
philosophy is a failed attempt to “demonstrate—above the level of actual empirical events—the
existence of a higher, autonomous realm of being, or at least a realm of value or normativity in
which transitory human beings have a share, but which is itself not reducible to mundane
events.”132 For this reason, the death and suffering of individuals appears senseless and
meaningless in the absence of a metaphysical absolute. Lastly, while positivism attempts to
reduce science to a set of empirically verifiable facts, it not only abdicates a method for assessing
the viability of competing theories of reality in doing so, but also thereby rejects metaphysics as
a meaningful phenomenon at large. However, according to Horkheimer, a careful survey of the
dominant social philosophies of the time—Comte, Marx, Weber, or Scheler—all employ
metaphysical theories of social reality nonetheless. Thus, positivism is at bottom
methodologically limited and careless in its unsupported metaphysical assumptions.
Given the failings of the above-mentioned approaches to social philosophy, Horkheimer
offers his own procedure for social philosophy that addresses the inadequacies of the previous
theories. According to Horkheimer, “[The failure of social philosophy thus far] can be overcome
to the extent that philosophy—as a theoretical undertaking oriented to the general, the
132
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‘essential’—is capable of giving particular studies animating impulses, and at the same time
remains open enough to let itself be influenced and changed by these concrete studies.”133 In
other words, Horkheimer advocates a synthetic and working relationship between philosophy
and science. “In short, the task is to do what all true researchers have always done: namely, to
pursue their larger philosophical questions on the basis of the most precise scientific methods, to
revise and refine their questions in the course of their substantive work, and to develop new
methods without losing sight of the larger context.”134 Thus, with philosophy and science
working in tandem, the scientific research of studying society can be directed by the larger
philosophical question of the connection between economics, psychology, and culture, while at
that the same remaining open to revisions as the collected data opens and closes horizons of
inquiry.
With this interdisciplinary approach, Horkheimer holds that he can avoid the trappings of
both metaphysical dogmatism and empirico-scientific shortsightedness. As a specific example,
Horkheimer contrasts his new interdisciplinary approach to both a naïve Hegelianism and a naïve
Marxism. Horkheimer rejects a naïve Hegelianism that would hold ideas as primary and
determinant and material conditions as derivative and secondary. Similarly, Horkheimer also
rejects a naïve Marxism that would hold the economy as the only true reality and human
psychology and culture as epiphenomenal. Instead, Horkheimer, by means of an interdisciplinary
approach, seeks to discover the ways in which the economy, human psychology, and culture are
interrelated and mutually affect one another. Thus, the agenda of the Institute is from the very
beginning to formulate a comprehensive theory of society, i.e., one that does not privilege a
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single perspective, such as idealism or the economy, but rather critically interprets both society
and the individual from several perspectives in an attempt to understand how they interrelate.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND METAPHYSICS
Having established the agenda of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer takes great pains to
develop a method adequate to its ambition and sensitive to its concerns. It is in this context that
Horkheimer distinguishes the methodological approach of the Institute from both previous
metaphysically dominated approaches in philosophy and current trends in science. I will examine
the ways in which Horkheimer characterizes dialectical materialism 135 in relation to metaphysics
first and then science.
CHARACTERIZATION OF METAPHYSICS
According to Horkheimer, metaphysics, as classically conceived, is primarily concerned
with securing an absolutely perfect understanding of ultimate reality. In the tradition of
metaphysics, the inquiring subject attempts to discern with perfect clarity the fundamentally
unified and universal structure of reality that underlies the totality of being. As a result, one of
the central components of metaphysical thinking, and the epistemological position that it
assumes, is the tendency to pursue an ideal correspondence between knowledge and the
known—or rather, an identity between the concept of the object and the object of the concept.
Metaphysicians maintain that the knowing subject can indeed accurately grasp the fundamental
structure of reality as it is and that the concept will thus accurately reflect this structure. In this
way, the knowledge of the knowing subject and the fundamental structure of reality will
perfectly reflect one another.
In characterizing Horkheimer’s position of dialectical materialism and metaphysics, I draw primarily from his
1933 essay, “Materialism and Metaphysics.” However, my characterization of dialectical materialism is also
informed by his essays: “Materialism and Morality,” “On the Problem of Truth,” “The Rationalism Debate in
Contemporary Philosophy,” and “Montaigne and the Function of Skepticism.”
135
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Since all of metaphysics is concerned with the attempt to attain an accurate knowledge of
the fundamental structure of reality that underlies it in its totality, Horkheimer declares that,
“Every metaphysics strives for insight into an essential nature, with the idea that the nucleus of
the future is already contained in it; what metaphysics discovers must underlie not only the past
but the future as well.”136 Horkheimer argues that if metaphysics, as it understands itself, is to
attain to the level of an absolutely perfect understanding of ultimate reality, then that which
metaphysics is trying to know cannot be subject to change; it must seek knowledge of an
essential nature that holds for all time. Conceiving of metaphysics in this way, Horkheimer
states, “Metaphysics takes the most general characteristics, the elements as it were, which are
common to all men in all times and places, and calls them concrete.”137 Metaphysics deemphasizes particulars in favor of a general and universal structure that provides a stable
foundation for understanding particulars. Thus, metaphysicians consider that which is both most
real and most valuable to be that which is eternal and unchanging.
Importantly, Horkheimer contends that metaphysicians do not engage in the project of
metaphysics, or a “disinterested contemplation of things,” merely for its own sake. Rather,
according to Horkheimer, metaphysics is motivated by a desire to provide an absolutely certain
foundation for action. As Horkheimer states:
The effort to make his personal life dependent at every point on insight into the ultimate ground of
things marks the metaphysician. It makes no difference whether what he intuits urges him to
intense worldly action or to indifference or to asceticism, and whether the demands made on men
by reality are presented as identical for all men at all times or as differentiated and changeable. 138
The metaphysician thus believes that, in the being he seeks to discover, a basis may be found for
shaping the individual’s life… Ultimate reality is regarded as normative, however, not only in
those systems where religious origins of the dependence relationship still show in the form which

Max Horkheimer, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J.
O’Connell and Others (New York: Continuum, 1999), p. 25. Hereafter “Materialism and Metaphysics.”
137
Horkheimer, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” p. 32.
138
Horkheimer, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” p. 18.
136

70

precept takes, but also in all cases where harmony between the individual’s existence and its
ground as discovered by metaphysics is regarded as valuable. 139

The metaphysical tradition, as Horkheimer takes it, is an attempt to ground ethics and a basis for
normative critique in an understanding of ultimate reality. In this way, one of the fundamental
assumptions of the metaphysician is that contained within an accurate understanding of the
fundamental structure of reality is an insight into the meaning and purpose of existence—that is,
an insight into how we “ought” to live. Thus, the metaphysician not only wants an accurate
concept of reality, but also to set her actions in accord with that reality. In this way, and very
importantly, knowledge of ultimate reality is intended to dictate what we should and should not
do.
OBJECTION TO METAPHYSICS
Horkheimer objects to the project of metaphysics for two reasons. First, he claims that the
task of trying to ascertain the fundamental structure of reality that underlies all of existence turns
us away, in the end, from the problems of this world and focuses us instead on another, and quite
possibly illusory, world. This, in effect, actually cultivates insensitivity to the wretchedness of
this world and our time, and distracts us from seeking its causes and altering its conditions. Thus,
rather than placing a higher value on changing the immediate material conditions of human
existence in this world, metaphysics relegates the social problems of this world to an inferior
position relative to the project of absolute knowing. Thus, for Horkheimer, the task of
metaphysics by its very nature devalues human existence in favor of another world and thereby
ignores the plight of humanity.

139

Horkheimer, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” pp. 18-19.

71

Second, Horkheimer claims that, under the guise of universality, metaphysical theories
have been employed throughout history as a means for justifying the demand to recognize the
particular interests of individuals and social groups:
Ruling and ruled classes alike have not been satisfied to present their claims simply as expressions
of their particular needs and desires. They have also proclaimed them as universally binding
requirements grounded in transcendent sources, as principles in accord with the eternal nature of
the world and man.140

In other words, social classes are rarely content to present their specific needs as an expression of
their own personal agenda and instead often present those needs as universal and binding laws of
nature.141 In this way, Horkheimer specifically characterizes metaphysics as an instrument of
domination, as a method for imposing one’s interests on others and soliciting their obedience in
the process of doing so.
CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS
Fundamentally, however, Horkheimer is critically suspicious of the project of
metaphysics—that is, Horkheimer casts doubt on the very possibility of gaining an absolute
insight into the eternal and unchanging structure of ultimate reality. According to Horkheimer,
The claim that there is an absolute order and an absolute demand made upon man always supposes
a claim to know the whole, the totality of things, the infinite. But if our knowledge is in fact not
yet final, if there is an irreducible tension between concept and being, then no proposition can
claim the dignity of perfect knowledge. Knowledge of the infinite must itself be infinite, and a
knowledge which is admittedly imperfect is not a knowledge of the absolute. 142

For Horkheimer, the project of metaphysics assumes both an eternal and unchanging structure
that underlies the totality of existence and a knowing subject that can, through reason, transcend
the particularities and specificities of space and time to access this essential structure. However,
it is not clear to Horkheimer that this can be done. Methodologically, Horkheimer operates with
an alternative conception of the knowing subject as deeply situated within its historical and
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contextual perspective and thereby limited by this perspective. In this way, the project of
metaphysics is an epistemological impossibility for Horkheimer’s contextualist subject of
knowledge.143
Furthermore, Horkheimer’s method not only affirms the historically and contextually
limited position of the knowing subject, it also affirms the historically and contextually
conditioned position of the object of knowledge:
The theoretical activity of men, like the practical, is not the independent knowledge of a fixed
object, but a product of ever-changing reality. Even in a society that would freely determine what
it is to be, nature, however gradual the change in it might be, would be a militating factor against
such an identification of knowledge and the object. Physics is an abstract product of human action
and may be related to future experience only as a highly conditional hypothesis, not as the full
reflection of a supposed essence of natural history. 144

That is, according to Horkheimer, we do not find a stable structure of nature in experience.
Rather, we seem to find something that is itself in a constant state of flux. Thus, as Horkheimer
attempts to elaborate in the above quoted passage, despite our attempts to formulate concepts
adequate to the phenomena of nature, nature itself seems to change both in its very structure and
its processes. Thus, from Horkheimer’s methodological position, an identity between knowledge
and object cannot be achieved.
For these reasons, Horkheimer considers our concepts as always limited and hypothetical.
We can never be sure that we have been given all the necessary information to formulate an
adequate concept of the object such that we have achieved absolute knowledge—an identity
between concept and object. Since we are both limited in our perspective, and nature itself seems
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to be in flux, our concepts remain hypothetical since some further information could be revealed
that demands that we revise our initial concepts. Therefore, for Horkheimer, given the epistemic
difficulties he identifies, the project of metaphysics seems implausible, and thus it is more useful
methodologically to consider our knowledge as probable rather than as necessary.
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO METAPHYSICS
Horkheimer terms his methodological alternative to metaphysics “dialectical
materialism.” According to Horkheimer, “materialism…maintains an irreducible tension
between concept and object.”145 That is, unlike metaphysics, which holds that the knowing
subject can attain knowledge that perfectly resembles the way reality truly is, and thereby points
to an identity between knowledge and known, dialectical materialism does not hold that such an
identity can ever occur. Rather, “materialism, unlike idealism, always understands thinking to be
the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time. It challenges every claim to the
autonomy of thought.”146 Thus, dialectical materialism begins with the methodological
understanding that the knowing subject, given the historically and contextually situated condition
of both itself and nature, can never attain to absolute knowing.147
More decisively, dialectical materialism does not envision the subject and nature as two
independent units of which the metaphysical task is to bring them into accord, i.e., to achieve
absolute knowing. Instead, for dialectical materialism, both the subject and nature are two
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interdependent aspects of a fundamentally unified structure. Thus, for dialectical materialism, we
will never be able to distinguish with absolute precision the boundary between the subject and
nature. As Horkheimer states, “In what we call objective, subjective factors are at work; and in
what we call subjective, objective factors are at work.”148
Using Kant as an example of an undialetical metaphysical thinker, Horkheimer claims
that while Kant ultimately prohibits reason from absolute knowing—barring reason from the
noumenal and relegating it to the phenomenal—he nonetheless presupposes a process of
knowing that, while it lies at a point in infinity, nevertheless envisions the process of knowing as
a process in which the subject and object march progressively closer to one another, a process in
which the concept and object are ever-approximating one another even though the ultimate
coincidence of the two lies at a point in infinity. Thus, while the Kantian project abandons the
possibility of an ultimate unity between subject and object, it nonetheless still guides the Kantian
project in the form of a hope. In contrast, dialectical materialism wholly rejects the model of
metaphysics upon which the epistemological task of philosophy founds itself.
Using science as an example, and envisioning it across Kantian lines, we typically and
naively hold that the concepts of science as they develop through history are an ever-greater
approximation of nature. Both the metaphysical and Kantian ideas of science assume the ideal of
an infinite progress in knowing and that there is, ultimately, an essential and unchanging
structure of reality that we are ever more-closely approximating conceptually.149 Dialectical
materialism, however, rejects the idea that we are taking steps toward the absolute. “Metaphysics
usually has its gaze fixed on ‘the structural unity of this one, great, unknown reality to whose
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questions we have no answer, but for the materialist such a unity is habitually neither startingpoint nor goal.”150 Rather, for dialectical materialism, the process of knowing and formulating
concepts always occurs within the dynamism of history and society. In this way, dialectical
materialism understands that specific men formulate concepts at a specific time, in a specific
socio-economic context, and with a specific agenda in mind. Thus, these concepts do not reveal a
fixed and timeless reality that existed in the past and will hold for the future. Rather, they are
operative within, and indicative of, a moment in time. Any concept can one day reveal itself as
meaningless. Likewise, for Horkheimer, just as historical context shapes concepts, so too do
concepts shape their historical context as a productive force. At any given time we accept certain
concepts as true, and act on and shape our world according to those concepts, i.e., religious
ideals, economic theories of incentive, etc. Here is the mutual interdependence of concept and
object in dialectical materialism. Nature, as a socio-historical context shapes our concepts, but
our concepts equally shape nature as principles that inform our action.
As is evident, dialectical materialism operates wholly outside the confines of a project
that busies itself with getting reality “right,” which is the task of metaphysics. Instead, dialectical
materialism abandons the old paradigm of measuring its concepts against reality or an ideal of
absolute knowing: “Since that extra historical and hence exaggerated concept of truth is
impossible, which stems from the idea of a pure infinite mind and thus in the last analysis from
the concept of God, it no longer makes sense to orient the knowledge that we have to this
impossibility and call it relative.”151 Dialectical materialism thus abandons the traditional project
of philosophy, as metaphysics, and moves closer to the methods and practices of science—that
is, dialectical materialism utilizes concepts as hypotheses formulated on the basis of the best and
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most rigorously accumulated data at the time, but nonetheless holds those concepts open to
revision and continual scrutiny. As Brunkhorst characterizes it, “The most general fundamental
principles of the materialists—constitution-theoretical, even ontological-sounding theses such
that ‘all that exists is material’—have a merely hypothetical status, dependent of fallible
experience…”152
RELATIVISM, SKEPTICISM, AND TRUTH
Considering that dialectical materialism rejects metaphysical absolutes for contextually
situated subjects and objects, it appears on the surface that dialectical materialism is either a form
of relativism or a form of skepticism. If we cannot know truth absolutely, or an absolute truth,
then one might argue that we are unmoored from any means by which to determine the validity
of concepts, that the difference between concepts would be liquidated by epistemic, and thus
metaphysical, uncertainty. Yet, Horkheimer asks, “Is there really only a choice between
acceptance of a final truth, as proclaimed in religious and idealistic schools of philosophy, and
the view that every thesis and every theory is always merely “subjective,” i.e., true and valid for
a person or group or a time or human beings as a species, but lacking objective validity?”153 This
is a false dilemma. Horkheimer explicitly critiques both relativism and skepticism, and casts
dialectical materialism as an alternative to both the naïveté of the metaphysics of truth and the
absurdities of a relativistic skepticism.154
According to Horkheimer, Hegel refutes philosophical skepticism via the concept of
“determinate negation.” While one could argue that because a series of concepts fail to represent
an object accurately and thereby that the project of knowledge is flawed, Hegel argues instead
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that the series itself is a process of more accurate depictions of the object and not a series of
failures. Thus, when an element of an object invalidates our concept of the object, we do not
merely abandon the previous concept. The negation of the previous concept is not absolute. That
is, a “determinate negation” is not a disjunction in which either the book is on the table or the
book is not on the table. Rather, the negation of a previous concept pushes knowledge forward
and points toward the formulation of a new concept. Using the U.S. 2012 presidential race as an
example, the Republican Party self-avowedly had a poor concept of the American voting
constituency. This was manifested in the extreme disjunction between their anticipation of the
election results and the actual election results. This discrepancy forced the Republican Party to
reexamine its initial concept. However, the previous concept is not merely negated, it is negated
in a fruitful way: the inadequacies in the original concept point toward a more accurate concept.
Thus, Hegel’s concept of “determinate negation” overcomes skepticism.
However, for Hegel, “The goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial
progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where
knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion.”155 On
Horkheimer’s reading, Hegel remains within idealistic, dogmatic, and metaphysical philosophy.
In this way, for Horkheimer, just as Kant’s theory of knowledge succumbs to Hegel’s critique, so
Hegel’s critique of Kant succumbs to Marx’s critique:
[In] contemplating his own system, Hegel forgets one very definite side of the empirical situation.
The belief that this system is the completion of truth hides from him the significance of the
temporally conditioned interest which plays a role in the details of the dialectical presentation
through the direction of thought, the choice of material content, and the use of names and words,
and diverts attention from the fact that his conscious and unconscious partisanship in regard to the
problems of life must necessarily have its effect as a constituent element of his philosophy.156
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That is, Hegel does not account for the historically situated element of thought, Hegel falls prey
to Marx’s critique—historical materialism—that thought is influenced by its time.157
Thus, whereas Hegel ultimately advocates a “closed dialectic” that will one day resolve
itself in absolute knowing, Horkheimer advocates an “open dialectic” that maintains an
irreducible tension between concept and object:
The open-ended materialistic dialectic does not regard the ‘rational’ as completed at any point in
history and does not expect to bring about the resolution of contradictions and tensions, the end of
the historic dynamic, by the full development of mere ideas and their simple consequences. It
lacks the aspect of the idealistic dialectic that Hegel described as ‘speculative’ and at the same
time as ‘mystical,’ namely, the idea of knowing the ostensibly unconditioned and thereby being
oneself unconditioned.158

Yet, this does not mean that a measure for truth cannot be established. As in the sciences,
“generally accepted criteria” 159 are in place at any given time for determining the truth-value of
propositions. Horkheimer speaks to the example of medicine. While the concept of cancer may
change over time and eventually become meaningless, it nonetheless has a precise meaning at a
given time and only one of two conflicting claims as to what indicates the presence of cancer in a
patient can be correct. That is, given the current state of knowledge concerning cancer at a
particular time, a doctor’s claim that a patient has cancer is either correct or incorrect. As
Horkheimer states, “Truth is decided not by individual’s beliefs and opinions, not by the subject
in itself, but by the relation of the proposition to reality.”160 There is a generally accepted body of
knowledge and a rigorous method for establishing truth. One either correctly or incorrectly
employs this method. This is not to say that the very concept of cancer cannot be called into
question and ultimately overthrown, but within set parameters, according to Horkheimer, a nonrelativistic truth can be established. Moreover, “From this follows the principle that every insight
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is to be regarded as true only in connection with the whole body of theory, and hence is so to be
understood conceptually that in its formulation the connection with the structural principles and
practical tendencies governing theory is preserved.”161 In other words, while on the particular
level of specific instances of cancer, one either diagnoses correctly or incorrectly, when the battle
of the very concept of cancer is called into question, this itself takes place within the greater
context of a theoretical framework and will ultimately have to resolve itself within this
framework. Here, Horkheimer is describing something akin to a “paradigm shift” within a
specific discipline.162 Concepts and theories can be brought into play that call into question the
entire body of knowledge heretofore established in a discipline—for example, the Einsteinean reframing of Newtonian mechanics. Yet, these debates themselves take place only in the context of
a greater theoretical framework, in the context of methods and aims that superseded and directed
the very nature of those debates.
In this way, we can see that Horkheimer is employing a combination of the
correspondence theory of truth and a coherence theory of truth. Yet, rather than naively thinking
that either reaches at reality, Horkheimer emphasizes the radically historically situated nature of
both the knower and her tasks. Theory is always related to socio-historical practice, even those
theories that appear most theoretically abstract on the surface. Thus, while there is no “absolute
knowing” for Horkheimer, not all claims to truth are equally valid. Within the generally accepted
parameters of knowledge at a given time, there is a criterion and a method for distinguishing true
claims from false claims, even if those claims once held true one day may prove to be false from
a refined and newly established perspective.

161
162

Horkheimer, “PT,” p. 204.
See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

80

Horkheimer is careful to distinguish the open dialectic of dialectical materialism from
pragmatism. According to Horkheimer, pragmatism is a theory of truth that claims that the
validity of propositions is determined by 1) what one accomplishes with them, 2) the ability to
produce desired effects, 3) the furtherance of life, 4) promotion of human activity, and 5) that
which “pays.”163 Horkheimer’s critique of pragmatism is that so long as it operates
independently of social philosophy, it ultimately works in collusion with the dominant form of
society—that is, it ultimately reinforces the interests of the powerful status quo. Thus, one must
ask, “A theory is correct if it advances life for whom?” So long as pragmatism is untethered from
social critique, it ultimately plays into the hands of reinforcing the status quo.
This ultimately underlines Horkheimer’s point that all theory is ultimately tied to
practice. In essence, Horkheimer ultimately rejects the idea of “disinterested contemplation.”
Instead, all scientific inquiry—loosely construed—is motivated by particular agendas at a
particular moment in history. Whether it is research into the genome project because of the
profitably of potential medicines, or political economy with the intent of altering the basic
economic configuration of society, all theory is motivated by practice, i.e., seeks to bring about
an effect in the world or is situated in a nexus that seeks to have an effect in the world. For this
reason, Horkheimer is clear that his goal is to understand the economy, like any other object of
science and nature, so as to be able to manipulate it and direct it.
Here we return to the Frankfurt School’s Marxist roots. Ultimately, what distinguishes
dialectical materialism from metaphysics, relativism, and science is that it seeks to understand
the current forms of social domination that arise under the capitalist mode of production so as to
change them. Thus, since the very object of inquiry for dialectical materialism is highly mobile

Horkheimer, “PT,” p. 197. According to this definition of pragmatism, Horkheimer classifies Nietzsche as a
pragmatist and highlights a theoretical difference he has with him. See Horkheimer, “PT,” p. 195.
163

81

and fluid—understanding as a multi-faceted, complex, and inter-related phenomenon—
dialectical materialism must of necessity take into account not only the fluidity of its object, but
also the necessity to remain fluid in its concepts. And, it is for this reason that dialectical
materialism rejects static metaphysical theories and opts instead for a fluid and open dialectic.
Thus, stating the benefit of the open materialistic dialectic, Horkheimer claims:
But by ceasing to be a closed system, dialectic does not lose the stamp of truth. In fact, the
disclosure of conditional and one-sided aspects of others’ thought and of one’s own constitutes an
important part of the intellectual process. Hegel and his materialist followers were correct in
always stressing that this critical and relativizing characteristic is a necessary part of cognition.
But being certain of one’s own conviction and acting upon it do not require the assertion that the
concept and object are now one, and thought can rest. To the degree that the knowledge gained
from perception and inference, methodical inquiry and historical events, daily work and political
struggle, meets the test of the available means of cognition, it is the truth. The abstract proposition
that once a critique is justified from its own standpoint it will show itself open to correction
expresses itself for the materialists not in liberality toward opposing views or skeptical indecision,
but in alertness to their own errors and flexibility in thought. 164

By means of an open dialectic, dialectical materialism can evade the problems of dogmatism that
beset Marxism in the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century,
especially under Lenin and Stalin.
MATERIALISM AND ACTION
Since dialectical materialism is operating outside the confines of the traditional project of
metaphysics, dialectical materialism also rejects the notion of a metaphysically grounded
normative position of action or critique. As Horkheimer notes, “What we have already said
implies that materialist views are incompatible with the idea of an absolute demand made upon
man.”165 Dialectical materialism, methodologically, bars the possibility of providing an absolute
foundation for morality. In fact, Horkheimer openly admits that dialectical materialism is without
a ground for its moral and normative position. “This materialist view has the negative
significance that it rejects a metaphysically grounded morality. But in addition it has always
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meant to materialists that man’s striving for happiness is to be recognized as a natural fact
requiring no justification.”166 In this way, dialectical materialism refuses to postpone changing
this world in favor of theorizing about another one. Instead:
The materialist tries to replace the justification of action with an explanation of it through an
historical understanding of the agent. He regards justification as an illusion. Most men down to the
present day feel a very strong need for such a justification; in important decisions they are not
content to rely on their feelings of indignation, compassion, love, solidarity, and so on, but must
relate their feelings to an absolute world-order by calling them ‘moral.’ But this widespread need
does not prove that there is a reasonable fulfillment of it. The life of most men is so wretched, the
deprivations and humiliations are so many, and their efforts and success are for the most part so
disproportionate, that we can easily understand the hope that the earthly order of things may not be
the only one.167

Thus, the focus of dialectical materialism is ultimately on altering the material conditions of this
world in which men suffer and employing a theoretical position that can most effectively realize
this project: “[Materialism] is concerned with changing the concrete conditions under which men
suffer and in which, of course, their souls must be stunted.”168 According to Horkheimer, we find
in the 20th century a disproportionate amount of suffering. Moreover, this is neither due to a
deficiency in resources nor in technology since in the 20th century the resources and technology
exist to provide a reasonable quality of life for all individuals. Thus, dialectical materialism does
not seek a ground for claiming that we should help people, as in metaphysics, but simply chooses
to do so. Moreover, it holds that the current state of inequality and barbarism found in the 20th
century is a product of the economic situation of the 20th century, i.e., capitalism as dominant
mode of production.169 Thus, the goal for dialectical materialism is to develop an economic
theory of society that ameliorates the suffering of the majority of people in this world, rather than
Horkheimer, “Materialism and Metaphysics,” p. 44.
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focusing on finding a reason to do so in another world.170 Significantly, then, rather than
attempting to gain an insight into reality so as to know how to live, the materialist wants to
interpret to the best of her ability how the world works so that she can direct it to her purposes—
the fulfillment of human satisfaction—rather than herself to it: “The reality which the materialist
seeks to master for himself is the opposite of divine, and his effort is to direct it according to his
will rather than to direct himself according to it.”171

FROM TRADITIONAL THEORY TO CRITICAL THEORY
While Horkheimer initially casts the project of dialectical materialism in distinction to the
task of metaphysical philosophy, and therein aligns dialectical materialism more closely to
science, by the late 1930’s Horkheimer also begins to cast the aims of his project in contrast to
the reigning science of his time as well as now referring to the theoretical position of the
Frankfurt School as “critical theory.” This transition, as Dubiel states, occurs in response to the
major socio-historical transformations occurring at the time.172 Most importantly, the Frankfurt
School had come to consider Soviet-style socialism under Stalin as a significant failure. In
previous years, the Frankfurt School thought that the abolition of the private ownership of the
means of production was enough to bring about the emancipatory effects of socialism. However,
Stalin’s Russia demonstrated that the means of production could be removed from private
ownership and put in the hands of a state-bureaucratic apparatus and yet still not serve the needs
of a society in the form of a planned economy. In this way, the Frankfurt School came to reject
openly Soviet-style Marxism as they realized that a planned economy in and of itself was not
enough to bring about a more rationally organized society. Thus, the Frankfurt School’s adoption
As I will argue later, Horkheimer’s rejection of the need to ground compassion metaphysically aligns him closely
with Buddhism.
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of the term “critical theory” was intended to cast them as engaged in a more “authentic” form of
Marxism than either that of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) or the
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). In this way, Horkheimer’s use of the term
“critical” was an explicit attempt to re-appropriate and redeploy Marx’s notion of the critique of
political economy developed in Capital, which on Horkheimer’s reading was intended to act as a
theory “adequate to its situation” rather than as a theory that misconstrues its analyses of history
for the process of history itself, as with Hegel. Moreover, the rejection of the proletariat as a
revolutionary force brought the Frankfurt School to place a greater focus on the individualizing
and politically stultifying effect of the scientific attitude on society. Thus, the name “critical
theory” marks for the Frankfurt School both an abandonment of the utopian image of socialism
after the failures of the Soviet Union as well as the project of critically appropriating science for
the precise purpose of transforming the current configuration of society into one that is organized
more rationally.
TRADITIONAL THEORY
For Horkheimer, the traditional concept of theory is, on the one hand, the culmination
and realization of the ideals of science set forth in Cartesian modernity. In essence, theory is
simply “the sum total of propositions about a subject.”173 In accordance with the basic principles
of Euclidean axiomatic geometry, the fundamental and most basic propositions of theory should
form a systematic, unified, and comprehensive whole that will thus provide a basis for a
universal and systematic science of all possible objects. In this way, every proposition within
theory must fit together consistently. However, the traditional concept of theory is not itself pure
mathematics. The goal of all theory is to provide an explanatory model of the totality of
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phenomena. Therefore, the primary goal of theory is to achieve a consonance between the
propositions of theory and the phenomena they are intended to describe. Specifically, this holds
for the most basic and fundamental propositions of theory since, regardless of the exact science
in which the theorist is engaged, they are derived from experience through a rigorous inductive
process. This means that new phenomena could potentially appear at any time creating a
dissonance between the propositions of theory and the phenomena they are intended to explain.
Thus, theory must always remain hypothetical. Furthermore, the task of theory is not merely to
explain phenomena as though theory were an idle curiosity. As Horkheimer points out, the
traditional concept of theory is, rather, the realization of Francis Bacon’s scientific dream of
manipulating and controlling nature. In this way, the Industrial Revolution with its technological
advances is the culmination of the task of the traditional concept of theory.
CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL THEORY
According to Horkheimer, a danger arose within the traditional concept of theory. With
its task set to manipulate and control nature for the purpose of human interests, the traditional
concept of theory was slowly reified until it came to stand as the only method for the acquisition
of knowledge, as though the traditional concept of theory was in accord with the inner and
essential nature of knowledge itself. Most problematically, traditional theory still operates as
under the Enlightenment era fascination with science as a gentleman’s hobby, overlooking its
relationship to society at large. Thus, to this extent, so long as science focuses on its research as a
practice of the fully realized methodology for gathering knowledge, scientific activity continues
to occur as though it were an isolated activity divorced from other social processes. Yet, as soon
as we ask how the objectives and goals of traditional theory are established and why some
projects are undertaken as opposed to others, it becomes evident that they are set by the interests
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of society in general and the interests of industry specifically, which becomes all the more
evident when one recognizes the predominance of the pragmatic principle of utility in science—
only that research that can deliver “useful” results is of value. Thus, according to Horkheimer, so
long as science continues to operate as if it were an isolated discipline divorced from the social
nexus, it will fail to recognize its relationship to—and more importantly, its complicity with—
the current and dominant mode of production, i.e., capitalism. As Thomas McCarthy notes, “One
of the first tasks of critical theory is to challenge the privileged ‘nonposition’ of socio-scientific
knowledge by analyzing the modes of its production, the role it plays in society, the interests it
serves, and the historical processes through which it came to power.”174
Horkheimer is concerned with traditional theory’s unreflective complicity with capitalism
for several reasons. First, for Horkheimer, an economic system based on commodity exchange is
inherently oppressive, exploitive, unjust, and barbaric. As Horkheimer states:
The bourgeois economy was concerned that the individual should maintain the life of society by
taking care of his own personal happiness. Such an economy has within it, however, a dynamism
that results in a fantastic degree of power for some, such as reminds of the old Asiatic dynasties,
and in material and intellectual weakness for many others. The original fruitfulness of the
bourgeois organization of the life process is thus transformed into a paralyzing barrenness, and
men by their own toil keep in existence a reality that enslaves them in ever-greater degree.175

Here, Horkheimer is calling attention to a contradiction that has arisen within free-market
capitalism. The basic tenets of free-market capitalism claim that, through the pursuit of
enlightened self-interest, a greater distribution of wealth will occur within society and lift the
general level of happiness experienced by most people from that previously experienced under
feudalism. Yet, according to Horkheimer, we currently find in society the consolidation of
wealth in the hands of a few, an ever-increasing population of those that are exploited and
oppressed, and an economic, political, and cultural system designed to ensure the privilege of a

174
175

McCarthy, pp. 135-136.
Horkheimer, “TCT,” pp. 212-213.

87

few at the expense of many. Moreover, according to Horkheimer, the basic politico-economic
principle of capitalism—that the interests of all can be met by the individual pursuit of selfinterest by each—was formulated and implemented in a very purposive fashion. Thus, capitalism
is not an historical accident, but a human construction quite consciously brought into existence.
However, for Horkheimer, this means that, “The bourgeois type of economy, despite all the
ingenuity of the competing individuals within it, is not governed by any plan; it is not
consciously directed to a general goal; the life of society as a whole proceeds from this economy
only at the cost of excessive friction, in a stunted form, and almost, as it were, accidentally.”176
In other words, rather than developing and implementing an economic system that utilizes and
distributes the resources of society in an organized and rational fashion, capitalism is
“orchestrated chaos.” What is worse, according to Horkheimer, is that capitalism is cast as
though it is an organic and inevitable product of nature and history and not as the design of very
specific individuals at a very specific moment in time. Thus, those who benefit from it cast
resistance to capitalism as futile. However, as Horkheimer notes:
There will always be something that is extrinsic to man’s intellectual and material activity, namely
nature as the totality of as yet unmastered elements with which society must deal. But when
situations which really depend on man alone, the relationships of men in their work, and the
course of man’s own history are also accounted part of ‘nature,’ the resultant extrinsicality is not
only not a suprahistorical eternal category (even pure nature in the sense described is not that), but
it is a sign of contemptible weakness. To surrender to such weakness is nonhuman and
irrational.”177

It is cowardly to continue to see capitalism as an inevitable and unalterable historical fact. So
long as we continue to see capitalism as natural, we will forestall any effort to change it. Thus,
Horkheimer argues:
Unemployment, economic crises, militarization, terrorist regimes—in a word, the whole condition
of the masses—are not due, for example, to limited technological possibilities, as might have been
the case in earlier periods, but to the circumstances of production that are no longer suitable to our
time. The application of all intellectual and physical means for the mastery of nature is hindered
176
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because in the prevailing circumstances these means are entrusted to special, mutually opposed
interests. Production is not geared to the life of the whole community while heeding also the
claims of individuals; it is geared to the power-backed claims of individuals while being
concerned hardly at all with the life of the community. This is the inevitable result, in the present
property system, of the principle that it is enough for individuals to look out for themselves.” 178

For Horkheimer, the historical nature of the principle of commodity exchange, and the
exploitation and oppression that follow from it, are reason enough to call capitalism into question
and to push towards a new politico-economic organization of society.
Ultimately, then, the problem with traditional theory for Horkheimer is that it reinforces a
metaphysical picture of the subject in which the individual is considered as an autonomous agent
that acts independently of social forces, and as if the individual herself were the sole ground of
all her values, beliefs, and actions. So long as the knowing subject remains a Cartesian subject,
divorced from a social and historical context, the individual will continue to operate with an
illusory sense of freedom and autonomy, and fail to recognize her place and role in the social
whole. The Cartesian knowing subject fails to recognize itself as an agent of social change and
abdicates its social responsibility. Thus, the form of the knowing subject under traditional theory
ultimately serves to reinforce a mode of production that is inherently exploitative and unjust.
CRITICAL THEORY
As a corrective to traditional theory, and as a major tenant of critical theory, Horkheimer
emphasizes the historically and socially situated condition of the knowing subject of dialectical
materialism. According to Horkheimer, “The facts that our senses present to us are socially
performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the
historical character of the perceiving organ.”179 In other words, neither is the world given as a
neutral and brute fact nor is the knowing subject merely a passive receptacle of information.
Rather, the objects of the world present themselves as part of a larger historical and social nexus.
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Every cultural artifact bears the mark of the time and place of its manufacture—that is, I do not
simply perceive a video game console in front of me, I see instead the Nintendo Entertainment
System, which, with its boxy appearance and video controllers that are connected directly to the
console via a cable, bears the technological and aesthetic marks of 1980’s. Moreover, when I see
the video games Super Mario Bros. or The Legend of Zelda on the television screen, I do not
simply see a “video game,” I see a 1980’s 8-bit video game in all its pixilated glory.
Horkheimer’s point is that objects do not exist in the world as brute facts, but locate themselves
in the precise historical and social nexus in which they arose and stand in relation to, and stand
out from, objects created in different historical and social milieus. I do not merely perceive a
phone; I perceive a phone either as a smart phone, cell phone, or a landline. I can place an object
within the historical and social milieu from which it arose. Moreover, according to Horkheimer,
not only are the objects themselves historically and socially conditioned, but our senses are as
well. Our senses become acclimated to technological “progress.” I grow accustomed to using the
latest operating system on my personal computer. However, when using an encroachingly
outdated computer in my office at work, I find the visual aesthetic and technological capabilities
of the dated operating system to be disruptive—to be honest, I find them downright appalling.
Having become accustomed to high-definition video, standard analog video stands out within my
visual horizon as an oddity. Thus, according to Horkheimer, we find a two-fold socio-historical
mediation of knowledge—both the object and the subject are historically and socially
conditioned. Objects reveal the place and time in which they were manufactured and my senses
are acclimated to the aesthetico-technological capabilities of the time. For Horkheimer, this is
enough to call into question the Cartesian ideal of an autonomous and isolated knowing subject.
Moreover, an historically and socially conditioned knowing subject exists precisely in relation to
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her place and time, and thus cannot in good faith ignore the socio-political environment in which
she exists.
All this is to say that critical theory, which takes as its object of study society itself,
neither engages in a disinterested and isolated examination of society nor takes its cues from
industry in its examination of society. Rather, the goal of critical theory is to study the
fundamental politico-economic structure of capitalism, which it considers irrational and unjust,
so as to bring about a more rationally organized society that will meet the needs of humanity at
large. To this end, critical theory is comparable to the discipline of medicine. Critical theory is
not interested in developing a merely abstract theory of the economic mechanisms at work in
capitalism. Rather, critical theory aims to develop a theory of society by means of which they
can change it. In this way, just as a doctor seeks to understand an illness so as to cure a patient,
so critical theory seeks to understand the principle of exchange at work in capitalism so as to
cure society of the ills that it creates. Thus, the goal of critical theory is to demonstrate that the
dominant system of political economy and exchange necessarily leads to the ills of the current
form of social organization—oppression, alienation, exploitation, and injustice—and to
formulate a way of creating a more rationally organized society that meets the needs of
everyone; or, as Horkheimer says, “Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery.”180 In other
words, the goal of critical theory is to analyze the dominant organization of society, i.e.,
capitalism, so as to pinpoint the causes of social injustice, and ultimately ameliorate them.

DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON
By the 1940’s the Frankfurt School’s theoretical orientation undergoes another
transformation. Its members no longer locate domination in either the structure of class conflict
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generally or even in capitalism specifically, rather they now locate domination in humanity’s
relation to nature. Inspired initially by Marx’s critique of capitalism, Horkheimer held out that a
humane form of society could be achieved by replacing the inherently irrational and anarchic
socio-economic organization of capitalism with a more rationally organized economy. However,
disillusioned by the totalizing and oppressive nature of post-liberal capitalism, as well as by the
powerful forms of psychology that support it, Horkheimer begins to locate the current forms of
socio-economic domination in the drives that gave rise to the scientific worldview—what they
now designate as instrumentellen Vernuft. On this account, it is instrumental reason’s
appropriation of nature as a mere resource—to be dominated and manipulated for human
purposes—that slowly turns humans themselves into another resource to be dominated,
manipulated, and controlled. Thus, Horkheimer’s turn to a critique of instrumental reason marks
a definitive break with Marx’s vision of a socialist utopia achieved through emancipation from
nature.181 As Dubiel puts it:
Behind the implicit identification with this topos is the surrendering, never made explicit, of Marx
and Engels’ prognosis that the emancipation of the human race will be achieved by perfecting
human domination of nature. The claim made by the industrial age—to have achieved
emancipation from the domination of nature through a high level of technological development—
is interpreted as signifying the deepest fall into nature. Hence the conviction, of the old European,
rationalist tradition, of the primacy of spirit over nature, is dialectically turned against itself: a
view of reason restricted merely to improving the technology of self-preservation is still a part of
that nature which actually instrumentalizes reason to even the score. This critique of technical
control over nature is the programmatic theme integrating all of the specific analyses made in
Dialectic of Enlightenment and other writings of the 1940s.182

In this way, Horkheimer’s emancipatory hope no longer lies in a more rational organization of
society, but rather in a form of thinking that is “other” to instrumental reason. Nonetheless, this
shift in Horkheimer’s thought does not constitute a radical break with his earlier work since

According to Jay, this marks a break with class conflict as the motor of history and replaces it with man’s
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unifying all of Horkheimer’s thinking is an impassioned concern to identify the causes of human
suffering and oppression in the contemporary world so as to alleviate them. Thus, as
Wiggershaus notes, “Horkheimer and Adorno believed that by interweaving these two themes
[of Weberian disenchantment and Klagesian domination of nature] they could give a better
account of the disastrous consequences of a form of capitalism which had led to fascism than
they could by continuing the Marxian critique of capitalism.”183
HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO – DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
In the “Introduction” to Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno describe the
project of their work as, “nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly
human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”184 Aside from being an open
condemnation of the state of Western culture during their time, which was born from witnessing
the atrocities of World War II and the Nazi regime in Germany, this question also sets the stage
for Horkheimer and Adorno’s development of a radical conception of the history of Western
thought and its evolution into 20th century late-capitalism. Their radical conception of the history
of Western thought is born from their analysis of the philosophy of the Enlightenment and their
resultant conviction in the necessity of a reflective criticism of the underpinning drives
motivating its development. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, “What is at issue here is not
culture as a value…but the necessity for enlightenment to reflect on itself if humanity is not to be
totally betrayed. What is at stake is not conservation of the past but the fulfillment of past
hopes.”185 In other words, Horkheimer and Adorno consider the “new barbarism” of their age to
stem directly from the philosophy of the Enlightenment and thus they hold that the only way to
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provide a corrective to this “new barbarism” is to trace the development of the philosophy of the
Enlightenment back to its origins so as to uncover the drives that motivated it in the hope of
redeeming it.
In the opening line of the first section of Dialectic of Enlightenment, “The Concept of
Enlightenment,” Horkheimer and Adorno state that, “Enlightenment, understood in the widest
sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and
installing them as masters.”186 In fact, these two goals have set not only the trajectory for the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, but also the trajectory for the whole course of Western thought.
Specifically, these two goals can be traced back to the mythological thinking of Homer’s
Odyssey and to the scientific thinking of the early pre-Socratics. Both mythological and early
scientific thinking find their source in the human tendencies toward self-preservation driven by
fear—fear in the face of a hostile world that threatens survival and fear in the face of a world that
is mysterious and unknown. In both of these experiences of fear can be found the desire to
understand and explain nature. In other words, since “humans believe themselves free of fear
when there is no longer anything unknown,”187 they seek to understand and explain nature. Thus,
through an ability to explain nature, by which the inexplicable would no longer remain
inexplicable, humans hope to eliminate any and all fear and to maximize self-preservation.
However, out of this simple desire Horkheimer and Adorno see the foundation of a burgeoning
tendency toward the domination and mastery of nature. In fact, Horkheimer and Adorno go so
far as to claim that, “What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate
wholly both it and human beings.”188 In other words, driven by fear, a form of knowledge is born
that becomes a method for understanding and mastering nature. Yet, the ability to master nature
186
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through knowledge, and thereby dominate nature, inevitably reduces nature to a matrix of objects
capable of manipulation that exist solely for the purpose of serving the knowing subject’s ends—
in this case, knowledge turns nature into a means for human self-preservation.
Through the rise of what Horkheimer and Adorno term “instrumental reason,” thought
takes on a form that is capable of achieving the type of knowledge necessary for mastering and
manipulating nature. The hallmark of instrumental reason, or scientific reasoning in general, is
the reduction of quality to quantity. Though the seed of instrumental reason can be found in the
science of early pre-Socratic thinkers, the Pythagoreans most especially, it first comes to
prominence with Galileo’s mathematization of nature. Under the Galilean conception of nature,
everything is reducible to number and calculability, and only that which is calculable is
considered real—that is, the world of pure ideational rationality becomes the one and only true
world. Thus, reason becomes the instrument for knowing the world through the ritualization of
mathematical procedures. In this way, thinking gives birth to a systematic conception of the
world that can be understood in its entirety through a mathematical method, which is seen as the
one and only method. In essence, science becomes technology. However, as Horkheimer and
Adorno point out, “Mental representation is only an instrument. In thought, human beings
distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a way that it can be mastered.”189
That is, the scientific conception of nature gives rise to a particular type of relationship between
humans and nature. Nature comes to be seen merely as a means for achieving human purposes—
namely, self-preservation—which in turn is the reduction of nature to an instrumental objectivity
capable of manipulation. Once nature is reduced to a mere means for serving human purposes, a
break is introduced between humans and nature that creates a false sense of separation between
the two—humans come to see themselves as distinct from nature since they become its master.
189
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The danger of instrumental thinking, for Horkheimer and Adorno, lies in the fact that
instrumental reason becomes all-pervasive. In fact, Horkheimer and Adorno consider
instrumental reason to be nothing less than a cloaked form of totalitarianism. This has two
devastating effects. First, since under instrumental thinking only that which can be quantified
and calculated is considered real, any form of thought that does not fit into the system of
quantification and calculation is excluded. As Horkheimer and Adorno note, “For enlightenment,
anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with
suspicion.”190 Consequently, any form of thinking for the Enlightenment that exists outside the
province of instrumental reason is seen as thoroughly irrational. However, this means that
instrumental thinking is incapable of self-reflection or self-critique. In other words, since
instrumental reason is strictly limited to assessing the most efficient means for achieving any
posited end, it cannot thereby assess the posited ends towards which it is directed. The question
of ends is outside the scope of instrumental reason. This means that questions of quality and noninstrumental value are outside the quantitative scope of instrumental reason since questions of
quality and of value are in fact a question of ends. Thus, there is no “objective” basis or criteria
by which instrumental reason can assess the appropriateness of its own ends. That is, the ends of
instrumental reason—in this case the mastery and the domination of nature—are unjustifiable
through instrumental reason itself.
Second, since instrumental reason turns all material objects of nature into objects capable
of being manipulated and dominated, humans also become capable of being manipulated and
dominated due to the fact that they too are material beings in the world. The false sense of
separation humans feel from nature, which results from human domination and mastery over
nature through technological and instrumental thinking, induces a forgetfulness amongst humans
190
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that they too, as material beings in the world, are capable of being manipulated and are thus
subject to the same principles of mastery and domination as nature. It is for this reason that
Horkheimer and Adorno aptly state:
At the moment when human beings cut themselves off from the consciousness of themselves as
nature, all the purposes for which they keep themselves alive—social progress, the heightening of
material and intellectual forces, indeed, consciousness itself—become void, and the enthronement
of the means as the end, which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is
already detected in the earliest history of subjectivity. The human being’s mastery of itself, on
which the self is founded, practically always involves the annihilation of the subject in whose
service that mastery is maintained, because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and
disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity, of which the
achievements of self-preservation can only be defined as functions—in other words, selfpreservation destroys the very thing which is to be preserved. 191

That is, once instrumental reason is coupled with industrial capitalism, human beings become
material means for achieving self-preservation by other human beings who possess power—the
knowledge necessary for mastering and dominating nature. This effect of instrumental reason
concerns Horkheimer and Adorno the most. It leads to the mastery and domination of some
human beings by others, which is precisely what led to Horkheimer and Adorno’s
characterization of their age as a new type of “barbarism.” In the end, instrumental reason, which
sought to liberate humans and establish their sovereignty, has merely streamed-lined the
processes by which some human beings can dominate other human beings, and has thereby
brought about exactly the opposite effect to which it was initially directed, which they consider
evidenced in the consumerism of 20th century late-capitalism.
Yet, despite the bleak picture Horkheimer and Adorno paint of the development and
current state of Western culture, they nonetheless hold onto the possibility of redeeming the
Western ethos. For Horkheimer and Adorno, “what matters today is to preserve and disseminate
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freedom, rather than to accelerate, however indirectly, the advance toward an administered
world.”192 And, more importantly:
Through this remembrance of nature within the subject, a remembrance which contains the
unrecognized truth of all culture, enlightenment is opposed in principle to power, and even in the
time of Vanini the call to hold back the enlightenment was uttered less from fear of exact science
than from a hatred of licentious thought, which had escaped the spell of nature by confessing itself
to be nature’s own dread of itself.193

Herein lies Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s corrective to the new age of “barbarism” in latecapitalism. By redeeming the hopes of the past—the hope of liberating men from fear and
establishing their sovereignty—we can move beyond the domination and mastery at work in our
age. But again, since humans currently fail to see themselves as a part of nature and have
forgotten their fundamental dialectical relation with nature, a forgetfulness which has resulted
from the processes of instrumental thinking, humans also fail to see the forms of domination
currently at play in culture and the way in which a technological view of nature gives rise to this
domination. Thus, a move away from the domination of humans and nature requires a rethinking
of the relationship between humans and nature.
First, Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that the freedom of every human subject must be a
criterion for assessing the state of culture at any given time. This is an end they hold can be
recognized by every individual and is without need of justification. Second, this is an end that
must take into account the forgotten relationship between humans and nature. Here, Horkheimer
and Adorno provide little by way of an explanation as to how we should conceive of this
relationship. However, Horkheimer and Adorno claim the need for a form of liberating reason as
opposed to instrumental reason. First, given that the essence of instrumental reason is to think
strictly in terms of quantification and calculation with the intent of reducing nature to a closed
system of known facts, we can surmise that a form of liberating reason would refrain from the
192
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tendency toward totalizing systems by respecting the dialectical relationship between our
concept of nature and nature as an “uncomprehended whole.”194 In other words, if one of their
critiques of instrumental reason concerns its totalizing tendency, then it would seem that the
alternative would be to refrain from such a tendency by resisting the reduction of nature to any
particular concept of it. Again, instrumental reason employs a totalizing concept of nature since
its very aim is to reduce all of nature to quantifiable measure and thus render nature knowable in
its entirety. Moreover, in so doing it excludes all other concepts of nature as “mythic” and
“irrational.” In this way, a dialectical conception of nature would recognize and maintain a
relationship with nature as an incomprehensible whole. Second, since instrumental reason
estranges humans from nature through its domination over nature, an alternative form of thinking
would recognize nature within the subject. Thus, for Horkheimer and Adorno, to escape the state
of domination and mastery that results from instrumental thinking, humans must adopt a form of
liberating reason that can simultaneously respect the autonomy of individuals, recognize nature
within humans, and maintain the dialectical relationship between our concept of nature and
nature as an incomprehensible whole.

ECLIPSE OF REASON
While Dialectic of Enlightenment advances a novel telling of the rise of Western history,
its analyses remain hastily sketched and only partially developed, and solutions to the problems
it raises are near non-existent. Thus, we find in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason a richer and
more nuanced development of the ideas first elaborated in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
Horkheimer states, in no uncertain terms, that the purpose of Eclipse of Reason is “to inquire into
the concept of rationality that underlies our contemporary industrial culture in order to discover
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whether this concept does not contain defects that vitiate it essentially.”195 The concept of
rationality with which Horkheimer is here concerned arose with ancient Greek mythology and
eventually developed into the philosophical project of ascertaining the ultimate nature of reality.
However, according to Horkheimer, the very ascendency of that reason, which was supposed to
usher in liberation from the irrational and hostiles forces of both man and nature by disclosing
the path to the best possible life, has transmogrified into an instrument of domination, which has
ultimately had the inverse effect of establishing tyranny and oppression as all-pervasive features
of contemporary social life. Specifically, reason has abdicated its role in establishing a collective
purpose for humans that transcends individual pursuits and has, instead, reduced both the self
and the world to mere instruments in a sadistic pursuit of irrational self-interests. Ultimately, as
Horkheimer argues, this has created a situation in which we forfeit any attempt to pursue our
own personal fulfillment and alternatively deny ourselves so as to survive in a seemingly
inescapable socio-political environment that is driven entirely by the pursuit of economic profit.
In other words, we find ourselves in the midst of a crisis of reason. Rather than culminating in
the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, justice, and freedom, reason has devolved into an instrument
of domination that has caused an all-encompassing alienation and exploitation to metastasize
throughout the social body. According to Horkheimer, in order to overcome this crisis,
philosophy needs to affect a reconciliation between nature and reason via a “remembering” of
forgotten nature. Ultimately, this entails abandoning the static concepts of metaphysics for a
dynamic conceptual thinking embodied in the open dialectic of dialectical materialism.
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SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE REASON
Reason, according to Horkheimer, manifests itself in two distinct, and yet intertwined,
forms. In its subjective formation196 reason is the formal mechanism of thought itself, which is
displayed in the faculties of classification, inference, and deduction. Its operations lie entirely in
coordinating the most efficient means for any given end. In this way, its primary activity is to
evaluate the suitability of concepts, procedures, tasks, and courses of action in light of already
established ends. Subjective reason itself, however, cannot evaluate the suitability and worth of
ends in themselves. It is the task of the objective formation of reason,197 rather, to reveal and
determine ends. As it originated in antiquity with Socrates and Plato, the purpose of objective
reason is to access and disclose the rational order inherent in the universe that exists
independently of individual subjects. The intention behind objective reason is to discern the
proper and harmonious relations between humans and humans, and humans and nature, which
would ultimately be the embodiment of the best possible life. As Horkheimer notes:
The term objective reason thus on the one hand denotes as its essence a structure inherent in
reality that by itself calls for a specific mode of behavior in each specific case, be it a practical or a
theoretical attitude. This structure is accessible to him who takes upon himself the effort of
dialectical thinking, or, identically, who is capable of eros. On the other hand, the term objective
reason may also designate this very effort and ability to reflect such an objective order.198

Thus, objective reason seeks to establish a measure by which we can determine the suitability of
personal interests in relation to the community and nature that is independent of, and transcends,
those interests.
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CONFLICT BETWEEN OBJECTIVE REASON AND RELIGION
By its very structure, objective reason makes a claim to absolute authority regarding the
ultimate nature of reality. To this extent, objective reason exists in a tension with mythology and
religion, both of which similarly make claims regarding the ultimate nature of things. This
conflict manifested itself most decisively within early modern philosophy in the tension between
religion and rationalist metaphysics. As Horkheimer notes:
From the time of the Renaissance, men have tried to excogitate a doctrine as comprehensive as
theology entirely on their own, instead of accepting their goals and values from a spiritual
authority. Philosophy prided itself on being the instrument for deriving, explaining, revealing the
content of reason as reflecting the true nature of things and the correct pattern of living. 199

The hope for objective reason was that it would provide an insight into ultimate reality such that
it would disclose universal and necessary truths, and thereby universal and necessary interests
binding for all rational people. Thus, the truths revealed by the natural light of reason would
convey to us how best to live. In this way, both rational metaphysics and religion agreed on the
role ultimate truth plays in orienting our moral lives, but disagreed whether reason or revelation
had the final word about that truth. Ultimately, objective reason, as it was resurrected in the
Renaissance, developed into the Scientific Revolution, and culminated in the ideals of the
Enlightenment, won out over religion as a legitimate source of knowledge and authority.
THE PURSUIT OF SELF-INTEREST AND THE COMMON GOOD
According to Horkheimer, with the victory of metaphysics over religion, “common
sense,” which was itself an appeal to self-evident truths grounded in objective truth, supplanted
revelation as the governing authority in the organization of the political body. The concept of the
“nation,” which established itself during the American and French Revolutions, supplanted the
centrality of previous religious and monarchic authorities. Ultimately, the ideal of the pursuit of
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individual “self-interest” established itself as the objective principle of social organization that
would ensure the liberty and security of both individual interests and the common interest. The
appeal to self-interest as an organizing political principle was itself grounded in the insights of
common sense as reflecting natural reality, i.e., dominant trends in both materialist and hedonist
philosophies. Thus, according to Horkheimer, “Originally the political constitution was thought
of as an expression of concrete principles founded in objective reason; the ideas of justice,
equality, happiness, democracy, property, all were held to correspond to reason, to emanate from
reason.”200 In this way, with the Enlightenment, the socio-political organization of the nation
directed toward the pursuit of individual self-interest was thought to reflect reason’s insights into
the proper order of things.
SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS OF REASON
Yet, according to Horkheimer, the very rationality that had overthrown religious tenets as
superstitious and mythological, and had supplanted them with the “common sense” conception
of the nation built upon the ideal of the pursuit of individual self-interest, ultimately undermined
itself:
The philosophers of the Enlightenment attacked religion in the name of reason; in the end what
they killed was not the church but metaphysics and the objective concept of reason itself, the
source of power of their own efforts. Reason as an organ for perceiving the true nature of reality
and determining the guiding principles of our lives has come to be regarded as obsolete.
Speculation is synonymous with metaphysics, and metaphysics with mythology and superstition.
We might say that the history of reason or enlightenment from its beginnings in Greece down to
the present has led to a state of affairs in which even the word reason is suspected of connoting
some mythological entity. Reason has liquidated itself as an agency of ethical, moral, and religious
insight.201

In other words, the rationalist metaphysical systems of early modernity evolved into formalized
science, and with this evolution a purportedly more rigorous method of determining truth in the
broadest possible sense was established. While Horkheimer is unclear about this historical
200
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evolution, he is most likely referring to the rise of empiricism as the official methodological
position of the sciences. Basically, since empiricism equates truth regarding reality with
empirically verifiable facts, it thereby renders the problems of rationalist metaphysics pseudoproblems.202 Moreover, with this move, science establishes itself as the sole method for securing
truth and in effect excludes all other forms of thought from having a claim on truth, i.e., the
poetic, mystical, intuitive, etc. In this way, just as objective reason dethroned religion upon the
basis of casting it as irrational myth, so too science cast metaphysics as unfounded speculation,
and thus as another iteration of myth and superstition.
With the rise of scientific absolutism during the 19th and 20th centuries, subjective reason
comes to supplant objective reason, which ultimately results in a crisis of reason—that is, once
objective reason is cast as another form of delusion and superstition, it no longer stands as an
authority to appraise the content of such concepts as equality, justice, and happiness since a
metaphysical order that could establish the objective content of such concepts is considered
mythological and irrational.
The present crisis of reason consists fundamentally in the fact that at a certain point thinking either
became incapable of conceiving such objectivity at all or began to negate it as a delusion. This
process was gradually extended to include the objective content of every rational concept. In the
end, no particular reality can seem reasonable per se; all the basic concepts, emptied of their
content, have come to be only formal shells. 203

In this way, science stands as the one, true authority, and yet, according to Horkheimer, “The
statement that justice and freedom are better in themselves than injustice and oppression is
scientifically unverifiable and useless. It has come to sound as meaningless in itself as would the
statement that red is more beautiful than blue, or that an egg is better than milk.”204 In other
words, without reference to ends established by objective reason, subjective reason, as
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manifested in scientific empiricism, is reduced to a mere instrument; it no longer acts in accord
with an objective orientation. Thus:
If the subjectivist view holds true, thinking cannot be of any help in determining the desirability of
any goal in itself. The acceptability of ideals, the criteria for our actions and beliefs, the leading
principles of ethics and politics, all our ultimate decisions are made to depend upon factors other
than reason. They are supposed to be matters of choice and predilection, and it has become
meaningless to speak of truth in making practical, moral, or aesthetic decisions.205

Something other than reason constitutes the values and ends that direct our lives. This means that
we are without a standard of measure or a principle of critique by which to assess what is indeed
in our own self-interest. The very notion of “our own best interest” has been severed from any
objective ground. According to Horkheimer, herein lies the crisis of reason: reason has
transmogrified into unreason. The dominant myth of our time is that through the pursuit of
individual self-interest our common interests will be preserved, and yet, without an objective
rational basis by which to measure what is indeed in our own self-interest, we abandon both
ourselves, and the common good, to irrationality.
SUBJECTIVE REASON AS A MECHANISM OF ADAPTATION
With the demise of objective reason thought no longer offers a utopian ideal according to
which we might try to change the world, but exists rather as a mere mechanism of adaptation to
the world as it is. This is because, in having abdicated a position of critique and an orientation
grounded in objective thought, subjectivized reason works in the service of, and conforms to, the
dominant interests and dominant ends of the time. Specifically, in the absence of objectively
orienting thought, the only obvious individual interest that remains, according to Horkheimer, is
the pursuit of self-preservation. Moreover, since the overthrow of objective thought strips
existence of any intrinsic meaning, the only value that remains is that of “utility”—in other
words, things possesses value only to the extent to which they are “useful” for some further
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purpose, which ultimately means in the context of our current and dominant socio-economic
environment that something contributes to economic profit. This means then, for Horkheimer,
that in order to survive in our current socio-economic environment, we adapt to our world by
making ourselves “useful” in it.
The effect of this is that the process of adjusting oneself and adapting oneself to our
current socio-economic environment in order to survive ultimately leads to individuals
abandoning both the pursuit of their own individual self-interest and their hope of any form of
personal fulfillment in life. Once subjective reason takes hold of economic profit as its exclusive
end, the individual engages in an all-encompassing series of calculations in order to render
himself into an economically “useful” agent. As Horkheimer says:
By echoing, repeating, imitating his surroundings, by adapting himself to all the powerful groups
to which he eventually belongs, by transforming himself from a human being into a member of
organizations, by sacrificing his potentialities for the sake of readiness and ability to conform to
and gain influence in such organizations, he manages to survive. It is survival by the oldest
biological means of survival, namely, mimicry. 206

The point is that without objective content informing reason, individuals no longer aim to change
the world in order to meet their ideals. Rather, individuals transform themselves so as to adapt to
the demands of the world. And, they do this by repeating already established patterns of behavior
that have been demonstrated to be “useful” in this context. On the one hand, individuals
primarily engage in thinking and activities that are ultimately useful for employment and thereby
industry, and, on the other hand, individuals readily accept the established aesthetic values
produced via the marketing of the culture industry. Thus, subjective reason meticulously weighs
every choice and action so as to bring individuals into accord with what currently passes as
“useful.” In its most basic sense, this means for Horkheimer, that individuals do not realistically
consider lifestyles that will not produce a “return on investment.” One does not seriously
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consider spending one’s life cycling around the world since this is “useful” to no one. An
education does not serve the purpose of transforming oneself into a better person so as to live a
potentially more fulfilling life; it provides the qualifications necessary to appear employable. If
one engages in more aesthetic endeavors, the quality of the work is assessed in terms of its
salability on the marketplace and not transcendental criteria—again, just like our lives.
Moreover, one is almost certain to wear fashionable clothes, listen to popular music, and watch
popular television programs so as to appear relatively normal, since, in deviating from the norm,
one runs the risk of exclusion, and those who are excluded diminish their chances of survival.207
All this is to say that one does what must be done in order to survive, one adapts to the socioeconomic environment in which one finds oneself, which is ultimately accomplished by
demonstrating one’s worth in the marketplace.
To Horkheimer, there is a real absurdity and contradiction in this situation. The very form
of reason that was supposed to overcome tyranny and oppression so that individuals could pursue
their own self-interests and find personal fulfillment has actually created a situation in which we
completely abandon our individuality and any hope of personal fulfillment so as merely to
survive. In this way, reason, rather than creating a better society, has created a socio-economic
environment that destroys the very individuality of the individual. Thus, the crisis of reason is
such that we find ourselves without a principle of critique and an intellectual means of resisting
the tide of global conformity and the decline of individuality. Reason’s only function now is
simply to adapt to the dominant irrational interests already in place. Thus, for Horkheimer,
Sade’s imprisoned pleasures have installed themselves as our social nightmare:

See Horkheimer and Adorno, DE, p. 106: “Anyone who does not conform is condemned to an economic
impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powerlessness of the eccentric loner. Disconnected from the
mainstream, he is easily convicted of inadequacy.”
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It may be just as meaningless to call one particular way of living, one religion, one philosophy
better or higher or truer than another. Since ends are no longer determined in the light of reason, it
is also impossible to say that one economic or political system, no matter how cruel and despotic,
is less reasonable than another. According to formalized reason, despotism, cruelty, oppression are
not bad in themselves; no rational agency would endorse a verdict against dictatorship if its
sponsors were likely to profit by it. 208

In effect, Horkheimer agrees with Nietzsche—God is dead; what we now face is the problem of
nihilism.209 Reason has abdicated its role in establishing a ground and principle of critique, and
society has thus come unmoored from its objective roots and is adrift in an all-encompassing
irrationality.
REASON AND DOMINATION
In claiming that the experience of the loss of individuality is a result of the crisis of
reason, Horkheimer is moving away from a Marxist critique of political economy that asserts
that exploitation and alienation are inherent in the socio-economic organization of capitalism,
and is instead arguing that the reign of irrationality under which we currently exist is a result of
the form of reason itself. As Horkheimer states:
The transition from objective to subjective reason was not an accident, and the process of
development of ideas cannot arbitrarily at any given moment be reversed. If subjective reason in
the form of enlightenment has dissolved the philosophical basis of beliefs that have been an
essential part of Western culture, it has been able to do so because this basis proved to be too
weak.210

In other words, Horkheimer claims that objective reason, manifested in metaphysics, was always
destined for failure. This is, quite interestingly, because the project of reason has always been to
establish human security and fulfillment through the domination of nature. According to
Horkheimer, the history of the project of metaphysics is the story of the abstract ego dominating
and subjugating everything alien to it. Whether it is the Platonic tripartite soul, the Thomistic
eternal soul, the free Cartesian ego, the Kantian transcendental ego, or the Hegelian Absolute
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Spirit, all of metaphysics assumes an abstract ego that distances itself from everything alien to
it—impulses, desires, the body, and the world—so as to more thoroughly dominate and
command them.
It is instructive to follow Descartes’ efforts to find a place for this ego, which is not in nature but
remains close enough to nature to influence it. Its first concern is to dominate the passions, that is,
nature, so far as it makes itself felt in us. The ego is indulgent to agreeable and wholesome
emotions but is stern with any conducive to sadness. Its central concern must be to keep the
emotions from biasing judgments. Mathematics, crystal-clear, imperturbable, and self-sufficient,
the classical instrument of formalized reason, best exemplifies the workings of this austere agency.
The ego dominates nature. To describe the ego’s aims except in terms of its own indefinite
persistence would contaminate the concept of the ego. 211

Horkheimer’s point is that the history of metaphysics, as the history of the abstract ego, has been
the story of the history of the domination of nature both within and without the subject—that is,
in order to guarantee the purity of its conceptualizations, which are necessary for dominating
nature without, the subject, as the ego, must dominate the corrupting influences of nature, as
desire, instinct, and passion, within. Thus, according to Horkheimer, the very project of the
domination of nature has always necessarily included the project of the domination of man.212
Yet, the ancient Greeks dominated themselves in the name of a common good that transcended
their own personal interests, but whose realization would allow them to find personal security,
happiness, and fulfillment in life.213 We, however, under the nihilistic reign of subjective reason,
dominate ourselves for no higher purpose than an ever greater, and yet aimless, domination of
nature, which reciprocally increases the domination of ourselves. Thus, according to
Horkheimer, rationality itself, as manifested in the abstract ego’s attempt to dominate nature for
the purpose of securing and propagating human individuality and freedom, essentially transforms
into an all-encompassing mechanism of aimless domination that brings about global conformity
and tyranny, i.e., the loss of individuality and freedom.
211
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REMEMBERING NATURE
For Horkheimer, the corrective to the crisis of reason and the effacing of individuality,
which is brought about through the ego’s construction of an artificial distance between itself and
nature, is to reconcile the antinomy of the two via the construction of a dialectical concept that
embraces the interpenetration of the two. However, as Horkheimer notes, “The disease of reason
is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature, and the ‘recovery’ depends on
insight into the nature of the original disease, not on a cure of the latest symptoms.”214 As
mentioned above, the disease of reason is most acutely manifested in the metaphysical impulse
to conceptualize nature for the purpose of commanding it more effectively. Thus, if one is to
“cure” the disease of reason, then one must not only guard against the impulse to domination, but
one must also guard against employing the very metaphysical techniques that have constituted
the nature of that domination. Specifically, this means developing something other than a
metaphysical conceptualization of nature.
According to Horkheimer, at the core of metaphysical conceptualizations is the logic of
identity—the attempt to fashion all-encompassing and totalizing concepts from which nothing
can escape and for which there is no remainder.215 The metaphysical ideal of epistemic
conceptualizations is a perfect equivalence between concept and object. However, metaphysical
concepts presuppose both transhistorical unities that exist independently of the historical
contingencies of space and time, and a knowing subject that can overcome those historical
contingencies so as to access such transhistorical unities. In this way, Horkheimer couples the
birth of the metaphysical impulse with the genesis of the abstract ego—that is, the metaphysical
impulse, which employs the logic of identity, of necessity includes the ideal of an abstract ego
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that can extricate itself from nature, both within and without, so as to conceptualize accurately
nature for the purpose of dominating and mastering it. Thus, at bottom, the metaphysical impulse
pits the abstract ego, as the basis of reason, against nature as if they were two distinct, and yet
somehow related, entities—of which Cartesian dualistic ontology is a paradigmatic example.
All in all, for Horkheimer, if we are to confront the disease of reason, then the task of
philosophy must be to affect a real reconciliation between reason and nature via a nonmetaphysical or dialectical concept or paradigm that neither perpetuates the illusory separation of
the two nor forces a false unity between them. As regards false unities, Horkheimer has in mind
both materialist theories that reduce conceptualizations to operations of matter, and idealistic
theories that reduce the material world to a manifestation of the mind. Ultimately, both
materialism and idealism remain trapped within the logic of identity and are thus both still driven
by the metaphysical impulse, and are thereby employing metaphysical conceptualizations since
each attempts to reduce one element to the other for the purpose of dominating nature. Instead,
Horkheimer is, once again, advocating the open dialectic of dialectical materialism. However,
this time he is advocating it not only as an alternative to metaphysical approaches to critical
social theory, but also as a solution to the tendencies toward domination inherent in the
metaphysical impulse, which has manifested itself in the most insidious of forms in the 20th
century. Thus, Horkheimer states:
Reason can realize its reasonableness only through reflecting on the disease of the world as
produced and reproduced by man; in such self-critique, reason will at the same time remain
faithful to itself, by preserving and applying for no ulterior motive the principle of truth that we
owe to reason alone. The subjugation of nature will revert to subjugation of man, and vice versa,
as long as man does not understand his own reason and the basic process by which he has created
and is maintaining the antagonism that is about to destroy him. Reason can be more than nature
only through concretely realizing its ‘naturalness’—which consists in its trend to domination—the
very trend that paradoxically alienates it from nature. Thus also, by being the instrument of
reconciliation, it will be more than an instrument. The changes of direction, the advances and
retrogressions of this effort, reflect the development of the definition of philosophy. 216
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In effect, Horkheimer is claiming that in order to overcome the crisis of reason—the impulse to
domination that has manifested itself in the 20th century as global mass conformity and
oppression—reason must recognize its own “naturalness”—the impulse to domination—at work
in its construction of the dualism between the abstract ego and nature, which itself was born out
of the impulse to dominate nature. Thus, if the impulse to dominate nature is at the heart of
reason’s invention of an abstract ego that stands above and outside nature, as the corrupting
impulses that would contaminate its absolute knowledge of conceptual truths, then reason must
precisely recognize its origin in, and relation to, nature. In other words, reason, as manifested in
the abstract ego, conceptualizes nature as other to itself only out of its drive to dominate nature.
In this way, once reason recognizes the metaphysical impulse as a manifestation of the will to
dominate nature—and thus that the metaphysical impulse itself is a manifestation of nature—it
can begin to suspend the will to dominate nature and thus the metaphysical impulse to
conceptualize nature as alien to the abstract ego. Moreover, only then can it begin to formulate a
dialectical concept of nature that neither re-inscribes the dualism between reason and nature nor
reduces the one to the other, but that is adequate to the complex interrelation between reason and
nature.
So, in the preceding quote, when Horkheimer refers to the “principle of truth that we owe
to reason alone,” he is referring to the correspondence theory of truth, to “the adequation of name
and thing.”217 However, as has been stressed again and again, this is not a metaphysical criterion
of conceptualization and truth, but a dialectical one. Horkheimer explicitly rejects the
metaphysical systems and methods of philosophy since they fail to recognize the mutually
interpenetrating relation of subject and object, of reason and nature, and thus only perpetuate the
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tendencies to domination. Thus, Horkheimer advocates fidelity to the historically situated
conceptualizations of dialectical materialism rather than the eternal ones of metaphysics, and to
this extent aligns himself with Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics. As he says:
Unlike science, ontology, the heart of traditional philosophy, attempts to derive the essences,
substances, and forms of things from some universal ideas that reason imagines it finds in itself.
But the structure of the universe cannot be derived from any first principles that we discover in our
own minds. There are no grounds for believing that the more abstract qualities of a thing should be
considered primary or essential. Perhaps more than any other philosopher, Nietzsche has realized
this fundamental weakness of ontology. 218

In other words, Horkheimer agrees with Nietzsche’s assessment that metaphysics is an
expression of will to power, or, in Horkheimer’s words, the will to dominate. And thus,
metaphysics is always ideological at bottom since it obscures the power relations, the social
context, at work in the formation of its concepts.
THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY
Having abandoned the traditional philosophical project of metaphysics as an impulse
toward domination, what then is the task of philosophy? According to Horkheimer, philosophy’s
positive character is developed through a two-fold negation. First, dialectical materialism
exposes the historical relativity of metaphysical systems that present their principles as ultimate
and eternal truths. Second, it measures a culture’s basic ideas and values against the social reality
in which they are supposed to belong. In other words, dialectical materialism assesses the breach
between ideas and reality. Thus, while ideals such as justice, equality, and freedom may have no
timeless metaphysical content, they are imbued with a certain meaning and value within a
specific socio-historical formation. Thus, according to Horkheimer, the task of philosophy, as
dialectical materialism, is to expose the historically situated nature of those concepts and to
measure social reality against the ideals it professes to valorize for dissonance.

218

Horkheimer, ER, p. 180.

113

Significantly, for Horkheimer, dialectical materialism is not a form of stoical quietism.
The realization that concepts are historically situated and constituted is not a terminus of
philosophical activity. Only metaphysics equates “wisdom with fulfillment.”219 To realize the
historically constituted nature of one’s situation is not to overcome it. Philosophy is not practice.
At best, for Horkheimer, philosophy can act as a form of cultural memory and hold social reality
up to the humanistic ideals of our past to test for their consonance or dissonance with our time.
In this way, philosophy can act as a corrective to history, and, in the words of Horkheimer,
“thereby help to keep the course of humanity from resembling the meaningless round of the
asylum inmate’s recreation hour.”220 Thus, philosophy, through negation, can remove
impediments to free development of humanity, which is ultimately, for Horkheimer, a step
toward a more robust freedom and individuality for humanity.

IN DEFENSE OF HORKHEIMER
Returning to Horkheimer’s critics, the criticisms leveled against Horkheimer fall into two
forms. On the one hand, McCarthy and Lohmann attack Horkheimer for abandoning all rational
justification for normative ends and for instead appealing to “ungrounded feelings.” In this way,
for both McCarthy and Lohmann, Horkheimer’s appeal to compassion as a normative ground is
baseless and thus lacks normative purchase. On the other hand, Habermas and Lohmann attack
Horkheimer for engaging in a totalizing critique of reason. Both Habermas and Lohmann claim
that Horkheimer’s critique of reason undermines its own foundations and thus falls prey to
performative contradiction.
First, McCarthy and Lohmann’s critiques of the normative foundations of dialectical
materialism fail to address adequately Horkheimer’s critique of metaphysics. Horkheimer
219
220

Horkheimer, ER, p. 183.
Horkheimer, ER, p. 186.

114

explicitly establishes dialectical materialism as a post-metaphysical methodological alternative to
metaphysics. This means, as I demonstrated previously in regard to Nietzsche, that
Horkheimer—as a post-metaphysical philosopher—is not engaged in the task of refuting
metaphysics since the assertion of the impossibility of metaphysics would only mire him more
deeply in metaphysics. Thus, Horkheimer’s objections to metaphysics are not refutations of
metaphysics. Instead, they establish the methodological commitments that orient dialectical
materialism as a critical and social program. As was discussed above, Horkheimer objects to
metaphysics for two reasons: 1) it prioritizes the project of knowing another possibly illusory
realm over and above the project of ameliorating the suffering and wretchedness of individuals in
this world, and 2) it has, historically, been used as an apparatus to justify the imposition of a
particular group’s interests upon the social body as a whole under the guise of universally
binding obligations—that is, metaphysics has historically served the purposes of domination. In
this way, Horkheimer does not merely equivocate, as McCarthy claims, rational justification
with metaphysical foundation. Rather, Horkheimer very clearly establishes as a postmetaphysical methodological commitment that the aim of dialectical materialism is to change the
concrete conditions under which humans suffer. Thus, any task that subverts this aim is
antithetical to the very method of dialectical materialism. For this reason, Horkheimer does not
engage in the task of providing “rational justifications,” as McCarthy suggests, precisely because
to do so, while not the project of metaphysics per se, nonetheless deprioritizes the aim of
alleviating suffering for the aim of providing “rational justifications.” In other words,
McCarthy’s concern to provide “rational justifications” for alleviating suffering would, for
Horkheimer, precisely place greater value upon those justifications than the aim of alleviating
suffering and is thereby antithetical to dialectical materialism. Thus, Horkheimer’s reluctance to
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provide “rational justifications” is wholly consistent with the methodological parameters he sets
for himself.
Similarly, despite Lohmann’s claims to the contrary, Horkheimer does not advance
suffering as an ontological foundation for the universalization of compassion since to do so
would be to sneak a metaphysical foundation into dialectical materialism via the subject. And, as
has been repeatedly demonstrated, Horkheimer rejects methodologically all metaphysical
foundations, both regarding the world and the subject. Thus, compassion, for Horkheimer, is not
intended to serve as an absolute normative foundation that would in some way reveal our social
obligations to others. Again, as was just argued in the previous paragraph, such attempts to
“ground” normative foundations are precluded from dialectical materialism for very explicit
reasons: they tend to forestall the immediate alleviation of suffering and they have been used as
mechanisms of domination.221 Thus, Horkheimer’s appeal to the “feelings” of indignation,
compassion, love, and solidarity, which require no justification, is his attempt to obviate the
previous two objections to metaphysics. First, without metaphysical justification, it is precisely
these feelings that call us to act for better or worse. And, second, by refusing to provide
metaphysical or rational justification, Horkheimer maintains a distanced relationship from those
theories that have come to act as mechanisms of domination and oppression. In other words,
since Horkheimer does not present the aim of dialectical materialism as a timeless absolute, that
221
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aim precisely remains something fallible and open to questioning, revision, or even
overturning—something that is precisely up for debate as McCarthy wishes. In this way,
Horkheimer establishes a methodology malleable enough to evade the tyrannical transformation
Marxism underwent at the hands of Stalin. Thus, despite McCarthy and Lohmann’s criticisms,
Horkheimer’s refusal to provide or engage in normative foundations is an asset of dialectical
materialism as a method and not a failure.
Secondly, Habermas and Lohmann’s claims that Horkheimer engages in a totalizing
critique of reason are premised upon a failure to locate Horkheimer’s analysis of instrumental
reason within the methodological parameters of dialectical materialism. This is in part due to
many commentators attributing Horkheimer’s turn to the critique of instrumental reason to an
abrupt and pessimistic break in his own thinking. It is important to note, however, that nothing
about this shift in Horkheimer’s critical focus marks a decisive break with his earlier work. In
fact, the single defining aim of Horkheimer’s entire oeuvre is to identify the sources of suffering
in our contemporary world so as to alleviate them. This motif is present in Horkheimer’s earliest
writing, Dämmerung,222 up until his last essays such as, “Threats to Freedom”223 and “The
Future of Marriage.”224 In his early materialist phase, still attached to the emancipatory hope of
Marxism, Horkheimer locates the causes of social suffering in the private ownership of both
property and the means of production. In this way, he hoped that a more rational and just society
could be achieved through the socialist management of a planned economy. However, as has
been said earlier, Stalinism, state-capitalism, and pessimism regarding the proletariat as the locus
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of revolutionary potential cast doubt on this hope. Thus, Horkheimer sought an alternative source
for contemporary suffering. Whereas Horkheimer previously saw philosophy and science
working in tandem to promote emancipatory ends, by the time Horkheimer adopts the term
“critical theory” to describe his work, he comes not only to see science as complicitous with
capitalism, but to see also that this complicity is born out of the feigned impartiality of science.
As was discussed earlier, Horkheimer begins to claim that science perpetuates a vision of the
subject as an autonomous and disinterested spectator, as though the interests of the subject are
unaffected by the conditions in which it finds itself. Thus, the knowing subject, reified into the
Cartesian subject, becomes a monadic social entity hovering above the fray of social life. This
vision of the subject as a monadic individual perpetuates an image of the subject as the ground of
its own values and not as a product of social forces. In this way, the monadic individual operates
with an “illusory” sense of freedom and autonomy, and fails to recognize itself as an agent of
social change, thereby abdicating its social responsibility. As Benhabib notes:
Horkheimer moves from an “externalist” to an “internalist” critique of science and theory: the
primary object of his attack is not the uses to which science and theory have been put in society,
but the manner in which the concepts, constructions, and scientific operations of traditional
theories reproduce a distorted image of social reality. 225

However, once Horkheimer locates the reified knowing subject as the cause of the socially
disengaged monadic subject, as he does under “critical theory,” then it becomes apparent that the
next critical move for Horkheimer is to trace out the historical origins of the scientific attitude,
most especially since dialectic materialism as a method begins with the principle that all thinking
is historically conditioned. In this way, one can reasonably read the critique of instrumental
reason not as radical break in critical method, or even a shift in critical object, but rather as a
tracing of the historical origins of the scientific attitude critiqued under the earlier aegis of
225
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“critical theory.”226 If Horkheimer has correctly identified the schematic form of the ills of our
time—a socially disengaged monadic subject—which he quite clearly thinks he has, then the task
becomes one of tracing the rise of this form of subjectivity back to its roots so that it can be
“corrected,” so that an alternative path can be taken, which is in accord with the very early aims
of dialectical materialism, which need not be construed as a metaphysics of history. Dialectic of
Enlightenment precisely presents us with just such a history of the modern knowing subject.
Contrary to Habermas’s claim that the purpose of Dialectic of Enlightenment is to
“unmask” the power relations that lurk beneath reason and corrupt it—that it is engaged in a
totalizing critique of reason—the project of Dialectic of Enlightenment is far more modestly to
analyze only that form of reason that has reified itself in the 20th century as scientific thinking—
namely, what Horkheimer and Adorno term instrumental reason.227 One of their essential
concerns regarding instrumental reason is that it has established itself historically as the only
form of reason and yet, as a technique devoted solely to quantification and calculation, it cannot
by its own standards of legitimacy lay claim to its tyrannical exclusivity.228 Thus, Horkheimer
and Adorno do not trace reason’s origin back to myth so as to vitiate reason in toto, and thereby
also the project of the Enlightenment, rather they advance an historical analysis of the origin of
the contemporary form of reason in the drive to self-preservation so as so to locate the cause of
the instrumentalization of reason itself. In this way, by tracing instrumental reason back to its
origin, the guiding hope of the analysis undertaken in Dialectic of Enlightenment is that by
identifying the processes that gave rise to it, and thus to the forms of domination at work in the
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20th century, we can thereby cease to enact those processes and affect a rupture in history such
that humanity can begin to write a truly humane history for itself, precisely so that the ideals of
the Enlightenment might be realized. Moreover, given the methodological parameters of
dialectic materialism, these ideals no longer stand as absolute truths, but merely as regulative
ideals. This is evidenced in Horkheimer and Adorno’s commitment to alternative forms of
reason, subjectivity, and relations to nature. However, as commentators often note, these
alternative forms are quite opaque and never fully developed—they never draw an explicit
connection between the open dialectic of dialectical materialism and the alternative form of
reason they advocate—leaving Dialectic of Enlightenment with a generally pessimistic tone
despite its optimistic aim. In this way, the critique of instrumental reason continues, and remains
squarely within, the methodological parameters of dialectical materialism—that is, it maintains
its commitment to both the open dialectic and the project of alleviating the current forms of
suffering in our world.229
As Lohmann argues, however, Horkheimer’s analysis of reason in Eclipse of Reason is
far more problematic. Here, Horkheimer’s analysis veers towards the more totalized form of
critique that Habermas attributes to Dialectic of Enlightenment. However, my contention is that
this totalization occurs at a different register than either of the ones at which Habermas or
Lohmann locate it. Whereas Habermas claims that Horkheimer and Adorno’s purpose is to
undertake a form of ideology critique that discloses the illegitimate admixture of power and
reason by exposing reason’s origin in the drive to self-preservation, and Lohmann claims that
Horkheimer’s analysis of reason either remains merely at the level of the programmatic or
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succumbs to historical relativism since it fails to secure adequately a foundation for critique, my
position is that, by appealing to non-identity thinking, Horkheimer lapses into an antimetaphysics—rather than the post-metaphysical position he was able to maintain throughout his
career—that ultimately thrusts dialectical materialism into asserting a metaphysical position.
The focus of Dialectic of Enlightenment is an historical analysis of the origin and rise of
instrumental reason, which is, in essence, the modern scientific attitude. While Dialectic of
Enlightenment holds out the hope for a form of reason that is other to instrumental reason, a
discussion of the relationship between metaphysics and instrumental reason is conspicuously
missing from its analysis. In part, Eclipse of Reason provides a fuller and richer historical
account of the rise of instrumental reason, there termed subjective reason. Included within this
richer historical account is now an explicit preclusion of metaphysics as an antidote to the
tyrannical reign of subjective reason. While Horkheimer’s historical account of the evolution of
Western reason in Eclipse of Reason continues to locate the birth of reason in the drive to selfpreservation and the reciprocal impulse to dominate nature, its history now passes through
metaphysics. In this way, Western reason finds its first expression in myth, transforms into
metaphysics, and ends in science. The significance here is worth noting. Whereas Horkheimer
had formerly been quite careful to characterize dialectical materialism as an alternative to
metaphysics, and not as refutation of metaphysics, here in Eclipse of Reason Horkheimer
announces the destruction of Western metaphysics. However, it is not because of reason’s
admixture with power, as Habermas argues. Rather, it is because, on Horkheimer’s account,
metaphysics already contains within itself the traces of its own destruction. Metaphysics, the aim
of which is to employ reason so as to gain access to the necessary and universal truths regarding
reality, slowly evolves into modern science, and in doing so comes to be seen, from the
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perspective of science, as little more than a form of idle speculation, as fairytale. Thus, in this
way, it is science that puts an end to metaphysics and catapults the modern world into its
nihilistic malaise.
Unifying myth, metaphysics, and science is the impulse to dominate nature and it is here,
in the impulse to dominate nature, that Horkheimer locates reason’s creation of the division
between the abstract ego, as the knowing subject, over and against nature as that which is to be
conceptualized and schematized for the purposes of being controlled. In this way, again, the
concerns that guided Horkheimer under the aegis of “critical theory” are sustained and
elaborated with the critique of instrumental reason. However, with the critique of instrumental
reason, Horkheimer can now locate the cause of our modern suffering in the false dichotomy
between the abstract ego and nature. Thus, if at the core of abstract conceptualizations is the
logic of identity—the metaphysical ideal of all-embracing and totalizing epistemic
conceptualizations that achieve a perfect equivalence between concept and object, and which
presuppose the existence of transhistorical unities that exist independently of the historical
contingency of space and time as well as a knowing subject that can overcome those
contingencies so as to access such transhistorical unities—then, according to Horkheimer, we
need to affect a reconciliation between reason and nature via a new form of non-identity
thinking, one that no longer perpetuates the illusory separation of reason and nature due to its
impulse to dominate nature.
Significantly, whereas Horkheimer previously advocated the open dialectic and the
alleviation of suffering from within the parameters of dialectical materialism as a method,
Horkheimer makes the move to ground his critique of instrumental reason in the nature of reason
itself. As he himself states:
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Reason can realize its reasonableness only through reflecting on the disease of the world as
produced and reproduced by man; in such self-critique, reason will at the same time remain
faithful to itself, by preserving and applying for no ulterior motive the principle of truth that we
owe to reason alone.230
The concept of truth—the adequation of name and thing—inherent in every genuine philosophy,
enables thought to withstand if not to overcome the demoralizing and mutilating effects of
formalized reason.231

In essence, by tracing our modern form of scientific thinking back to its historical origins,
Horkheimer claims to have disclosed the aberrant moment in history, in thinking, at which
reason derailed from its emancipatory potential—namely, at the moment of the creation of a
division between the abstract ego and nature as an antagonist. In this way, in Eclipse of Reason
Horkheimer can confidently advocate non-identity thinking as the corrective to our modern
barbarism—which is only intimated at in Dialectic of Enlightenment. However, as Lohmann
points out, if this is the case, “then the denunciatory version of the self-criticism of reason
has…passed over into the attempt to recover a comprehensive concept of reason.”232 And thus,
“The ‘basic difference between the ideal and the real’ characteristic of this ‘true philosophy’ is at
the same time a relapse into metaphysics.”233 In other words, for Lohmann, Horkheimer’s appeal
to a foundational conception of truth, and thus a comprehensive concept of reason, means that
Horkheimer is engaged in metaphysics. However, for Lohmann, this leaves Horkheimer in an
irresolvable contradiction since, in regard to metaphysics, Horkheimer elsewhere states that,
“The classical systems of objective reason, such as Platonism, seem to be untenable because they
are glorifications of an inexorable order of the universe and therefore mythological.”234
Horkheimer appears to both denounce metaphysics and yet appeals to a foundational conception
of truth that has metaphysical implications.
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Lohmann, however, is incorrect; the tension here is not a blatant contradiction, but a
category mistake on Horkheimer’s part. Since Horkheimer narrowly equates metaphysics with
identity thinking, he thereby considers a disclosure of the non-identical at the heart of a more
authentic reason to be something “other” than metaphysics. Though the open and non-totalizing
character of non-identity thinking is, on the surface, different from the closed and total character
of identity thinking, it nonetheless serves in Horkheimer’s final thought the very same function
he had earlier in his career attributed to metaphysical philosophy—namely, an insight into the
essential structure of reality upon which one can establish the normative foundations for one’s
life, albeit in this case the insight reveals non-identity rather than identity. Here, one could
designate the difference between identity and non-identity thinking as the difference between
what I will term “centripetal” and “centrifugal” metaphysics. Whereas a centripetal metaphysics,
which Horkheimer rejects, would aim to wash away historical contingency and difference so as
to reveal an absolute identity that would in some way return us to the privileged perspective of a
metaphysical center, a centrifugal metaphysics would aim to disclose the fundamentally
contingent nature of history so as to “unmask” all metaphysical identities as false in the name of
a non-center that continually displaces and fractures.235 Thus, Horkheimer’s critique of
instrumental reason does not contradict itself; it is a metaphysics of non-identity.
That non-identity thinking now serves as a centrifugal metaphysics for Horkheimer is
evidenced both in his characterization of identity thinking and in his claims regarding the new
tasks of philosophy. First, because Horkheimer considers non-identity true, he falls into
designating identity thinking as false, the division between the abstract ego and nature as an
illusion, and the forms of domination at work in 20th century as the result of an error that can be
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corrected only by returning to the truth, i.e., non-identity thinking. In this way, the only tasks
Horkheimer can envision for his new centrifugal metaphysics are merely destructive and
negative. Besides maintaining the now vague hope of alleviating the suffering of individuals in
contemporary society, Horkheimer can envision no greater aims than dismantling all false
absolutes and persevering in the vigilance against advancing any himself—and, it is here that we
find the origin of the pessimistic tone with which the early-Frankfurt School’s work is generally
characterized. In this way, non-identity thinking stands as a form of proto-deconstruction.236 In
the end, Horkheimer managed to fashion another absolute in the attempt to undermine all
absolutes, and for this reason succeeded in reestablishing what he had fought his entire career to
avoid: the tyranny of dogmatic metaphysics. But, in this case, it is the tyranny of antimetaphysics committed to uprooting every identity in the name of the non-identical at the heart
of reason.

CONCLUSION
Throughout his career, Horkheimer was vigilant in casting dialectical materialism as a
methodological alternative to metaphysical philosophy, one that importantly evades the equally
perilous absurdities of academic skepticism and relativism. This was all the more impressively
demonstrated in Horkheimer’s refusal to provide a metaphysical foundation for the normative
orientation of dialectical materialism, especially given the overwhelmingly powerful impetus we
experience in wanting to do so. Thus, one of the single greatest contributions of Horkheimer’s
work to critical social theory is the rigor and sophistication with which he demonstrated that
post-metaphysical philosophy can serve as a coherent and viable method for addressing the
socio-political issues of our time. His emphasis on alternative forms of thought and subjectivity,
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as well as alternative ways of relating to others and the world, still stand as significant ideals for
critical social theory. However, in the end, having turned from the open dialectic of dialectical
materialism to a critique of instrumental reason grounded in non-identity thinking, Horkheimer
shifted from employing a post-metaphysical methodology to establishing an anti-metaphysical
philosophy, which mires him in the totalizing, dominating, and oppressive forms of thought that
he ultimately sought to evade. It is, here, against the backdrop of Horkheimer’s successes and
failures as a post-metaphysical philosopher, that I would like to situate the work of Foucault. My
intention is to demonstrate that the alleged failures of Foucault’s work—the purportedly opaque
critical orientation of his genealogical method and his refusal to provide conventional normative
resources—when contrasted to the work Horkheimer, actually mark the considerable
achievements for a post-metaphysical critical social theory that aims to resist tyrannical and
fascist forms of thinking and living.
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CHAPTER 4:
UNMASKING FOUCAULT: FROM A METAPHYSICAL TO A GENEALOGICAL METHOD
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INTRODUCTION
The apparent lack of an orientating foundation for critique as well as the explicit lack of
normative resources in the work of Michel Foucault has generated considerable debate in regard
to the role that genealogy might play in furthering the emancipatory politics of critical social
theory. Early critics of Foucault such as Charles Taylor,237 Nancy Fraser,238 and Jürgen
Habermas239 dismiss genealogy either as falling prey to a form of performative contradiction
since it ostensibly employs principles of critique that it ultimately undermines or as failing to
provide the normative resources requisite to differentiate between opposing political interests
since it purportedly suspends questions of both epistemic and normative justification.
Contemporary commentators such as Amy Allen,240 Colin Koopman,241 and Dianna Taylor242 are
equally in disagreement on the issue of normativity in Foucault, arguing for the necessity of
either a “middle ground” between Habermasian critical theory and Foucaultian genealogy, for a
“synergistic” deployment of pragmatic critical theory and genealogy, or for genealogy’s
contribution to politics via a critique of normativity itself. While this debate largely unfolds
under the assumption that normativity is essential to critique, it generally fails to examine
genealogical critique from the perspective of the set of problematics with which it is engaged,
which ultimately obscures the very objectives and advantages of genealogical critique as a form
of post-foundationalist critique. So as to defend Foucault’s refusal to provide either a normative
principle of critique or a political program for resistance, I argue that Foucault not only provides
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a conceptually coherent and strategically advantageous post-foundationalist critical philosophy,
but that he also provides a version of critique that evades forms of domination and normalization
without himself introducing a principle of normativity.
To make this case, I first defend Foucault from the criticisms that his purported
genealogical ‘unmasking’ of metaphysical absolutes as historical contingencies is self-refuting.
These criticisms, I claim, hinge on reading Foucault as engaged in the project of ideology
critique, the aim of which is to liberate individuals from domination by unmasking false
absolutes in the name of a primordial truth. From this perspective, Foucault’s critics incorrectly
read him as appealing to a ineradicable field of power that reveals discourses of truth both as
historically contingent and as producing insidious effects of domination and normalization. Thus,
it is claimed, Foucault’s work is inconsistent since he supposedly undermines any viable
conception of truth via an appeal to a more primordial truth concerning power. However, a
coherent account of Foucault emerges when we cease to read him as vitiating self-identical and
immobile structures and instead as beginning with the methodological decision to favor
discontinuity and fabricated assemblages. On this account, Foucault’s deployment of genealogy
is a methodological alternative to, and not an invalidation of, metaphysics. Thus, as an
alternative to metaphysics, genealogy must renounce any version of critique or resistance that
would aim to emancipate an “authentic” subject from domination by liberating it from the
maliciously corrupting powers of untruth and returning it to the sacrosanct province of truth.
I subsequently defend Foucault’s refusal to provide conventional normative resources by
situating Foucault’s post-foundationalist conception of critique, “the art of voluntary
insubordination,” within the context of his claim that the “politics of truth” is the locus of
political activity. Specifically, I argue that because Foucault claims from the methodological
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perspective of genealogy that discourses of truth induce effects of normalization on subjects and
are thereby a form of exclusion and domination, he therefore refuses to offer a normative
principle as a basis for critique, which, as another discourse of truth, would only induce new
forms of normalization. Instead, Foucault aims political resistance at “the politics of truth,” the
very apparatus of the production of truth that induces effects of power. In this way, genealogical
critique, as political refusal, focuses on altering the conditions of the production of truth that
normalize and exclude subjects rather than on emancipating subjects in the name of a primordial
truth or set of truths. Thus, in the end, by closely examining both Foucault’s methodological
decision to favor genealogy rather than metaphysics, as well as the conception of critique that
necessarily follows from this decision, I demonstrate that Foucaultian genealogy, as a form of
post-foundationalist critique, is not only coherent, but is also an advantageous strategy for
altering practices of coercion and domination, which simultaneously evades reintroducing those
practices itself by refusing to offer conventional normative resources.
TAYLOR’S CRITIQUE OF FOUCAULT’S IMPLICIT USE OF TRUTH AND FREEDOM
While Taylor takes issue with several specific analyses in Foucault’s later genealogical
works, it is ultimately Foucault’s position on the relationship between power, freedom, and truth
that Taylor finds most troublesome. Quite simply, Taylor argues that Foucault’s position is
inconsistent since Foucault employs notions of freedom and truth that he explicitly rejects. As
Taylor himself states, “To speak of power, and to want to deny a place to ‘liberation’ and ‘truth’,
as well as the link between them, is to speak incoherently.”243
Taylor’s argument against Foucault turns on Taylor’s definition of domination, which is,
for him, synonymous with power: “Something must be imposed on someone, if there is to be
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domination.”244 An imposition, on Taylor’s account, must take the form of an intervention that
frustrates or prevents one’s non-trivial desires, interests, or purposes if it is to be intelligible as
domination. While a subject need not actively wield the application of power, power must
nonetheless always have a subject as its target of application. For this reason, power necessitates
a notion of liberty as the removal of the restraint that impedes the fulfillment of one’s interests.
However, according to Taylor, the aim of Foucault’s genealogies is precisely “to discredit as
somehow based on a misunderstanding the very idea of liberation from power.”245 Thus, for
these reasons, Taylor thinks Foucault’s position is indefensible—one cannot have an account of
power that does not also include an account of freedom. Similarly, Taylor also argues that power
necessitates a notion of truth. Since power imposes itself upon us through deception and illusion,
since power falsely presents itself as reality, since power falsely presents its interests as our own,
it can only do so against the backdrop of truth. In this way, according to Taylor, not only does
power necessitate freedom, but it also necessitates truth as the condition of that freedom since
one must recognize domination for what it ‘truly’ is in order to remove it as an impediment to
freedom. Thus, again, Foucault’s position is incoherent since he repudiates notions of freedom
and truth that are essential to his analyses of power.
Taylor attributes this contradictory refusal of ‘liberation’ and ‘truth’ to Foucault’s
Nietzschean relativism, which follows from Foucault’s purported adoption of Nietzsche’s
position that truth is subordinated to power. Taylor finds evidence for this in Foucault’s June
1976 interview, “Truth and Power,”246 in which Foucault claims that truth is merely a product of
the specific regime of truth in which it is produced. Taylor thus takes Foucault as claiming that
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“[there] can be no such thing as a truth independent of its regime.”247 In this way, Foucault’s
acceptance of Nietzschean relatively undermines the possibility of a primordial truth to which we
could appeal so as to unmask as false the “truths” imposed by a specific regime. According to
Taylor, Foucault leaves us instead only with a ceaseless game of “musical chairs” in which one
regime of truth is replaced by another without there ever being “a gain in truth or freedom.”248
There is no truth to which we could appeal in order to denounce the forms of domination that
originate and circulate within our current regime of truth. However, the problem for Taylor, once
again, is that even to consider these regime-relative truths as falsely presenting themselves as
“truths” is to evaluate them as untrue in accordance with a truth that stands above any specific
regime-relative truth: “The idea of a manufactured or imposed ‘truth’ inescapably slips the word
into inverted commas, and opens the space of a truth-outside-quotes, the kind of truth, for
instance, which the sentences unmasking power manifest, or which the sentences expounding the
general theory of regime-relativity themselves manifest (a paradox).”249 In other words, for
Taylor, Foucault must be advancing his genealogical account of the regime-relative nature of
truth as a regime-independent truth that unmasks the falsity of the specific regime-relative
productions of truth.
Ultimately, Taylor claims that Foucault’s genealogical analyses remain committed to the
unmasking structures of truth and liberation that his genealogical analyses purportedly aim to
undermine and repudiate. Taylor even finds this tendency in Foucault’s last work, claiming that
Foucault sought to unmask as an illusion the notion of a “true self” introduced into Western
history by Christianity—that is, Foucault’s last work was supposed to rescue us from the illusion
of a “true self,” which would make possible the truth of self-making found in an “aesthetics of
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existence.” In the end, according to Taylor, Foucault’s position is at best paradoxical and at
worst incoherent.250
FRASER’S CRITIQUE OF FOUCAULT’S “NORMATIVE CONFUSION”
Like Taylor, Fraser is concerned with what appears to be at best another ambiguity in
Foucault’s work and at worst a blatant contradiction. Even though, on Fraser’s account,
Foucault’s work offers a novel approach for conceptualizing modernity, the methodological
strategy that enables this conceptualization ultimately renders Foucault’s theoretical stance
suspect. Specifically, Foucault’s suspension of questions regarding the epistemic justification of
the validity and invalidity of the discourses produced by the modern power/knowledge regime
allows him to investigate the procedures, practices, apparatuses, and institutions that function to
produce those discourses. Furthermore, Foucault’s analysis of the modern power/knowledge
regime also suspends normative questions regarding the legitimacy and illegitimacy of the
exercise of power in modernity so that he can analyze the ways in which power operates within
those procedures, practices, apparatuses, and institutions. However, according to Fraser, it is the
suspension of the question of normative legitimacy that is most problematic for Foucault’s
analyses. Foucault’s analyses explicitly suspend the standards of liberal, political legitimacy and
yet ultimately seem to presuppose them. Thus, Fraser can only conclude that Foucault’s work
lacks adequate normative resources.
According to Fraser, Foucault’s analyses draw a unique distinction between pre-modern
and modern forms of power. Whereas previous pre-modern forms of power were centralized in a
Obviously, Taylor’s argument rests on whether or not he has correctly presented Foucault’s conception of power,
which, as Patton has adequately demonstrated, he does not. Thus, my interest is not in ascertaining whether or not
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the question of freedom here—that is, Patton focuses on delineating clearly Foucault and Taylor’s uses of power and
freedom, I am solely interested in Taylor’s characterization of Foucault’s method.
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person or institution such as the king, sovereign, or state and exercised their power through
conspicuous acts of violence and force for the purpose of suppressing dissent, the modern form
of power is localized in diverse institutions and operates throughout the social body via
disciplinary micro-techniques that aim to produce desirable forms of subjectivity. For Fraser,
however, Foucault’s account of modern power as both capillary and productive—rather than
centralized and repressive—renders the modern concepts of political legitimacy and illegitimacy
inadequate to the nature of modern power. The concept of a sovereign whose exercise of power
can be determined as illegitimate when it transgresses its rightful limits does not apply to
Foucault’s account of a non-centralized, modern power. And yet, according to Fraser, despite
Foucault’s suspension of the standard, liberal normative framework that allowed him to advance
his theory of modern power, Foucault nonetheless casts the formation of the modern
power/knowledge regime as something “undesirable and in need of dismantling and
transformation.”251 Foucault speaks of domination, subjugation, and subjection as practices to be
corrected. Thus, despite Foucault’s claims to suspend normative questions, his work is clearly
engaged in political critique. The question becomes, for Fraser, to what normative framework
does Foucault appeal—to a new alternative normative framework or to the old liberal ideals? As
Fraser says, “Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what’s
wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it.”252
Though Foucault is often vague on this issue, he nonetheless suggests that his analyses of
power are strategic and military rather than normative. His analyses simply describe the
operations of power in a strategic field. However, Fraser finds Foucault’s stance unsatisfactory
since, again, Foucault’s analyses are clearly not neutral, but politically engaged. Foucault’s
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work, according to Fraser, precisely identifies schools, prisons, hospitals, and mental institutions
as sights of domination. Thus, Fraser argues that Foucault must be employing a new normative
framework since he purportedly suspends the use of the standard, liberal normative framework.
But, Foucault never explicitly offers any such framework nor is any such framework to be
constructed from the concepts with which Foucault analyses modern power. Foucault offers no
way to justify one’s commitment to one side or the other in war. He cannot tell us why resistance
is preferable to submission or why domination ought to be resisted. Thus, according to Fraser,
Foucault’s analyses of domination, baring an alternative normative framework, seem to
presuppose the very liberal norms that he rejects. For these reasons Fraser concludes that:
Foucault vacillates between two equally inadequate stances. On the one hand, he adopts a
conception of power that permits him no condemnation of any objectionable features of
modernity. But at the same time, and on the other hand, his rhetoric betrays the conviction that
modernity is utterly without redeeming features. Clearly what Foucault needs and needs
desperately are normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of
power.253

It appears that Foucault explicitly refuses to employ any normative position, implicitly employs
one in his analyses, and yet offers none to justify his analyses. Thus, Fraser ultimately concludes
that, “Foucault’s work is normatively confused.”254 It appears essential to Foucault’s own project
that he can distinguish better from worse social practices and yet to do so requires greater
normative resources than he possesses.
HABERMAS’S CRITIQUE OF SELF-REFERENTIALITY
In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas states quite clearly his critical
interest in the work of Foucault: “I will take up the question of whether Foucault succeeds in
bringing off a radical critique of reason in the form of a historiography of the human sciences,
which starts as archaeology and is expanded into genealogy, without getting caught in the
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aporias of this self-referential undertaking.”255 Here, we find Habermas in essence leveling the
same critique against Foucault that he earlier levels against both Nietzsche and Horkheimer and
Adorno. The problem with their work, for Habermas, is that it must implicitly employ
conceptions of truth and normativity that it explicitly aims to repudiate and thus remains mired in
an untenable theoretical contradiction.
On Habermas’s reading, Foucault’s early archaeological work, as historiographical
inquiry, is a form of anti-science that aims to unmask reason as a mechanism of violence and
exclusion that results in practices of domination. In this way, the archaeological analyses of
History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic demonstrate that reason secures its sovereignty
through the exclusion of its other. In the above-mentioned works, Foucault demonstrates that
rational discourse excludes madness as inherently irrational and thus as abnormal and inhuman.
These archaeological analyses ultimately reveal the inextricable link between discourse and
practice. The historically shifting discourses of madness result in shifting practices of exclusion,
confinement, and treatment linked to them, practices that are ultimately cast as techniques of
domination.
In the end, Foucault’s archaeological inquiries reveal the historically contingent and
socially constructed nature of discourses in general as well as that historically discontinuous
discourses structure the conditions of the possibility of making statements at any given time.
This means that both the objects of scientific inquiry and the practices surrounding them are
constituted by discourse—in other words, archaeology uncovers the historically divergent
discursive regimes that shape the criteria of validity that separate true from untrue statements.
Most vexing, for Habermas, is that this means that one cannot assess the validity or invalidity of
discourses themselves since there is no “outside” the contingency of discourse. For this reason,
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Habermas reads Foucault as having sought to neutralize the validity claims of philosophic and
scientific discourse by demonstrating that their claims are always historically constituted by the
discursive regimes that produce them and thereby demonstrating that discourse is both
historically relative and that any discourse that attempts to stand outside discourse is itself
another historically constituted discourse. In this way, Foucault’s archaeological work stands as
the apotheosis of an absurdist anti-science for Habermas.
According to Habermas, the insidious mechanisms of violence and exclusion that
Foucault uncovers in the discourses of the human sciences—what Foucault comes to term “the
will to knowledge”—reveal a will to power that lurks behind all discourse.256 Thus, Foucault
turns from archaeological analyses that reveal the play of power in discourse to the play of power
that accounts for the contingent ebb-and-flow of historical discourses in general—that is,
genealogy analyzes the “politics of truth.” As Habermas says:
[Foucault] strips the history of discourse-constitutive rules of any authority based on validity and
treats the transformation of transcendentally powerful discourse formations just as conventional
historiography treats the ups and downs of political regimes. Whereas archaeology of knowledge
(and in this it is similar to the destruction of the history of metaphysics) reconstructs the stratum of
rules constitutive of discourse, genealogy strives to explain “the discontinuous succession of the
sign-systems (ungrounded in themselves) that coerce people into the semantic framework of a
determinate interpretation of the world” — and indeed it explains the provenance of discourse
formations from practices of power that are entwined with one another in the “risky game of
overpowering.”257

On this reading, Habermas takes the task of Foucault’s genealogical inquiries as undermining
universal and necessary structures by disclosing the contingent beginnings of discursive
formations, as dissolving the illusion of identity by uncovering complexity, and as dissolving
false continuities by disclosing the play of historical rupture. For the genealogist, Habermas
claims, “the space of history is seamlessly filled by the absolutely contingent occurrence of the
disordered flaring up and passing away of new formations of discourse. No place is left for any
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overarching meaning in this chaotic multitude of past totalities of discourse.”258 Thus,
genealogical inquiry ultimately undermines the possibility of a singular and totalized history and
leaves us instead only with a battle of contingent discourses. The play of power alone describes
the historical ebb and flow of discursive regimes.
On Habermas’s reading of Foucault, every discourse of truth is vitiated essentially since
all discourse is now inextricably bound to a determination by power—that is, criteria of validity
cannot free themselves of the play of power. However, for Habermas, this is the point at which
genealogy becomes unintelligible since genealogy can only regard its reduction of discourse to
the play of power as true if it itself is somehow outside the bounds of genealogical analysis, if it
itself transcends the play of power and discourse. Thus, in the final analysis, Habermas considers
genealogy a form of relativism that falls prey to its own relativism—that is, it attempts to show
that everything is relative, but then its claims to truth must also be relative, and if that is the case,
then genealogy of necessity loses its force as an unmasking critique.
Lastly, for Habermas, this has a devastating effect on the capacity of genealogy to engage
in critique. Since every discourse is constituted through the play of power, there is no position
outside the play of power from which one could establish critique—that is, counter-power cannot
lay claim to validity since it itself is constituted through power. Moreover, since every counterpower moves within the horizon of power, counter-power is transformed into a new nexus of
power even if it wins. Thus, according to Habermas, “Genealogy only confirms that the validity
claims of counter-discourses count no more and no less than those of the discourses of power—
they too are nothing more than the effects of power they unleash.”259 For Habermas, as for
Fraser, genealogy can provide no impetus or justification for critique; genealogy cannot tell us
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why domination ought to be resisted or why struggle is better than submission. If genealogy is
simply a methodological strategy, then what gives it critical force? Why resist? In the end,
Habermas says, “Foucault cannot adequately deal with the persistent problems that come up in
connection with an interpretative approach to the object domain, a self-referential denial of
universal validity claims, and a normative justification for critique.”260
SUMMARY OF FOUCAULT’S CRITICS
Nancy Fraser, in summarizing Habermas, captures explicitly the thrust of the above
criticisms:
In their zeal to be as radical as possible, they [Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the French poststructuralists] ‘totalize’ critique so that it turns against itself. Not content to criticize the
contradiction between modern norm and modern reality, they criticize even the constitutive norms
of modernity, rejecting the very commitments to truth, rationality, and freedom that alone make
critique possible.261

Here, Fraser captures the methodological commitments that separate Foucault from his critics
and are, I am claiming, at the origin of the confusion and disagreement surrounding this debate.
Whereas Foucault’s critics seem incapable of conceiving of critique along any other lines than
“ideology critique,” Foucault’s work is best understood, on my reading, as an attempt to think
other than, and outside of, ideology critique. If I were to pose this difference of method as a
question, it would be this: Is truth necessary for critique? Foucault’s critics say, “Yes,” and
Foucault says, “No.”262
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FOUCAULTIAN METHODOLOGY: GENEALOGICAL VS. METAPHYSICAL HISTORY
Foucault states explicitly the methodological decision that orients his historical inquiries
in his lecture from the Collège de France on the 10th of January 1979:
Historicism starts from the universal and, as it were, puts it through the grinder of history. My
problem is exactly the opposite. I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that
consists in saying: Let’s suppose that universals do not exist. […] So what I would like to deploy
here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a
critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of
history we can do.263

In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,”264 Foucault elaborates on the significance of this
methodological decision for his historical inquiries by contrasting the orienting commitments of
genealogy to those of metaphysical history. On Foucault’s account, the metaphysical approach to
history assumes the existence of self-identical and immobile structures that lie beneath history
and act as what he calls “founding origins.” Specifically, these founding origins, once unearthed,
are supposed to serve as the sites of primordial truths that would provide a suprahistorical
perspective from which to survey history as a singular and closed totality. In this way, the
founding origin, as the site of a primordial truth, would provide a singular understanding of
history as the result of either a cosmological cause—something like Platonism or Monotheism—
or as the progressive realization of a teleological aim—something like Marx or Hegel.
The genealogist, alternatively, has no “faith in metaphysics”265 and therefore “refuses the
certainty of absolutes.”266 For this reason, rather than start with the assumption that its objects of
inquiry are self-identical and unified entities that remain the same through time, the genealogist
instead approaches history as a network of fabricated assemblages, ruptures, and multiple
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beginnings brought about through a play of forces and dominations. Thus, the genealogist neither
feigns pretense to disinterested observation nor is interested in pursuing ideal metaphysical
absolutes, but rather affirms the very perspective by which she constructs historical
interpretations from discontinuous and fragmented elements.267 What this means, then, is that
methodologically the genealogist divests herself of the task of washing away historical
contingency so as to reveal a primordial truth that would in some way return us to the privileged
position of a metaphysical origin—“the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return.”268
Instead, the genealogist chases the “infinite task of interpretation” to point of near “madness.”269
However, this also means that the genealogist is not engaged in the inverse task of disclosing the
fundamentally contingent nature of history so as to “unmask” purported metaphysical absolutes
as illusory, since this would, in essence, be the very same task as metaphysical history—that is,
difference would stand as an inverted metaphysical origin that would eternally de-center and
fracture history rather than congeal and totalize it.270 Ultimately, then, by affirming
interpretation, the genealogist renounces any and all claims to founding origins—whether those
are absolutes or contingencies. All this is to say that from the outset, as a method, genealogy is
avowedly post-metaphysical and post-foundational. Genealogy begins with the methodological
decision to postulate history as composed of discontinuous and fragmented practices whose
emergence can be traced from the play of forces.

This feature of genealogical history alone checks Fraser and Habermas’s claims to crypto-normativity since
Foucault accepts methodologically that the genealogist as historian has a vested interested in examining the
particular historical phenomena that she investigates. So, Foucault does not claim to engage in genealogy from
“nowhere.” Genealogy is precisely that method that is already underway from somewhere, from a vested
interpretative perspective or position.
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THE ANALYTIC GRID: TRUTH, POWER, AND THE SUBJECT
In “What is Critique?” a lecture to the French Society of Paris on the 27th of May 1978,
Foucault further elaborates upon the methodological decisions that orient his work. According to
Foucault, the theme with which his historical-philosophical work is concerned is the relationship
between truth, power, and the subject.271 More specifically, Foucault tells us that his historicalphilosophical inquiries are an examination of what he calls “eventualization,”272 which he
defines as an investigation into “the relationships between structures of rationality that articulate
true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation that are linked to it.”273 The aim of these
investigations is to identify connections between mechanisms of coercion and contents of
knowledge. In Foucault’s own words, he says:
What we are trying to find out is what are the links, what are the connections that can be identified
between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge, what is the interplay of relay and
support developed between them, such that a given element of knowledge takes on effects of
power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, probable, uncertain or false element, such
that a procedure of coercion acquires the very form and justifications of a rational, calculated,
technically efficient element, etc.274

Moreover, as someone who avowedly eschews the search for metaphysical origins in favor of
constructing interpretative assemblages, Foucault is explicit about the methodological decisions
that enable his inquiries. First, in investigating “eventualizations,” Foucault suspends the
traditional philosophical questions regarding both the validity of the systems of knowledge as
well as the legitimacy of the practices in question: “We are not attempting to find out what is true
or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, or legitimate or
abusive.”275 Second, the very terms of investigation, “knowledge” and “power,” serve as an
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analytic grid for investigation: “[These] two terms have only a methodological function. It is not
a matter of identifying general principles of reality through them, but of somehow pinpointing
the analytical front, the type of element that must be pertinent for the analysis.”276 In this way, as
analytical terms, savoir refers to the procedures and effects of connaissance in a given historical
domain and pouvoir refers to the mechanisms that induce behaviors and discourses.277
One of the most important concepts that Foucault formulates in connection with these
historical investigations is his notion of “power/knowledge.” Typically, and this is paradigmatic
of philosophy in general and metaphysics specifically, we approach power and knowledge as
uniquely distinct and separate entities. Power manifests itself as either legitimate or illegitimate
based on its relation to truth, and truth is that which stands free from the corrupting influences of
power. Likewise, the subject is considered autonomous to the extent to which it remains faithful
to the truth and is corrupted to the extent to which it deviates from the truth. However, within
Foucault’s analytic grid, “truth is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it
induces regular effects of power.”278 In this way, power and knowledge form the nexus or
ensemble “power/knowledge.” Describing the power/knowledge ensemble in greater detail,
Foucault states:
Nothing can exist as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it does not conform to a set of
rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given
period, and if, on the other hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the
incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally
accepted, etc. Conversely, nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed
according to procedures, instruments, means, and objectives that can be validated in more or less
coherent systems of knowledge.279
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What this means is that mechanisms of power are always deployed according to precise
procedures, with specific instruments, for definite aims, all of which are given validity via a
coherent system of knowledge. And, every coherent system of knowledge, in that it is generally
accepted, rational, and valid, induces effects of power. In this way, mechanisms of power are
always deployed in concert with a coherent system of knowledge and every coherent system of
knowledge induces mechanisms of power.
Foucault’s deployment of the power/knowledge ensemble as an analytic grid allows him
to analyze power/knowledge ensembles at two different levels—the archaeological and the
genealogical. At the archaeological level, Foucault can take an empirically observable and
historically accepted power/knowledge ensemble such as the mental health system, the penal
system, delinquency, or sexuality and inquire into both the conditions of its acceptability as well
as the historical ruptures that indicate its emergence and disappearance as a distinct ensemble
separable from other ensembles. Foucault’s own distinction between discourse analysis and
linguistic analysis clarifies precisely how these ensembles can be identified:
Even if it disappeared a long time ago, even if no one speaks it anymore and it is reestablished on
rare fragments, a language always constitutes a system for possible statements. It is a finite
ensemble of rules which authorizes an infinite number of performances. Discourse, in contrast, is
the always-finite and temporally limited ensemble of those statements alone which were
formulated. They might be innumerable; they might, by their mass, exceed any capacity for
registration; they nevertheless constitute a finite ensemble. The question asked by linguistic
analysis, concerning a discursive act, is always: According to what rules has this statement been
constituted and consequently, according to what rules could other similar statements be
constructed? The description of discourse asks a different question: How is it that this statement
appeared, rather than some other one in its place?280

In other words, archaeological analysis investigates the mechanisms of constraint that produced,
out of infinite possibility, the actual practices and statements found at a particularly time.
Significantly, for Foucault, these empirically observable ensembles are to be regarded as pure
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singularities and not as historical species, forms, universals or essences—that is, Foucault is not
investigating something like “madness as such” and its historical variations, but rather is
investigating the absolute singularity of different power/knowledge ensembles constituting
madness, delinquency, or sexuality.
At the genealogical level, Foucault can investigate the process of emergence of a
power/knowledge ensemble as a singularity. This means for Foucault that his genealogical
analyses must involve a complex causal network that is capable of accounting for a singularity as
an effect. Significantly, having methodologically suspended a metaphysical approach to history,
Foucault will not deploy causal schemes that aim to reduce the singularities under investigation
to unitary, pyramidal, or necessary principles—in other words, Foucault avoids causal accounts
that reduce singularities to either a single causal agent (economics), reduces the characteristics of
the singularity to a species variation of a genus, or reduces the singularity to a necessary
phenomena via an appeal to a teleological final cause. The goal is to make the singularity
intelligible as a singularity. Thus, Foucault says, “[As] opposed to a genesis oriented towards the
unity of some principal cause burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a
genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a
singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather
the effect.”281 In this way, genealogy is a method for rendering the emergence of singularities
intelligible without reifying and totalizing them along the lines of a metaphysical causal account
since no element in a singularity is taken as either primary or fundamental. Thus, Foucault’s
genealogical analyses aim to trace the complex causal networks that give rise to a singularity
rather than totalizing a singularity by reducing it to the effect of a singular cause. For this reason,
a singularity, a power/knowledge ensemble, is thus a fabricated assemblage—that is,
281
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archaeological and genealogical analyses never feign either to trace the boundaries of a
singularity in its exactitude or to exhaust the potentially infinite causes that constitute its
emergence.
Proceeding along these methodological lines, Foucault can investigate “eventualizations”
as historically contingent forms of knowing—that is, as historically contingent discursive and
epistemic formations. And so, suspending the traditional philosophical question regarding the
validity of these systems of knowledge, Foucault can instead examine the ways in which truth,
power, and the subject interpenetrate one another and function within these systems. This means,
then, that when the genealogist ceases to ask the question of whether or not a particular
discursive formation is a legitimate way of knowing, she can instead investigate the procedures
that make a discursive regime function as true at a particular time as well as the operations and
effects of truth within that system.
Ultimately, Foucault calls this circular relation, in which truth is linked with a system of
power that produces and sustains it, and to effects of power that it induces and extends, a
“regime of truth.”282 Foucault uses different terms to name this circular relation throughout his
career: a “regime of truth,” the “general politics of truth,” the “political economy of truth,” or
“games of truth.” Nonetheless, Foucault’s point is that every society has its regime of truth—that
is, “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific
effects of power attached to the true.”283 The specific effects of power with which Foucault is
concerned are the normalizing and subjectivizing effects of regimes of truth. For this reason,
Foucault investigates a plurality of regimes of truth that create subjects of sexuality, gender, law,
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delinquency, medicine, etc., and that all have the effect of normalizing and abnormalizing,
including and excluding, and producing both social subjects and social practices.284
This relation finds its most systematic treatment in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish.
There, he focuses on modern disciplinary power, which both normalizes and subjectivizes. Quite
simply, disciplinary power operates through pervasive and anonymous surveillance, the diagram
of which is embodied in Bentham’s Panopticon. For Foucault, the Panopticon illustrates the
ensemble formed between forms of knowledge, mechanisms of power, and their subjects. Using
the Panopticon as a spatial metaphor, Foucault details the ways in which—whether it is in
prisons, schools, or barracks—the observation of individuals’ conduct allows for the
accumulation of data about them that transforms individuals into cases that can described,
measured, and compared. Significantly, the scientific discourses built upon this data produce
truths about individuals that then function as the norm—that is, we can plot statistical trends on a
graph concerning anything from diet and fitness to spending habits and sexual proclivities. This
knowledge serves as a basis by which to both identify individuals who are aberrant as well as for
formulating techniques for correcting their deviant behavior. Thus, for Foucault, modern
disciplinary power serves as a mechanism of normalization and, significantly, this mechanism of
normalization operates through individuals’ internalization of the norms produced from scientific
discourse—a process Foucault calls subjectivation and later the “government of
individualization.”285 In his own words:
This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks
him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that
he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes
individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by
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control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both
meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to.286

Returning to the spatial metaphor of the Panopticon, individuals internalize the norms of modern
disciplinary power and in effect act like their own prison guards in an attempt to approximate
norms and fashion themselves into acceptable social subjects. In the end, Foucault’s account of
modern disciplinary power describes a situation in which the modern power/knowledge
ensemble acts to produce specific socially acceptable subjects.
Foucault’s focus on the human sciences is highly illustrative since both their history and
operation most clearly reveal the mutually interpenetrating relation of power/knowledge and its
relation to the subject that Foucault is investigating—that is, the interpenetrating relationship of
truth, power, and the subject is at its most intense register in those sciences that take the subject
as its object of inquiry. So, from the genealogical approach, a singular phenomenon like
“madness,” as Foucault demonstrates, not only manifests itself in multiple clearly delineated
historical forms, but also reveals the historically contingent discursive formations that produced
madness as a phenomenon of investigation. Moreover, the truths produced by these multiple
investigations deploy themselves in the social body and structure social practices and subjects.
So, as Foucault illustrates, the “truths” produced by psychiatry about the “insane” legitimates the
social practice of dividing the populace into sane and insane subjects. And, these “truths”
produced by psychiatry have considerable effects within the socio-political sphere since the
“insane” are excluded and rendered silent while specific types of behavior constitute one as
“sane” and grant the sane unique privileges within the socio-political sphere—such as the right to
speak for oneself (whether as a citizen, in a court of law, in a voting booth, or even as a person
since the insane are not quite people) or the right over one’s own body (the insane are literally
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confined in space while the sane are mobile, the insane are administered medication without
consent while the sane can refuse medication, the insane are operated upon without consent
while the sane can refuse to undergo operation). Foucault similarly examines these mechanisms
in relation to medical institutions, penal institutions, and sexuality.

POWER, FREEDOM, AND DOMINATION
With the first volume of his History of Sexuality, Foucault turns to a more focused,
sophisticated, and nuanced treatment of the power relations operative in mechanisms of
normalization and subjectivation. According to Foucault, power relations are very simply the
way that some act on the actions of others. Foucault tells us quite explicitly, however, that:
By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the
subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of
subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind
a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects,
through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. 287

Rather, Foucault says:
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design
or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in
the various social hegemonies.288

On this account, the power relations that serve as an analytic grid for Foucault’s analyses are
local, everywhere, and unstable; they are coextensive with every social relationship. This means
that rather than locating the locus of power in the centralized point of a sovereign and its
associated bureaucracies, Foucault prefers to examine the networks of power relations formed
between economies, doctors’ offices, courtrooms, Child Protective Services, schools,
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workplaces, and families as well as the everyday practices between social groups and
individuals. Rather than confining his analyses of power relations to the great binary divide of
rulers and ruled, which would form a pyramidal structure of the application of power from the
top down, Foucault instead focuses on power relations that pervade the social body and thus
cannot form or provide either a privileged foundation for analysis or a mechanism for a totalized
causal account of the social order. In other words, rather than examining power relations in
simplistic vertical or horizontal axes of application, Foucault prefers to examine power relations
as de-centered, multiple, multi-layered, mobile, and reverberating networks of social
interactions. This means, for Foucault, that, “Power relations are both intentional and
nonsubjective.”289 Power relations always involve strategies, objectives, and aims as well as their
associated tactics, methods, and procedures of implementation even if these do not directly arise
from the conscious choice of individual subjects—that is, as subjects, we find ourselves
permeated by networks of interacting and reverberating power relations that precede us, act on
us, and shape the styles of behavior in which we can identify ourselves as normal and legitimate
subjects. In Foucault’s own words, he says:
[Neither] the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who
make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a
society (and makes it function); the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often
quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics
which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding
their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems: the
logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to
have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic
of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose
“investors” or decision makers are often without hypocrisy. 290

Foucault’s description of power in “The Subject and Power” attests to the complex and vast field
of analysis that interests him:
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[Power] operates on the field of possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to
inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes
easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it
constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects
by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.291

Such a “conception” of power relations allows Foucault to examine and make intelligible—
without reducing them to a single conception of intelligibility—the widest possible array of
social interactions and practices.
Ultimately, and quite significantly, Foucault’s conceptualization of power stands in
contrast to those advanced by Marx and Freud—namely, ideology and repression. At the core of
the concept of ideology—in what one might call “naïve” Marxism—is the position that the
dominant conceptual schemes of the time—the superstructure—ultimately serve to mask and
maintain the economic interests of the ruling class. In this way, ideology distorts the mechanisms
of economic domination that are in place exploiting the proletariat. To break the spell of
ideology and liberate oneself from its mechanisms of exploitation requires an insight into the
“true” nature of capitalism. In this way, truth is necessary as a corrective to abuses of power.
Repressive power, on the other hand, operates entirely along the lines of prohibition. It is a
power that acts through mechanisms of civilization and socialization to impede upon and disrupt
our acting-out our basest desires. In this way, repressive power acts to separate us from what we
truly are at our core.
Ultimately, both of these conceptions of power are inadequate models for the forms of
social inquiry with which Foucault is interested. On the hand, ideology must employ a
conception of truth that stands outside the influences of power so that it can stand as a counter to,
and as an unmasking mechanism for, ideology. Additionally, in conceiving of truth as an
unmasking antidote to ideology, ideology must envision a subject that can extricate itself from
291
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the corrupting influences of a power that aligns itself with illusion. Ideology critique presupposes
a truth outside the influence of power and a power that can come uncoupled from truth as well as
subject that is caught in the fray of their relation. Repressive power, on the other hand, has as its
mirror-inverse an ideal of power that is free from all coercion, discipline, and normalization—
repressive power dreams of a free subject that can liberate its “true” self from the influences of
power. Moreover, repressive power in the end, by focusing only on the prohibitive aspects of
power, is incapable of accounting for the ways in which power produces, induces, and seduces.
As Foucault’s analyses demonstrate, power can equally be conceived as productive of
subjectivities through the mechanisms of normalization and subjectivation. Thus, ideology
critique and repressive power, as they are envisioned along Marxist and Freudian lines,
necessitate conceptions of truth, power, and the subject that Foucault rejects methodologically.
Despite the oceanic presence of power relations throughout the whole network of the
social, Foucault nonetheless tells us, “Where there is power, there is resistance.”292 Since
Foucault rejects from the outset a centralized locus of power that would exist in contrast to its
“other”—an “other” that would stand outside power and nonetheless serve as the site of the
application of power—and since power relations involve their own objectives and aims as well
as their own mechanisms and strategies for success, power relations thus stand in an “agonistic”
relation to one another rather than in an “antagonistic” relation.293 In other words, there is no
“great war” of binary power relations arranged in a mutually exclusive and confrontational
opposition to one another. Rather, the network of the social is composed of a multiplicity of
power relations pursuing their own aims and deploying their own strategies, and all without
direction from a center. In this way, power relations, through interaction and play, can just as
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much reinforce, extend, and strengthen one another as they can reverse, deplete, and weaken one
another. Therefore, since there is no center to power relations, since there is no outside to power
relations, there is therefore no privileged position of refusal to power relations. Similarly, just as
there is no center to power relations and only a play of multiple power relations, there is also no
great locus of refusal, but only a multiplicity of resistances. Thus, for Foucault, the whole
network of the social is the strategic field of the play of power relations.
Furthermore, since power relations are, on Foucault’s account, both fluid and mobile,
they can also therefore be conceived in terms of freedom and domination. As Foucault states:
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of others, when one
characterizes these actions as the government of men by other men—in the broadest sense of the
term—one includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects,
and only insofar as they are ‘free.’ By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced
with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes
of behavior are available.294

In this way, for Foucault, freedom exists as an intrinsic feature of his conception of power
relations. Since power relations are inherently unstable, they are capable of intensification and
extension as well as de-escalation and reversal. Thus, freedom for Foucault ultimately speaks to
the element of modification in any power relation. And, when this capacity for modification is
absent, a state of domination exists:
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what
may be called situations or states of domination in which power relations, instead of being mobile,
allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen.
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing
them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one
is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of
freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited.295
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On Foucault’s account, then, freedom is not a state free from power relations, but is instead the
inherently fluid dynamic of power relations themselves. And, likewise, domination is not the
imposition of power on a state of freedom, but is instead a particularly static power relation.

IN DEFENSE OF FOUCAULT
Having given a general account of Foucault’s work let me return to Foucault’s critics,
beginning with Habermas. On Habermas’s reading, Foucault’s work can be reduced to the
general project of a totalizing critique of reason. As Habermas sees it, Foucault’s work presents a
three-prong attack on the autonomy of reason. First, for Habermas, Foucault’s archaeological
analyses of discursive formations reveal not only the historically contingent nature of discourses
themselves, and thus the relativity of the scientifico-philosophical statements and practices
produced within those discourses, but also that there is thus no “outside” of discourse. In this
way, Habermas reads Foucault as having taken aim at the heart of reason itself—archaeology
purportedly “demonstrates” that all claims to truth are essentially undermined since all claims to
validity are necessarily relative to the historically contingent discursive formations in which they
are produced and for this reason the possibility of necessary and discourse-transcendent truths is
foreclosed. Second, and following from the previous point, Foucault’s archaeological and
genealogical analyses “unmask” the necessity purported to adhere in the claims of reason as the
historically contingent formations that they truly are. In this way, Foucault’s analyses ultimately
disarm truth’s hold on us and liberate us from its mechanisms of domination. Lastly, Foucault’s
genealogical analyses demonstrate, for Habermas, not only that discursive formations are
historically contingent, but that they are also the result of the play of power. In this way, since all
truth claims are relative to the discourses in which they are produced, there is thus no truth that
can stand outside the play of power, which undermines the autonomy of all claims to truth.
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However, for Habermas, all this means that Foucault’s work is little more than the height of
absurdity since in order to accept Foucault’s analyses regarding the historically contingent
production of discourses as true, those analyses would themselves have to stand outside
discourse and the play of power, but this is a possibility that Foucault’s analyses precisely
foreclose. Thus, for Habermas, Foucault’s analyses fall prey to the relativism of which he
accuses other discourses and therein lose their validity and critical force.
While much has been made of the supposed debate between Foucault and Habermas,296
my aim is less to stir the waters once more than it is to use what I take to be a significant
misunderstanding on Habermas’s part to highlight Foucault’s unique approach to metaphysics
and critique so as to open up new ways to engage and utilize Foucault’s work. In essence, my
aim is precisely to move away from this debate rather than possess the pretension to try to put an
end to it. Nonetheless, at issue here in this “non-debate” is a question of method. It is a question
of the nature of the task and the approach to the task that each thinker presumes. Habermas
regards the task with which Foucault is engaged as the task of metaphysical philosophy—the aim
of which in this case is to undertake a critique of reason that discloses its inherent tendencies to
exclusion and domination via an appeal to a more fundamental insight into the nature of power.
For this reason, the term with which Habermas continually characterizes Foucault’s work is
“unmasking.” According to Habermas, Foucault’s archaeological analyses “unmask” necessity
as contingency and Foucault’s genealogical analyses “unmask” truth as power. Upon this
reading, Habermas is correct that Foucault’s work—as well as that of many other thinkers from
the twentieth century—is inherently aporetic. Any appeal to a deeper reality so as to undermine
metaphysics, even to that of contingency and power, would nonetheless remain trapped in the
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structures of metaphysics and would ultimately only reestablish what it sought to displace.
Habermas’s insights into the perils with which a critique of metaphysics is faced are significant
for any movement of thought that seeks to operate outside the confines of metaphysical
philosophy. And, my claim is that Foucault’s work is sensitive to just such perils.
As my account of Foucault’s work above importantly demonstrates, archaeology and
genealogy begin with the methodological decision to suspend belief in the existence of the selfidentical and immobile structures of history that are presupposed by metaphysics. Instead, both
archaeology and genealogy proceed upon the inverse theoretical basis that fabricated
assemblages and contingency constitute the basic ensembles of theoretical inquiry. Quoting
Foucault’s lecture from the Collège de France on the 10th of January 1979 again, he states:
Historicism starts from the universal and, as it were, puts it through the grinder of history. My
problem is exactly the opposite. I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that
consists in saying: Let’s suppose that universals do not exist. […] So what I would like to deploy
here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a
critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of
history we can do.297

Here, Foucault rejects explicitly the theoretical position that Habermas attributes to him. Thus,
Habermas’s insistence that Foucault’s archaeologies disclose the rupturing and fundamentally
contingent nature of historical discourses so as to “unmask” the universal and necessary claims
of philosophy as false is fundamentally incorrect. This is not the task of thought to which
Foucault sets himself.
Moreover, in methodologically suspending the presuppositions upon which metaphysical
philosophy operates, Foucault likewise suspends the notions of a founding origin and a
primordial truth that are essential to metaphysics. In other words, since Foucault suspends the
existence of self-identical and unified structures in his analyses, nothing could thereby serve as
an unalterable foundation upon which to erect a immutable truth. In relation to Habermas’s
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criticisms, Foucault’s suspension of the use of the metaphysical notion of a primordial truth is
significant for two reasons. First, since Foucault suspends from the outset the possibility of the
metaphysical conceptions of a founding origin and a primordial truth, Foucault’s archaeological
and genealogical analyses clearly cannot, and do not, aspire to the status of a “suprahistorical”
perspective from which to survey history as a singular and closed totality—that is, Foucault’s
archaeological and genealogical analyses clearly do not aspire to the status of a metaphysical
theory of history and thus do not claim the status of truth that Habermas attributes to them.
Second, it cannot be the case that Foucault appeals to a theory of power that is antecedent to
reason and truth so as to “unmask” them as manifestations of power since, again, Foucault’s
analyses do not aspire to the status of a metaphysical theory of reality. As Foucault clearly states
in The History of Sexuality, “The aim of the inquiries that will follow is to move less toward a
‘theory’ of power than toward an ‘analytics’ of power: that is, toward a definition of the specific
domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will
make possible its analysis.”298 Clearly, Foucault’s work does not aim to advance a theory of
power, but rather only more modestly to delineate and investigate a field of analysis.
Like Habermas, Taylor also mistakes Foucault’s methodological approach and analytic
grid for metaphysical claims concerning a theory of power. According to Taylor, by accepting
Nietzsche’s theory of power, Foucault ultimately reduces truth to an effect of power and thus
undermines the possibility of a primordial truth by which one could “unmask” as false
counterfeit truths. Yet, for Taylor, this places Foucault in a double bind since Foucault’s
genealogical analyses commit him in the end to the structures of truth and liberation that he
precisely aims to invalidate. On the one hand, if we are to regard as true the genealogical
revelation that reason is a manifestation of power, which would undermine all claims to validity,
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then Foucault’s own analyses must operate outside the confines of power to make a claim to
validity. However, this would violate the very finding of genealogical analysis that all truth is
relative to power and thus points to a fundamental incoherence in Foucault’s position. On the
other hand, according to Taylor, any notion of power must of necessity include a conception of
liberation. In other words, if power is capable of being imposed upon me, it must also therefore
be capable of being removed. And yet, on Taylor’s reading, the aim of Foucault’s genealogies is
precisely “to discredit as somehow based on a misunderstanding the very idea of liberation from
power.”299 Thus, for Taylor, Foucault rejects the very notion of liberation and yet must
presuppose it in his analyses.
As was stated just before in connection with Habermas, Foucault neither advances a
metaphysical theory of power nor do his archaeological and genealogical analyses aspire to
disclose primordial truths. Thus, quite simply, Taylor misunderstands the relationship between
truth and power in Foucault’s analyses as well as the methodological commitments orienting his
inquiries. Foucault himself explicitly rejects the reduction of truth to power that both Habermas
and Taylor attribute to him:
[When] I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of
truth are just concealed power relations—that would be a horrible exaggeration. My problem, as I
have already said, is in understanding how truth games are set up and how they are connected with
power relations.300

Again, truth and power serve as analytic grids of inquiry for archaeological and genealogical
analyses, both of which have suspended the use of metaphysical assumptions. Thus, Foucault is
engaged in an entirely different project than the one Taylor attributes to him. And, this
misunderstanding further manifests itself in Taylor’s comments on liberation. As was mentioned
above, Foucault’s account of power relations differs from those that posit power as a
299
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unidirectional phenomenon that finds its center of application in the singular bureaucratic
apparatus of the state or some other similar construct. Rather, Foucault’s conception of power
relations conceives of them as de-centered, multiple, multi-layered, mobile, and reverberating
networks of social interactions and practices. Thus, Foucault considers power relations as
omnidirectional and therefore as fragile, tentative, and fluid. This means that Foucault is not
concerned with describing a binary ontological condition in which there either exists power or
freedom from power, but is rather interested in describing the ways in which power relations
operate—their formation, circulation, condensation, dissipation, and reversal. Since power
relations are in Foucault’s conception already fluid and dynamic, they therefore include the
possibility of reversal and augmentation—in other words, the possibility for a reversal or
augmentation in power relations, which Taylor wants to call “liberation,” is already included in
Foucault’s conception of power relations as “omnidirectional.”
Taylor is correct, however, that Foucault takes issue with the idea of “liberation,” but the
conception of liberation with which Foucault is concerned is not that which Taylor describes. In
Foucault’s own words, he tells us:
I have always been suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not treated with
precautions and with certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a
human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes,
has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. According to
this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be
reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a
full positive relationship with himself.301

The problem with this conception of liberation is not that it somehow gets “reality” wrong, or is
inherently problematic, but rather that it employs a host of metaphysical assumptions that
Foucault methodologically suspends in order to undertake his archaeological and genealogical
analyses. As quoted above, Foucault assumes methodologically that universals do not exist, and
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this must of necessity include the universals of a human essence or nature. As Foucault explicitly
states:
[The] first rule of method for this kind of work is this: Insofar as possible, circumvent
anthropological universals (and, of course, those of a humanism that would assert the rights, the
privileges, and the nature of a human being as an immediate and timeless truth of the subject) in
order to examine them as historical constructs. 302

Again, Foucault does not undertake his archaeological and genealogical analyses so as to
“unmask” as false the purported universal and necessary truths of the human subject by
disclosing their historical contingency, but rather begins with the assumption of contingency and
inquiries into their historical construction. In this way, Foucault cannot possibly make use of
Taylor’s conception of liberation in his analyses. Thus, despite Taylor’s claims to the contrary,
Foucault neither aims to discredit such a conception of liberation in his work nor does he employ
one in his analyses of power.
The last criticism I will address concerns the place of a normative foundation for critique
in Foucault’s work. On this front, both Fraser and Habermas accuse Foucault of “normative
confusion” since his analyses purport to provide neutral descriptions of the modern
power/knowledge ensemble while nonetheless seeming to suggest that the modern
power/knowledge ensemble is something “undesirable and in need of dismantling and
transformation.”303 And yet, despite the appearance of denunciation on the part of Foucault
toward the modern power/knowledge ensemble, he offers neither a normative principle of
critique nor a political program for resistance in his work. Thus, according to Fraser, Foucault’s
work is normatively deficient since he never offers us a way to justify taking a stand for one side
of a power relation over another, or a reason for why we should find resistance to domination
more preferable than submission.
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Habermas finds Foucault’s position even more untenable than Fraser. Since, on
Habermas’s reading, Foucault reduces discourse to the play of power, there is no position outside
the play of power in which one could establish a foundation for critique. In other words, since
every position is constituted by the play of power, no position possesses any more validity than
another—all positions are equalized in Foucault’s field of power. Resistance is no more
legitimate than the mechanisms of power that it seeks to supplant. Thus, for Habermas,
genealogy in the end can provide no justification for critique. As a methodological strategy, it
lacks all critical force.
Foucault’s critics, however, employ a conception of critique that operates upon the
theoretical assumption that domination, subjugation, and tyranny are always some form of
infidelity to, and distortion of, the truth since on their conception power is only legitimate when
it is applied in accord with truth; moreover, upon this assumption, liberation from domination
must entail a free subject capable of liberating itself from the corrupting influences of
illegitimate power so as to bring itself back into accord with truth.304 Thus, for Foucault’s critics,
critique, as resistance to domination and illusion, must be grounded in a truth accessible to a free
subject, which is alone capable of establishing a privileged position from which to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate instances of power and from which non-dominating social
practices can be orchestrated and arranged. It is for this reason that Fraser claims that truth,
rationality, and freedom alone make critique possible. In other words, Foucault’s critics, as good
metaphysicians, are of the position that truth alone, in disclosing that which is universal and
necessary, can stand as a legitimate authority and that possession of the truth requires a free
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subject capable of extricating itself from the influences of power. In this way, only a truth held in
possession by a subject free from the influences of power could lay claim to legitimate critique.
Given the methodological commitments of genealogical analysis, however, Foucault
must of necessity repudiate such a conception of critique. And, he explicitly does so:
[The] question is no longer through what error, illusion, oversight, or illegitimacy has knowledge
come to induce effects of domination…The question instead would be: …In what way can the
effects of coercion characteristic of these [regimes of truth] not be dissipated by a return to the
legitimate destination of knowledge and by a reflection on the transcendental or semitranscendental that fixes them, but how can they instead by reversed or released from within a
concrete strategic field, this concrete strategic field that induced them. 305

Clearly, Foucault refuses his critics’ line of thinking since, whatever critique and resistance are
going to be for Foucault, they are never going to be about either an “escape” from domination
and distortion, or a “return” to some privileged position and founding origin—that is, Foucault
cannot employ a metaphysical conception of either critique or resistance. They are going to have
to be something altogether different since the methodological commitments of archaeology and
genealogy demand something different—or, more specifically, they demand post-metaphysical
and post-foundational conceptions of critique and resistance. And, in fact, Foucault offers us a
conception of critique consistent with these demands:
I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question
truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. [Critique] will be the art
of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure
desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we would call, in a word, the politics of
truth.306

In other words, for Foucault, critique is the political act of refusal; it is to refuse the effects of
power induced by discourses whose authority rests in their purported truth; it is to refuse to
accept as authoritative those discourses whose truths induce effects of power; it is to refuse the
forms of subjectivity to which we are compelled to have allegiance. Thus, for Foucault, critique
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is aimed at the “politics of truth,” at the circular relation that links mechanisms of normalization
and subjectivation to effects of power that are induced by discourses of truth.
Conspicuously missing from Foucault’s account of critique are precisely the normative
resources grounded in claims of truth and legitimacy for which his critics chastise him. And,
obviously, it is this “lack” of such resources that continues to generate debate. However, as I
have argued, sensitivity to the methodological commitments that orient archaeological and
genealogical analyses reveals that those commitments of necessity preclude advancing
conventional—which is really to say metaphysical—normative resources. If one accepts the
methodological commitments orienting archaeological and genealogical analyses, if one accepts
their analytic grids of investigation, and if one accepts their conceptual constructs, then three
things of necessity must follow for Foucault’s post-metaphysical methodology. First, no
founding origin could serve as a basis upon which to erect a primordial truth or as a basis to
which one might return and to which one might appeal as an ultimate principle of adjudication.
Second, the discursive regimes that produce truths must be treated as historically contingent and
thus amenable to change. Lastly, every metaphysical truth is going to induce effects of power
that establish mechanisms of normalization and subjectivation. Thus, for Foucault, if—and note
that I use the conditional—the goal is to evade or resist mechanisms of normalization and
subjectivation, then the only thing that an appeal to a conventional normative principle of
critique is going to achieve is to introduce new mechanisms of normalization and subjectivation
since every principle of normative critique is itself an appeal to a truth as a founding origin—that
is, one is precisely going to establish a new regime of truth in order to justify one’s normative
principle. “In fact,” Foucault tells us, “we know from experience that the claim to escape from
the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of
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another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of
the most dangerous traditions.”307 Thus, if the aim of Foucault’s work is, as he tells, the
desubjectivation of the subject via a reversal of the regimes of truth operative in our present, then
traditional, metaphysical normative resources will run counter to this very aim since there is an
inherent incompatibility between metaphysical normative principles and the methodological
commitments of genealogy.
For this reason, given the methodological commitments of archaeological and
genealogical analyses, Foucault is neither “normatively confused” nor is his work inherently
aporetic. Rather, he is correct not to offer conventional normative principles. The very aim and
commitments of archaeology and genealogy as methods demand that we re-conceive our relation
to normativity. It is precisely for this reason that Foucault insists on an experimental ethos in his
later works in the form of “an aesthetics of existence” and as the project of “the undefined work
of freedom.” If Foucault were to tell us what to change and why we should change it, he would
no longer offer us a method for desubjectivation, but would instead manage to erect a new mode
of subjectivation, the very antithesis of the aim of genealogy.

CONCLUSION
In the end, Foucault’s critics are correct; he offers neither a conventional normative
principle of critique nor a political program for resistance, which his critics so desperately want.
However, when examined from the perspective of the methodological commitments of
genealogy, these are not ineptitudes or careless omissions on the part of Foucault, but rather
great strides in advancing a coherent and strategically advantageous post-metaphysical and postfoundational conception of critical social theory. In other words, the lack of conventional
Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 3: Ethics, ed. Paul
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normative of resources in Foucault’s work is neither an aberration nor a failure; it is instead a
considered success as well as testament to both the sensitivity and courage of Foucault’s own
thinking. In evading the metaphysical impulse, Foucault locates critique in individual’s and
group’s “refusal to be governed.” This means that the impetus for political resistance is not the
possession of a truth that guarantees that one carries justice on one’s side, but is rather the refusal
to continue participating in social practices that one has come to find intolerable. Thus, in aiming
political resistance at the “games of truth” that make us into what we are, Foucault provides a
strategy, based in genealogy as a method, for altering the conditions that make us into something
that we would rather not be. Genealogy as a method is “the art of voluntary insubordination”:
genealogical method is the right one gives oneself to call into question those discourses that
presuppose that the only legitimate form of critique is that which is undertaken in the name of
truth by a free subject liberated from power.
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CONCLUSION
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In the preceding chapters, I have sought to overturn those readings of Nietzsche,
Horkheimer, and Foucault that characterize their work as self-refuting critiques of metaphysics.
According to these readings, Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault each purport to “unmask”
reason’s origin in power, myth, and contingency so as to undermine the authority of all rational
standards. However, as commentators note, such critiques manage in the end only to undermine
their own foundations since, by undermining the rational standards that ground all critique, they
of necessity also undermine the standards that ground their own critiques. For this reason, critics
often dismiss the work of Nietzsche, Horkheimer, and Foucault as little more than variations on
postmodern, absurdist philosophy.
As I have argued, however, attributing the project of an “unmasking” and “vitiating”
critique to Nietzsche does not accord with what Nietzsche actually says in his texts regarding his
“critical suspicion” of either metaphysics or a primordial truth. As I have demonstrated via a
close reading of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche’s philosophical project is to carry out a
critical suspicion of a primordial truth the purpose of which is neither to disprove the existence
of such a truth nor to prove its impossibility since both claims are in fact self-refuting. Rather,
Nietzsche’s initial aim, like that of the Pyrrhonian skeptics, is merely to advance enough
evidence so as to render the existence of a primordial truth indeterminate and to do so without
thereby lapsing into dogmatism himself. Significantly, it is upon the basis of this critical
suspicion that Nietzsche proceeds to suspend methodologically the metaphysical interpretation of
life. On Nietzsche’s account, philosophers take-up the metaphysical interpretation of life—and
thus the project of ascertaining the way the world really is—out of a desire to set their lives, as
well as those of others, in accord with the ultimate nature of things. Whether it is Socrates and
the Ancients, Augustine and the Medievalists, or Montaigne and the early Modernists, nearly
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every philosophical system purports to offer the essential insight into the true nature of reality
such that if one accepts its metaphysical system and the moral position that follows from it, then
one will live the best possible life. The reasoning behind this assumption is quite clear.
Philosophers generally assume that the singular motive driving all humans is the desire for
happiness.308 It seems to philosophers that it is the nature of human beings to pursue happiness as
the single end to which all other ends become a means. Thus, the fundamental questions of
human existence become, what is happiness and how do I achieve it? In this way, the entire
project of Western metaphysics for Nietzsche has been an attempt to avoid blundering on the
path to happiness. In other words, metaphysics has been an attempt to disclose the infallible
means to happiness. It is within this context that Nietzsche situates the all-important roles of
truth and reason to metaphysics. Reason can purportedly overcome the biases of our emotions
and senses so as to access that which is eternal and abiding. Thus, metaphysics is an attempt to
discern a primordial truth so as to secure an assured means to happiness. Fundamental to
metaphysics, then, is the assumption that there is a “right” way to live and that one can gain
insight into this path if one can understand the ultimate nature of things. In other words, the
fundamental logic operating at the core of every metaphysical system is the belief that the good
life is to accord with knowledge of reality and that the worse life is the one lived in ignorance of
truth.
This facet of metaphysics is most apparent in the case of Socrates as Nietzsche depicts it
in Twilight of the Idols. According to Nietzsche, the time of Socrates’ Athens was a period of
decadence and dissolution of the good life. The instincts had become unruly and anarchic. More
importantly, they were beginning to play the role of tyrants. An Athenian male out of sorts could
have just as easily been misled by an insatiable sexual appetite or addiction to alcohol as he
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could have been by obsessive greed for wealth and power. Moreover, it was held that unless
one’s appetites could be curbed, one was destined for failure or ruin. Thus, according to
Nietzsche, the sentiment of the time must have gone something like: “[If] the instincts want to
play tyrant, we must devise a counter-tyrant who is stronger.”309
Interestingly, though, given the way in which Nietzsche quite purposefully phrases the
problem of metaphysics, the question of a legitimate ruler for the instincts comes to the fore.
From the perspective of metaphysics, at least according to Nietzsche, not only can the instincts
not lead themselves, but they themselves are also the cause of a disastrous life. The instincts are
both fleeting and unquenchable. In the estimation of metaphysicians (of Socrates), the instincts
are neither permanent nor true, but are instead precisely expressions of impermanence and
opinion, and thereby a danger and a temptation to falter on the path to happiness. As Nietzsche
says:
The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of
emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or – be absurdly rational….
The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato downwards is pathologically conditioned:
likewise their estimation of dialectics. Reason = virtue = happiness means merely: one must
imitate Socrates and counter the dark desires by producing a permanent daylight – the daylight of
reason. One must be prudent, clear, bright at any cost: every yielding to the instincts, to the
unconscious, leads downwards…310

Thus, according to Nietzsche, we find in Socrates’ turn to reason both the counter-tyrant to the
instincts and the savior from décadence. Reason can discern the measure and standard by which
to determine the best course of action—or rather, how best to co-ordinate one’s instincts and
drives. Again, it is held by philosophers that the instincts are fleeting and impermanent, are
expressions of bias, preference, and opinion, and do not represent, or come from, anything
lasting and firm. Therefore, the instincts are disqualified as rightful measures according to
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metaphysicians. Rather, the ideal of an impartial judge is needed to put the instincts in accord
and to relegate each to its proper place; the instincts and drives need a legitimate and rightful
master, an unswerving standard by which to calculate an assured path to happiness and justice,
which, as the proper relation between things, amounts to the same thing.
It is precisely here, when the question of the legitimacy of a rightful ruler is raised, that
the connection between metaphysics and morality presents itself. Truth alone is the rightful ruler
since it alone is both certain and enduring—it is the ensured means to happiness. For
metaphysicians, opinion is not knowledge, and thus not certainty. Thus, that which issues from
bias and opinion can only ever be a false claim to authority. Philosophers dismiss all claims to
legitimate rule—those from the instincts, drives, desires, and emotions—except for those that
issue from a primordial truth itself, from an essential insight into the ultimate nature of things,
from a founding origin. Thus, for metaphysicians, reason alone is the rightful ruler over the
instincts since only reason can access the truth and provide the abiding and assured means to
happiness and keep us from falling upon the path of ruin. As an expression of truth—as the very
mouthpiece of truth—reason does not express its whims and fancies as do the instincts, but rather
employs an immutable standard derived from the ultimate nature of things to impose upon the
turbulent rabble that are the instincts. Again, latent deep within the project of metaphysics is the
belief that there is a way to order things properly, and that if this way is not characterized with
certainty, if this way does not issue as a decree from a true authority, i.e., that which is
undeniable, then calamity will strike.
In this way, the essential function of metaphysics, according to Nietzsche, is to ground
morality (as the assured means to happiness) in a primordial truth. In order to remain grounded
in the truth, one’s moral position must emanate from one’s understanding of reality since

170

otherwise one’s moral position is nothing more than an opinion, which is not only antithetical to
the project of metaphysics itself, but also lacks any binding force. The assumption here amongst
metaphysicians is that if a claim is merely someone’s opinion, then it is not a true authority and
thereby a danger. For metaphysicians, true authority is established strictly upon the foundation of
a primordial truth. All other claims to authority are always false claims, are merely instances of
ideology. Thus, if a moral position is an expression of opinion, then one need not accept it; if a
socio-political position is an instance of ideology, then it is illegitimate. In fact, one ought to be
wary of ideology according to metaphysicians. However, in the case of truth, something abiding
exists that cannot be dismissed—the truth is certain, and thus its authority is undeniable. If a
moral position is true, then it is an expression of the ultimate nature of reality; and, if it is an
expression of the ultimate nature of reality, then it applies universally to all people equally, and
therefore there is no escaping it. Thus, if the universal moral law is an expression of a universal
law of reality from which there is no escape, then one will be punished for breaking the law. In
other words, every moral demand is coupled with a reciprocal punishment. To disregard the truth
is to court disaster; it is to break the inherent laws of the universe for which one will be punished.
In this way, the very idea of a primordial truth assumed by metaphysics carries within it a sense
of causal necessity—disregarding the truth will make one miserable, will cause one to suffer. In
essence, the idea of a primordial truth carries within it the idea that one will be punished, and
ought to be punished, for disregarding the truth. We have two choices: either obey the truth and
be saved, or disregard the truth and take one’s chances in the hope of evading punishment and
misery. Thus, for metaphysics, the truth saves and deviation from the truth punishes.
As Nietzsche rightly identifies, the equation “reason = virtue = happiness” is the formula
of metaphysics. Here, it is presumed that only reason can transcend the senses, instincts, drives,
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and emotions, and can access the essential structures of reality, which alone can serve as the
basis for the proper ordering of our desires and the path to the good life: virtue is the proper
measure of desire that can put the instincts into accord, which is the sole path to happiness and
the best possible life. The truth will keep us from falling into error, which for metaphysicians is
the same as danger. This is the dream of metaphysical philosophy: reason as the mouthpiece of
truth is the rightful and legitimate ruler over the instincts and desire—reason is the tyrannical
master. For Nietzsche, all of metaphysics assumes this equation. Thus, from the perspective of
Wille zur Macht, Nietzsche ultimately regards metaphysics as a form of tyranny and domination.
Metaphysics is an attempt to justify the imposition of a moral position on others via an appeal to
a founding origin that establishes its normative position as an incontrovertible primordial truth—
that is, metaphysics, in assuming the value of truth, equates truth with legitimate authority.
Alternatively, having suspended methodologically the metaphysical interpretation of life,
Nietzsche draws the full consequences of this decision and accepts “untruth” as the basic
condition from which he will theorize about life. This means that, unlike metaphysics, neither the
values he affirms nor the principles he deploys in characterizing life stand as immutable truths,
but rather possess only a heuristic and hypothetical tenor. Thus, contrary to those critics who
read Wille zur Macht as a metaphysical principle, I have demonstrated that out of Nietzsche’s
methodological suspension of the metaphysico-philosophical moral impulse to accord with the
truth, and as an alternative to a primordial truth erected upon a founding origin, Wille zur Macht
is instead the fabrication of what I have termed a “post-metaphysical interpretative principle.” In
this way, Nietzsche’s deployments of Wille zur Macht are merely heuristic interpretations
explicitly put forward for the purpose of characterizing life in such a way so as to be able to
affirm life.
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Consequently, unlike metaphysical philosophies, we are under no theoretical compulsion
to employ Wille zur Macht as the one and only principle for interpreting life in our own
interpretations of life since only metaphysical philosophies maintain the exclusivity of a singular
interpretation of existence and Nietzsche has, once again, suspended methodologically the
assumptions of metaphysics. For this reason, there is nothing coercive about Nietzsche’s postmetaphysical philosophy of Wille zur Macht; no one has to accept it as true. Moreover, as a postmetaphysical philosopher, Nietzsche can affirm the existence of different and competing
interpretations of existence since he does not aim to present Wille zur Macht as the definitive,
and thus as the exclusive, theory of reality. In other words, as a post-metaphysical philosophy,
Nietzsche can advance Wille zur Macht as an interpretation of life in contradistinction to other
interpretations while nonetheless affirming and maintaining the difference between
interpretations—that is, without subsuming their differences under the identity of Wille zur
Macht. Thus, in suspending the metaphysical interpretation of life, Nietzsche brackets the
antagonistic and mutually exclusive characterizations of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Wille zur
Macht is not intended to stand in a position of legitimacy in relation to a field of illegitimate and
false contenders.
It is here in his methodological decision to suspend the metaphysical interpretation of life
and to experiment with fabricating a heuristic principle for interpreting life, Wille zur Macht, that
Nietzsche paves the way for conceptualizing post-metaphysical philosophy as a methodological
alternative to metaphysics. Since the fundamental principles underpinning metaphysics are to be
founded upon an incontrovertible insight into the essential structures of reality that establish
legitimate authority—and are thus to be regarded as immutable, universal, and necessary—then
Nietzsche’s work reveals that we can alternatively regard the commitments that orient post-
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metaphysical philosophies as reflexive, tentative, experimental, and dialogical. In this way,
Nietzsche’s work establishes the tenability of an experimental thinking and living—embodied in
post-metaphysical philosophy as a methodology—that circumvents the impulses to tyranny and
domination that he discerns in metaphysical philosophies. Post-metaphysical methodologies lay
no claim to the exclusivity of metaphysical legitimacy by which to denounce other positions as
“imposters.”
Similar to Nietzsche, Horkheimer advances dialectical materialism as a methodological
alternative to metaphysics. This means that Horkheimer, as a post-metaphysical philosopher, is
not engaged in the task of refuting metaphysics since the assertion of the impossibility of
metaphysics would only mire him more deeply in metaphysics. Thus, Horkheimer’s objections to
metaphysics are not refutations of metaphysics. Instead, they establish the methodological
commitments that orient dialectical materialism as a critical and social program. As was
discussed previously, Horkheimer objects to metaphysics for two reasons: 1) it prioritizes the
project of knowing another possibly illusory realm over and above the project of ameliorating the
suffering and wretchedness of individuals in this world, and 2) it has, historically, been used as
an apparatus to justify the imposition of a particular group’s interests upon the social body as a
whole under the guise of universally binding obligations—that is, metaphysics has historically
served the purposes of domination. Thus, Horkheimer, like Nietzsche, ultimately equates
metaphysics with domination. For this reason, Horkheimer very clearly establishes dialectical
materialism as a post-metaphysical methodology that eschews the metaphysical ideals of
epistemic and normative certainty, and instead advances as a methodological commitment the
historically contextual character of both the knowing subject and the object known as well as
changing the concrete conditions under which humans suffer as a socio-political project without
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need of justification. Horkheimer’s refusal either to posit the metaphysical ideal of absolute
knowing or to provide a metaphysical foundation for critique stands as the greatest triumph of
his early work. Horkheimer refuses to accept the false dilemma that one must either hold a
metaphysical standard of epistemic certainty or be a relativist, and takes great pains to present
dialectical materialism as a metaphysical, epistemic, and normative alternative. Similarly,
Horkheimer is aware that if he were to provide a metaphysical foundation for normativity, he
would simply erect another system of domination; he would participate in the strategy of
securing a foundation for his socio-political program that would establish its exclusive
legitimacy such that he could denounce all other positions as illegitimate. Thus, Horkheimer
recognizes that to circumvent metaphysics is to circumvent the need to provide an absolute
justification for one’s normative position via an appeal to a primordial truth founded upon a
metaphysical philosophy of either the world or the subject. In this way, Horkheimer’s early work
is paradigmatic of the reflexive, tentative, experimental, and dialogical tenor that characterize
post-metaphysical philosophy as a methodology. More importantly, Horkheimer explicitly casts
dialectical materialism in these terms.
As I argued, however, Horkheimer’s later analysis of reason in Eclipse of Reason is far
more problematic. Here, Horkheimer’s analysis veers towards the more totalized forms of
critique that his critics attribute to anti-metaphysical philosophies. Whereas Horkheimer
previously advocated the open dialectic of dialectical materialism and the alleviation of suffering
as reflexive and tentative commitments from within the methodological parameters of dialectical
materialism as a post-metaphysical philosophy, in Eclipse of Reason Horkheimer proceeds to
ground his critique of instrumental reason in the essential nature of reason itself, thereby falling
back into a metaphysical strategy of critique. According to Horkheimer, the project of reason has
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always been to establish human security and fulfillment through the domination of nature. On
this account, the history of the project of metaphysics is the story of the abstract ego dominating
and subjugating everything alien to it—impulses, desires, the body, and the world—so as to
more thoroughly dominate and command them. Horkheimer’s point is that the history of
metaphysics, as the history of the abstract ego, has been the story of the history of the
domination of nature both within and without the subject—that is, in order to guarantee the
purity of its conceptualizations, which are necessary for dominating nature without, the subject,
as the ego, must dominate the corrupting influences of nature, as desire, instinct, and passion,
within. Thus, according to Horkheimer, the very project of the domination of nature has always
necessarily included the project of the domination of man.311 However, under the nihilistic reign
of subjective reason, which was brought about through reason’s own destruction of metaphysics
via science, we dominate ourselves for no higher purpose than an ever greater, and yet aimless,
domination of nature, which reciprocally increases the domination of ourselves. Thus, according
to Horkheimer, rationality itself, as manifested in the abstract ego’s attempt to dominate nature
for the purpose of securing and propagating human individuality and freedom, essentially
transforms into an all-encompassing mechanism of aimless domination that brings about global
conformity and tyranny, i.e., the loss of individuality and freedom. We do not try to change the
world through metaphysical ideals, but rather adapt ourselves, our lives, to the world as it is
given.
According to Horkheimer, at the core of metaphysical conceptualizations is the logic of
identity—the attempt to fashion all-encompassing and totalizing concepts from which nothing
can escape and for which there is no remainder.312 The metaphysical ideal of epistemic
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conceptualizations is a perfect equivalence between concept and object. However, metaphysical
concepts presuppose both transhistorical unities that exist independently of the historical
contingencies of space and time, and a knowing subject that can overcome those historical
contingencies so as to access such transhistorical unities. In this way, Horkheimer couples the
birth of the metaphysical impulse with the genesis of the abstract ego—that is, the metaphysical
impulse, which employs the logic of identity, of necessity includes the ideal of an abstract ego
that can extricate itself from nature, both within and without, so as to conceptualize accurately
nature for the purpose of dominating and mastering it. Thus, at bottom, the metaphysical impulse
pits the abstract ego, as the basis of reason, against nature as if they were two distinct, and yet
somehow related, entities.
This division is, however, on Horkheimer’s account, the construction of a false
dichotomy between the abstract ego and nature. The principle of truth that is the very principle of
reason—the adequation of name and thing—reveals for Horkheimer the very impossibility of that
adequation. The very attempt to generate an adequation between concept and object reveals the
historically constituted nature of both objects and knowing subjects, which ultimately
undermines the very possibility of an identity between concept and object. This in turn reveals
that the knowing subject is not an abstract ego and that nature is not something wholly different
from us—in fact, the very problem is that the impetus to metaphysics leads reason to think that it
is somehow other than nature. Thus, the very principle of truth born from reason—the
adequation of name and thing—reveals that the project of metaphysics and the ideals of an
abstract ego and an independent nature, which have given birth to the modern forms of
domination, are impossible. In this way, by tracing our modern form of scientific thinking back
to its historical origins, to metaphysics and myth, Horkheimer claims to have disclosed the
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aberrant moment in history and thought at which reason derailed from its emancipatory
potential—namely, at the moment of the invention of a division between the abstract ego and
nature. Thus, in Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer confidently advocates non-identity thinking as
the corrective to our modern barbarism. Though the open and non-totalizing character of nonidentity thinking is, on the surface, different from the closed and total character of identity
thinking, it nonetheless serves in Horkheimer’s final thought the very same function he had
earlier in his career attributed to metaphysical philosophy—namely, an insight into the essential
structure of reality upon which one can establish the normative foundations for one’s life, albeit
in this case the insight reveals non-identity rather than identity. That non-identity thinking now
serves as a metaphysical origin for Horkheimer is evidenced both in his characterization of
identity thinking and in his claims regarding the new tasks of philosophy. First, because
Horkheimer considers non-identity true, he falls into designating identity thinking as false, the
division between the abstract ego and nature as an illusion, and the forms of domination at work
in 20th century as the result of an error that can be corrected only by returning to the truth, i.e.,
non-identity thinking. In the end, Horkheimer managed to fashion another absolute in the attempt
to undermine all absolutes, and for this reason succeeded in reestablishing what he had fought his
entire career to avoid: the tyranny of dogmatic metaphysics. But, in this case, it is the tyranny of
an anti-metaphysics committed to uprooting every identity in the name of an essential nonidentity at the heart of reason.
It is, here, against the backdrop of Horkheimer’s successes and failures as a postmetaphysical philosopher, that I have situated the work of Foucault. The alleged failures of
Foucault’s work—the purportedly opaque critical orientation of his genealogical method and his
refusal to provide conventional normative resources—when contrasted to the work of
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Horkheimer, actually mark considerable achievements for a post-metaphysical critical social
theory that aims to resist tyrannical and fascist forms of thinking and living. First, as my account
of Foucault’s work most importantly demonstrates, archaeology and genealogy begin explicitly
with the methodological decision to suspend belief in the existence of the self-identical and
immobile structures of history that are presupposed by metaphysics. Instead, both archaeology
and genealogy proceed upon the inverse theoretical basis that fabricated assemblages and
contingency constitute the basic ensembles of theoretical inquiry. This means that despite claims
to the contrary on the part of critics, Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies do not aim to
disclose the rupturing and fundamentally contingent nature of historical discourses so as to
“unmask” the universal and necessary claims of metaphysics as false. Rather, Foucault is quite
clear that his aim is to offer historical inquiries into the relationships between truth, power, and
the subject that refuse the metaphysical assumptions of essentialist and universal structures.
Thus, Foucault’s work is not a variant of anti-metaphysics.
Second, in methodologically suspending the presuppositions upon which metaphysical
history operates, Foucault likewise suspends the notions of a founding origin and a primordial
truth that are essential to metaphysics—that is, since Foucault suspends the existence of selfidentical and unified structures, nothing could thereby serve in his analyses as unalterable
foundations upon which to erect primordial truths. This means that from the very beginning
Foucault disavows methodologically the very notions of either a disinterested and neutral
account of history from nowhere or a complete and totalized conception of history that would
provide a singular and absolute account. Thus, again, despite critics’ claims to the contrary,
Foucault suspends methodologically any foundations that could serve to establish the antimetaphysical forms of history that his critics attribute to him—even the possibility of a
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foundation built upon an insight into the inherently contingent nature of things. For this reason,
rather than providing either a neutral or an anti-metaphysical account of history as contingency,
Foucault tells us that:
Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value
but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and
to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this
criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is
genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological—and not
transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all
knowledge [conaissance] or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique
will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is
impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made
us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It
is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to
give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. 313

Foucault does not feign to provide either an anti-metaphysics grounded in the true nature of
reality as contingency or disinterested and value-neutral historiographies. Like Horkheimer,
Foucault establishes via a methodological decision the commitments that orient his inquiries—
Foucault asks: In what ways can suspending the assumptions of metaphysics, and assuming an
ontology of contingency, instead enable us to reconceive and thus transform ourselves? Thus,
Foucault is clear that the purpose of his archaeological and genealogical inquiries is not to
unmask as false the philosophical narratives of essentialism and humanism; they are instead
heuristics for transforming our lives—our relations to our selves, our relations to others, and our
relations to the world.
More specifically, Foucault’s historical inquiries examine “regimes of truth,” the
interpenetrating relationship of truth, power, and the subject. According to Foucault’s historical
accounts, every regime of truth induces of effects of power that act on and shape subjects and
relations of power are deployed in accordance with procedures and objectives established via a

Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 3: Ethics, ed. Paul
Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp. 315-316.
313

180

coherent system of knowledge. Foucault details the ways in which the observation of
individuals’ conduct allows for the accumulation of data about them that transforms individuals
into cases that can described, measured, and compared. Significantly, the scientific discourses
built upon this data produce truths about individuals that then function as the norm—that is, we
can plot statistical trends on a graph concerning a variety of forms of behavior. This knowledge
serves as a basis by which to both identify individuals who are aberrant as well as for
formulating techniques for correcting their deviant behavior. Thus, for Foucault, regimes of truth
serve as mechanisms of normalization and, significantly, these mechanisms of normalization
operate through individuals’ internalization of the norms produced from scientific discourse, i.e.,
subjectivation. Moreover, every society has its regimes of truth—that is, “the ensemble of rules
according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to
the true.”314 For this reason, Foucault investigates a plurality of regimes of truth that create
subjects of sexuality, gender, law, delinquency, medicine, etc., and that all have the effect of
normalizing and abnormalizing, including and excluding, and producing both social subjects and
social practices.
Foucault’s historical inquiries into regimes of truth, and the practices normalization and
subjectivation that are attached to them, brings us to the question of the place of normativity and
critique in Foucault. Foucault’s critics claim either that genealogy undermines any position from
which to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate instances of power or that Foucault
fails to offer any normative resources for determining how we might proceed to move from
social arrangements of more domination to less domination—or, some variations on these.
Foucault’s critics hold that both truth and freedom are essential conditions for critique. However,
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Foucault’s critics employ a conception of critique that operates upon the theoretical and
methodological assumption that domination is always some form of infidelity to, and distortion
of, the truth since power is only legitimate when it is coupled with truth; moreover, upon this
assumption, liberation from domination must entail a free subject capable of emancipating itself
from the corrupting influences of illegitimate power so as to bring itself back into accord with
truth. Thus, for Foucault’s critics, critique, as resistance to domination, must be grounded in a
truth accessible to a free subject, which is alone capable of establishing a privileged position
from which to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate instances of power, and from
which to orchestrate and arrange non-dominating social practices. Given the methodological
commitments of genealogy, however, Foucault would of necessity have to repudiate
conventional notions of normativity and critique. And, Foucault explicitly does so:
[The] question is no longer through what error, illusion, oversight, or illegitimacy has knowledge
come to induce effects of domination…The question instead would be: …In what way can the
effects of coercion characteristic of these positivities [these regimes of truth] not be dissipated by a
return to the legitimate destination of knowledge and by a reflection on the transcendental or semitranscendental that fixes them, but how can they instead by reversed or released from within a
concrete strategic field, this concrete strategic field that induced them. 315

In other words, practices of normalization and subjectivation are not, on Foucault’s account, the
result of power relations that have come uncoupled from truth. Normalization and subjectivation
are not aberrant practices. They are not to be “corrected” via a return to truth, which is supposed
to establish legitimate and correct practices. Thus, critique and resistance are not going to be, for
Foucault, either an “escape” from domination or distortion, or a “return” to some privileged
position or founding origin. If one accepts Foucault’s genealogical method and his analyses of
power/knowledge, then there are no primordial truths or founding origins to which we could
either appeal or to which we might return. Secondly, given the methodological commitments of
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genealogy, truths and the discursive regimes that produce them are historically contingent and
thus could never establish the universal and necessary legitimacy that Foucault’s critics demand
of normative resources. And, lastly, every primordial truth, of which a conventional normative
principle would have to be classified, is going to induce effects of power that normalize and
subjectivize according to Foucault’s analyses.
So, for Foucault, if—and note that I use the conditional—the goal is to evade or resist
mechanisms of normalization and subjectivation, then the only thing that an appeal to a
conventional normative principle of critique is going to achieve is to introduce new forms of
normalization and subjectivation since every principle of normative critique is itself an appeal to
a primordial truth and a founding origin—that is, one is precisely going to establish a new
regime of truth in order to justify one’s normative principle. Thus, as I have demonstrated,
genealogy as a post-metaphysical methodology precludes conventional normative resources; it
demands an alternative conception of critique. By locating critique in individual’s and group’s
“refusal to be governed,” Foucault offers such an alternative. This is why Foucault characterizes
critique as “the art of voluntary insubordination.” The impetus for political resistance is not the
possession of truth, but the refusal to continue participating in social practices that one has come
to find intolerable. Only metaphysics demands a “reason” to resist. Only metaphysics demands
that one do nothing for fear that one’s resistance is illegitimate. Metaphysics is, as Horkheimer
notes, a tendency to inaction. Thus, in aiming political resistance at the “games of truth” that
make us into what we are, Foucault provides a post-metaphysical method for altering the
conditions that make us into something that we would rather not be. The very aims and
commitments of genealogy as a method demand that we re-conceive our relation to
normativity—thus, Foucault insists on the experimental, undefined, and dialogical in his later
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works, which emphasizes the tentative, open and reversible nature of the commitments of
genealogy in contradistinction to those of metaphysics. The demand on the part of critics that
Foucault provide either a principle by which to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
practices, a program for political action, or a reason to resist and struggle is ultimately a demand
that Foucault violate the methodological parameters he established for himself, that Foucault
return to metaphysics.
In the end, I have demonstrated, contrary to those commentators of Nietzsche,
Horkheimer, and Foucault who regard their work as forms of self-refuting metaphysics, that their
work is instead a coherent form of post-metaphysical philosophy. As post-metaphysical
philosophies, their tenability rests in their methodological suspension of metaphysical
assumptions. This means that the theoretical commitments that orient their critical inquiries do
not claim the status of incontrovertible truths regarding the immutable structures of reality, but
are instead the result of a reflexive and tentative methodological decision. Furthermore, I
demonstrated that post-metaphysical philosophies, having suspended methodologically the
assumptions of metaphysics, must advance alternative normative resources to those typically
advanced by metaphysical philosophies. Thus, where Horkheimer’s appeal to non-identity
ultimately lapses into metaphysics, Foucault’s notions of the art of voluntary insubordination, the
aesthetics of existence, and the undefined work of freedom, mark considerable advances for
post-metaphysical critical social theories that aim to circumvent mechanisms of domination and
the tendencies to tyranny and fascism that produce them.
My dissertation, nonetheless, raises several important questions for further analysis: how
might post-metaphysical philosophies arbitrate epistemic and normative conflicts? To what
forms of epistemology and ontology are post-metaphysical philosophies committed? As
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heuristics, how are post-metaphysical philosophies different from pragmatism? How else might
we conceive of post-metaphysical philosophy? Despite these questions, the import of my
dissertation ultimately rests in demonstrating that there exists a coherent philosophical position
outside of the theoretical blackmail of being either for or against metaphysics. Whereas both
metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophies purport to begin with universal and necessary
principles, post-metaphysical philosophies proceed instead from a methodological commitment
to maintain a reflexive, tentative, experimental, and dialogical relation to the principles that
orient their inquiries. Thus, the uniqueness of post-metaphysical critical social theories lies in
their openness and dialogical relationship to both their own commitments as well as those of
other forms of inquiry, an asset to any form of philosophy aiming to mitigate domination,
exploitation, and oppression.
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